Central Asia: Foundations of Change

by

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Ambassador Leon B. Poullada

In memoriam

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THIS BOOK IS AN EXPANDED version of the Leon B. Poullada Memorial Lectures that I delivered at Princeton University in the spring of 1993. I am grateful to the Poullada family for supporting the lecture series and the publication of this book. I am also grateful to the Program in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, and especially to Professor L. Carl Brown, for inviting me to give the lectures.

I like to think that Ambassador Poullada would have enjoyed this book and the lectures that served as its basis. I first met him in Afghanistan in 1968 when I was a recent college graduate on a Fulbright, trying to decide whether to accept appointment to the Foreign Service or go on to graduate school. At the time, Ambassador Poullada was retired from the Foreign Service and had returned to Afghanistan to do research for his doctoral dissertation on the reformist administration of the Afghan amir, Aman Allah Khan. Ambassador Poullada's love for his subject and for Afghanistan was infectious and remains an indelible memory for me. It is with profound admiration for the man and his life that I dedicate this book to him.

* * * * * * *

Obligations accumulate in scholarship and as time passes one sometimes forgets how much is owed to colleagues who may not have been directly involved in a project but who, over time, offered advice, helped develop ideas, and were unstinting in sharing materials. I owe particular thanks to friends and colleagues in Tashkent at the Institutes of Oriental Studies and History of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences and at Tashkent State University. During two visits there, in the 1970s and 1980s, I enjoyed the thoughtful

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

TRANSLITERATION—THAT IS, the substitution of letters in one alphabet for those from another—is an exercise fraught with pitfalls and nowhere more so than when dealing with an area like Central Asia, where textual sources are often found in more than one alphabet, with Arabic, Latin, and Cyrillic being the most common for the period covered by this book. Technical transliteration, that is the careful differentiation by the use of diacritics of letters for which only a single letter might exist in the Latin alphabet (for example, the ذ ز ظ ض, which are all pronounced as "z"), is of little if any use to the non-specialist who does not know the source language. Nor is transliteration important to the specialist, who knows the language and its alphabet and, in most cases, doesn't need the transliteration to know what word is being reproduced. Only in cases of unusual names and terms or an unusual spelling of a common term does the specialist require technical transliteration. To address the interests of as many readers as possible, I have omitted almost all diacritics from the text. The exceptions are the hamza (') and the 'ayn ('). I include diacritics, however, in the Glossary and in the Index.

For the spelling of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish words, I have followed the system used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*; for Russian, the Library of Congress system.

MAPS



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

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

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Shrine Location

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Shrine Location

- Mazar-i Sharif ('Ali b. Abi Talib)
- Old Urganch (Najm al-Din Kubra)
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INTRODUCTION

CENTRAL ASIA[1] IS A REGION where history has left an oversized footprint. In the Western imagination and therefore in the Western record of human events, Central Asia occupies a place disproportionate to its resources, population, and territory. From Herodotus on, historians have provided rich and dramatic accounts of events occurring on the Central Asian stage. World interest in the region has been mainly due to its geographical position at the intersection of the overland lines of communication, which for millennia have linked the great riparian civilizations of India, China, and the Middle East. Ideas, people, and goods moving between those civilizations have left their marks on Central Asia. Those same lines of communication also gave nomadic peoples from the Altai and southern Siberia access to the region, and they brought their cultures as well.

The history of Central Asia is a product of its geography. Its story, past and present, is a record of the ebb and flow of ideas and peoples along the routes linking South Asia with the Mediterranean and China, with political rather than cultural events holding a tighter grip on the historical imagination. For historians, certain moments in the past have come to epitomize the crux of the region's story. These were moments when disjunctions occurred in the political life of the region or when the flow of ideas and peoples seemed to culminate in a major shift in cultural orientation. A classic instance of the former case is the Mongol invasion in the early thirteenth century A.D. Instances of the latter case include the Alexandrine conquests of the fourth century B.C. and the Arab conquests of the early eighth century A.D. More recently, the Russian conquests of the nineteenth century and their aftermath—notably the political and cultural transformations started by the Marxist-Leninist revolution of 1917—may be viewed as such a moment of disjunction comparable in its effects to the Mongol invasion.

Such moments are conventionally referred to as "turning points," times when the cultural orientation of a society seems to undergo radical and long-lasting change. Sometimes these are moments redolent with historic significance—for example, the Arab victory over a Chinese army in July of 751 along the Talas River in what is now eastern Kazakhstan. This event helped determine Central Asia's orientation to the west and the monotheistic traditions of the Middle East rather than eastward to the Confucian tradition. (As legend has it, this was also the moment when the technology of paper manufacturing was transferred from China to the Middle East.) Another singular moment was the Muslim massacre of Chingiz Khan's merchants at Utrar in 1218, which triggered the Mongol conquest of most of Islamdom and traumatized the Middle East for centuries thereafter. Sometimes a period, a reign, or an entire dynastic era is identified as such a turning point.

If interpreted from the perspective of "events" and "turning points," the last decade of the twentieth century may eventually be viewed as a time of significance comparable to the Russian conquest of the nineteenth century or the arrival of Islam in the eighth century. The decade began in 1991 when the Soviet Union, against all expectations and predictions, was dissolved into its component parts —the individual soviet republics and autonomous republics and regions. Simultaneously, the Communist Party, which had maintained firm control for seventy years of most of what we know as Central Asia and had held an exclusive grip on the machinery of government and the political process, appeared to vanish (at least its name was suppressed), although it left a legacy of leadership (as did Chingiz Khan) at least in the short run. The party's universalist, multiethnic, and unitary message disappeared under a torrent of nationalist and ethnic sentiment, a wave that had already swept other parts of the Soviet imperium.

With the dissolution of the union, the five Central Asian Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) found themselves thrust from a state of secure, if paternalistic, political and economic dependence into the insecure and unpredictable condition of political and social, if not economic independence. (Northern Afghanistan has undergone a comparably disjunctive but quite different political evolution since the late

1970s.) The transformation was unexpected and traumatic. From a politically quiet and submissive role within the former Soviet Union, each of the republics was, without warning or preparation, forced to assume full responsibility for political organization, economic policies, and the well-being of its citizens. Until the Gorbachev Era, the republics enjoyed little control over their own resources. These resources—natural, labor, and intellectual—were understood to be at the disposal of the union as a whole. Conversely, though not without controversy, the union as a whole took responsibility for the welfare of all its members, transferring resources from better-endowed to less well-endowed regions.

The Soviet Central Asian republics, predominantly if nominally Muslim, had long been characterized by Western experts as the Achilles heel of the Russian-dominated U.S.S.R. and a likely source of future revolution and resistance to Russian hegemony. Moscow, however, surprised everyone by voluntarily giving the region its political freedom and leaving it to cope as best it could with its future. At the time of this surrender of political authority, certain widespread assumptions probably made a non-violent separation possible. First, it was to be hoped that the Central Asian republics would preserve their multiethnic or multinational character and that "friendship of the peoples" would prove to be more than just a slogan. Second, it was assumed that these Muslim republics were so thoroughly secularized from exposure to generations of Soviet education and culture that the kind of reaction against Western institutions that Iran had displayed (and seemed to be a fact of public life in Egypt, Algeria, and Pakistan as well) would not arise in the formerly Soviet part of Central Asia and so threaten the nearly ten million non-Muslim Russians and others who called the region home.

When the separation occurred, there was agreement among the Central Asian republics (with the exception of Turkmenistan) that an ongoing association would be valuable if not inevitable, and so they formed a voluntary confederal structure, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to cope with the common needs of border defense, disposition of nuclear weapons, and regulation of trade.

The independence celebrated by the Central Asian republics was not, as others have noted, hard-won. Nor has it yet produced the kinds of myths other countries use to celebrate their nationhood.

Certain symbols of the past were abolished or transformed (e.g., the name of the Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist street and town names, and the Soviet flag) and new symbols adopted in their stead (e.g., new flags, new or revived toponyms, new anthems, new constitutions). But the change was, and is, largely cosmetic and the form and ideology of the old symbols remain. While the name of the Communist Party disappeared, its leaders and members did not. Old cadres adopted new names, especially in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Those who formerly hewed to the party line became the new voices of "democratization," though economic, political, and social structures remained more or less intact, albeit now with no visible Muscovite hand in the background to organize, legitimize, and help pay the bills. The ubiquitous public monuments to Marx or Lenin were replaced by public monuments to Timur; statues of Pushkin by those of Firdawsi. Ceremonies associated with Soviet symbols now occur in the presence of neo-Soviet symbols. Thus, when the president of Turkey, the late Türgüt Ozal, visited Tashkent in April of 1993, he performed the usual ceremonial wreath-laying at the foot of the statue of the fifteenth-century writer and politician, Mir 'Ali Shir Nawa'i (Navoi)—not at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, which would have been the case prior to September 1991. Symbolic substitution extends to place names, official protocol, flags, national anthems, and the designation of the language of the ethnic majority of the population as the "official" language.

Kyrgyzstan is a good example of the struggles each of the former republics has with its Soviet legacy. As part of the campaign to create a new constitution in which both the socialist past and the market economy of the future would be addressed, the president, Askar Akaev, vowed in a speech in the spring of 1993 that "Kyrgyzstan must be a country of proprietors and nothing short of private ownership can lead to a free economy."[2] But in the same speech he promised that the new constitution would stress "solidarity, equality and collectivism," social ideals that might seem to be at odds with some of the consequences and implications of private ownership.[3]

On 5 May 1993, the new constitution was ratified by Kyrgyzstan's legislature. Article 4 guarantees the right to private property

but restricts access to the country's natural resources. Article 16 is an unexceptional guarantee of human rights; however, the right to one's language is apparently not one of them. Kyrgyz is designated the official language although more than 13 percent of the population is Russian (and therefore generally not Kyrgyz-speaking). Furthermore, Russian news reports from Kyrgyzstan as well as Kazakhstan, the other early hope for a multiethnic society, underline the indignities the "non-ethnics" (i.e., non-Kyrgyz and non-Kazakhs: Russians, Uighurs, Tatars, and others) now face in the places where most of them were born and the pressure on them to emigrate.[4]

The initial euphoria of independence was short-lived. In varying degrees, social fault lines in Afghanistan and in the now-independent republics have widened in the absence of a strong national political structure. Political stability seems predicated on the degree to which the Soviet model (i.e., strong-man, one-party rule) can be reproduced. On one end of the spectrum, Afghanistan and Tajikistan appear politically fragile. On the other end are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Where central government appears weak, ethnic, class, and local identities take precedence over national interest.

In Tajikistan, for example, groups characterized as opposing the former Communist leadership briefly came to power in a coalition government in late 1991 but were purged in a coup that has since produced civil war, devastation in parts of the country, large numbers of refugees, and the emergence within the country of three regions antagonistic to each other. The first and most powerful is the political "North," an axis of political ties linking Khojent at the mouth of the Farghanah Valley in Tajikistan's far north with Kulab (Kulyab in the Russian transliteration), a town in the southeast.[5] The second region is the "South," which is a political alliance linking the towns of Garm and Vorukh in the north with the southern city of Kurgan Tepe (or Tyube) some seventy kilometers north of the Afghan border. The third region, once allied with the "southerners" in opposition to the old Communist Party factions, is the Badakhshan region in the Pamir Mountains in eastern Tajikistan. The Pamir region is home to Isma'ili Muslims (a sect of Islam that

maintains the continuance of the revelation through a living Imam, the Aga Khan). The Pamiris have long been geographically and politically isolated within Tajikistan.

The Khojent-Kulab axis represents the political establishment. The Communist Party leadership and the government positions controlled by the party have historically been monopolized by families from Khojent and Kulab. On the other hand, the Badakhshanis and those who associate themselves with the Garm-Kurgan Tepe axis have long seen themselves as economically and politically deprived by the Khojentis and so are alienated from the government.

Nevertheless, many other factors besides regionalism play a role in determining where the fault lines lie. Among these are: the definition of and adherence to an Islamic or "democratic" identity; the way in which the past is perceived, not just the Soviet past but the past in which the cities of Bukhara and Samarqand (both now in Uzbekistan) play leading roles; and the loyalties arising from membership in such ethnic groups as the various Uzbek tribes (e.g., the Ming, Keneges and Durman) that settled in the valleys of the region in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But certain other issues seem to be more destabilizing and characteristic of societies in a state of near-anarchy. For instance, the collapse of a center in Tajikistan has meant, as elsewhere, a governmental vacuum, where the rise of sociopathic elements like armed gangs are able to carve out niches of influence for themselves.

In Uzbekistan, opposition to the former party apparatus has been effectively silenced, and the press censorship of the pre-Gorbachev era reimposed; the former Communists have not so far allowed other political organizations to develop, as witnessed by Russian press reports indicating that the office of the chief prosecutor in Tashkent was busy after 1991 bringing charges of sedition and treason against such transient political associations as Birlik, Erk, and Majlis Milli.

In Turkmenistan, the authorities who were formerly the heads of the Communist Party have not been seriously challenged for control of the post-Soviet political structures; news media are still subject to censorship; and foreign (i.e., Russian) news organizations have

reported harassment and intimidation when they attempt to file reports critical of the regime.

Economically, the five former Soviet republics appear to be worse off than they were under the socialist system. From the standpoint of natural resources, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (in descending order) are least well-endowed. Even where there is abundant potential wealth in the form of oil and natural gas, there is as yet little evidence that the countries that have it, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, find it easy to exploit for the benefit of their citizens. The attitudes of government and the population about economic relations, i.e., how to transform the natural resources into goods and how to organize society to produce services, seem far more critical than the relative abundance of natural resources.

Certainly a catalyst for change is the country that occupies the southernmost region of Central Asia, Afghanistan. The Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in force in December 1979 and withdrew its last troops in February 1989. This period, during which the Soviet Union waged war against groups of Afghan guerrillas, is already being regarded as a historical "turning point" or "disjuncture," the time and place where the ideological underpinnings, economic and military strength, and political will of the Soviet Union were destroyed along with tens of thousands of its own young men. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, some argue, may indeed have been the prime catalyst in the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself and Russian withdrawal from the Baltic countries, from Eastern Europe, and from Central Asia.

With the independence of formerly Soviet Central Asia, whose culture and history link it much more closely to the Perso-Islamicate world than to the Russo-Christianate one that had dominated it for more than a century, new issues and new forces have arisen to challenge the Soviet legacy in Central Asia. Where the nationalities once briefly imagined themselves united against what Moscow represented, they now find themselves at odds with each other over scarce resources.

Central Asia is a region of more than 50 million people (see Table 1). This fact alone is significant, particularly in the context of the

new Commonwealth of Independent States. But the region's importance to the world beyond Russia and the CIS lies, as it always has, in Central Asia's commercially strategic position at the intersection of land routes that once linked all of Asia. The realization of plans for railways, highways, and petroways connecting the markets of Russia, India, Pakistan, China, and the Middle East, assumes that a politically stable Central Asia will evolve.

If the past offers one perspective on possible ways in which the region will find political and social equilibrium, the interpretation of that past can sometimes provide an understanding of how equilibrium, or what passes for stability, might be reached or at least find acceptance by the people of the region. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, the past offers a perspective on what constitutes social equilibrium or, in the phrase of the moment, "national reconciliation." If the past is any indication of the future, the struggle by the Afghans for the spoils of victory will not soon be over. But the country's history, at least, provides a realistic basis for assessing the prospects for social calm in both the short and long term.

* * * * * * *

The preceding sketch provides an "events" approach to interpreting Central Asia and understanding the significance of its recent past. What we know of the region is based on reports of events and on the interpretation of those events. We know much less about the realities (especially geographic and geopolitical) and processes (such as agriculture and local economies) from which events derive their importance. Events are unquestionably important indicators of social conditions, but they need to be considered against the backdrop of long-term realities and processes. For the purposes of this essay, the long-term covers the past five centuries. Over such a period of time, discernible patterns, themes, and enduring structures emerge. In what follows, I will identify the kinds of institutions that historians and writers of history believed best served the welfare of society and that may again provide solutions to today's needs.

In grappling with Central Asia's present, however, we must also account for perceptions of the past that guide and constrain human decisions today. Perception may not be all. Certainly permanent

TABLE 1:
THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONS AND THEIR POPULATIONS IN 1989

Region	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan	Northern Afghanistan
Date Established	1936	1936	1929	1925	1925	circa 1989?
Capital	Almaty	Bishkek	Dushanbe	Ashkhabad	Tashkent	Mazar-i Sharif
Population	16.5 million	4.3 million	5.1 million	3.5 million	19.8 million	1.6 million*
Ethnic Composition	Kazakhs: 40%	Kyrgyz: 52%	Tajiks: 62%	Turkmen: 72%	Uzbeks: 71%	N/A
	Russians: 38%	Russians: 22%	Uzbeks: 24%	Russians: 10%	Others: 12%	
	Others: 22%	Uzbeks: 13%	Russians: 8%	Uzbeks: 9%	Russians: 8%	
		Others: 13%	Others: 4%	Others: 6%	Tajiks: 5%	
			Tatars: 1%	Kazakhs: 3%	Kazakhs: 4%	
			Kirgiz: 1%			

Source: 1989 Soviet Census (except for Northern Afghanistan)

*Source: Afghan Demographic Studies, Central Statistics Office, Prime Ministry, Provisional Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Vol. II, February 1975. Population is based on the following Northern Provinces: Badakhshan, Takhar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, Badghis.

conditions of nature, such as the presence or absence of water, must be accounted for as partial determinants of human choice. But perception is what gives meaning and symbolic value to the actions of individuals. The meaning that attaches to an event or natural phenomenon is crucial for generating sympathetic feelings for objects, places, ideas, and forms of behavior. And such emotional attachment is often the resource to which individuals and groups appeal in order to mobilize human beings to act. Much of what is contained in the following chapters is an attempt to identify how phenomena appear to have been, and perhaps still are, perceived in this region and how people as a group and as individuals are mobilized for action.

Because of the existence of national borders, each of the Central Asian republics sees itself as a coherent polity with distinct national interests and policies. The world's news media also offer information about the region in national chunks. Afghanistan, for instance, is still represented to the world as a single national unit even though several of its regions now appear largely independent of one another. The country is further fractured by the divisions among its main "parties," the numerous mujahidin groups. These parties have earned a degree of political legitimacy by having fought a fourteen-year war, first against a Soviet-backed government and then against Soviet occupation of the country.

Tajikistan, after Afghanistan the most politically fragile of the countries, appears to be increasingly drawn into the orbit of the government of Uzbekistan. With little resembling a coherent and distinctive national past, at least within its present borders, Tajikistan, nevertheless, is today a national entity.

Perceptions limit the policy choices available to the governments of Central Asia. Yet nature, history and culture offer persuasive grounds for seeing the region as a cultural whole, bound together by shared natural resources, by a common history, and by a common Turkified Perso-Islamicate culture that has produced artists, poets, statesmen, and warriors of renown over the centuries. But national identity, the psychological borders within which individuals define themselves, is a powerful force offsetting what might seem to be economically and culturally beneficial transnational institutions.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has, by all accounts, heightened rather than defused national sensitivities. A process of nationalizing the republics through increased out-migration of non-indigenous groups was already well underway before the breakup. For instance in the decade before independence there was an absolute decline in the Russian populations of three of the five republics—Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.[6] And while the Russian population of Central Asia as a whole increased by more than 50 percent between 1959 and 1989, it fell from 27 percent to 19.4 percent of the total population during that time. Over the past three decades the eponymous group in each of the republics has increased the percentage of its population substantially. In other words, population trends have long since been pointing away from diversity and cultural heterogeneity towards national dominance in the homeland.

But as the Tajiks have discovered and the Afghans have long known, national identity is no protection against civil strife. Nationalism can be a source of hostility and conflict as well as solidarity. Even when the parties share the same national identity, there is no guarantee against internal division, hatred, and vindictiveness. Afghanistan and Tajikistan show the power of religion as a badge of self-identity: as professed believers versus a world of unbelievers and as professed believers of one brand of religion versus professed believers of another. Afghanistan also exemplifies the continuing power of tribal loyalty and tribal identity combined with the articulation of strong sectarian differences, and shows how powerful these are as motivators of human action.

But this kind of information about Central Asia contains too much of the immediate past and not enough of the long term. We rely on, and tend to be influenced by, those sources of information most accessible to us—especially newspapers, magazines, radio and television. The stories they tell of economic crises and political maneuverings are inevitably short-term and grounded in the here and now. The nature of journalistic reporting tends to hide any traces of an underlying order and to treat casually, if at all, the embedded institutions, the structures to which people refer when seeking order amidst the apparent disorder around them.

In the following chapters I shall refer to the situation in Central Asia today in the context of some of these structures and institutions. Understanding the nature and evolution of the more durable structures, and ways of thinking about them, will, I believe, help clarify why contests are being waged today. I shall also discuss these structures and institutions within the context of four general themes—geographical/spatial; economic; social; and political. Each of the four overlaps and mingles with the other three, and I have chosen one or two special sub-themes—characteristic institutions or modes of thinking and acting that I believe are particularly telling—as a way of describing each one separately. In the case of the geographical/spatial, I am particularly interested in the way in which space has been imagined and how the imagining gives primacy to certain aspects of the populated landscape. In economic organization, the subject of the acquisition and preservation of wealth, in particular land and the permanent structures man erects on the land, seem particularly apropos for the transition from the Soviet socialist system of property ownership to a so-called market economy system. For the social context, the organizational aspects and social meaning of Islamic shrines and the families associated with them are of particular interest to me. In terms of today's transition from a system of privilege based on membership in the Communist Party or as an industrial or farm worker to an as yet unarticulated system of privilege in which ascribed status as well as earned status (through the dictates of the market) will probably play an important role, the families associated with Islamic shrines seem an obvious subject of study. Finally, for the political context, I will examine the intertwined issues of law, leadership, and legitimacy.

* * * * * * *

A region as large as Central Asia with a history as rich and multifaceted as any other region of the world resists easy generalization. One can look at the landscape, identify the most visible prominences, and then try to assess their significance in the larger context. The outcome, although never wholly satisfactory either to the writer or the reader, may lead, in irritation if not inspiration, to others applying their own skills and experience to the problems posed.

CHAPTER ONE

A Region in Transition: Central Asia Imagined

THE VARIOUS NAMES UNDER which this particular region of the Asian continent has been known to the Western world—Central Asia, Inner Asia, the Silk Road, Trans-Oxiana, Turkestan—all evoke certain images in the mind of the reader. Many imaginations have been at work generating these images, the imaginations of residents of the region as well as visitors from other cultures and civilizations. The record of the ways in which people have envisioned Central Asia is vast and rich in its variety. But even a casual survey of the enormous historical literature on Central Asia finds that the ways of viewing and recording the past are not infinite. Certain themes and approaches stand out. I have selected here a few of the more commonly found ways in which the region has been viewed in the past and at present.

THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION

One enduring and universal theme that threads its way in and out of the literature about Central Asia is the theme of the sacred place, a geography of the transcendent in which a physical locale derives much of its meaning for society from its sacred associations.

In Central Asia, where influences from pastoralist societies mingle with urban agrarian ones, sacred geography has its own characteristics. Shrines, the imputed final resting places of saintly figures or relics, play a major role in imagining the landscape. Whereas in other cultures a cathedral, a temple, an idol, or the site of a vision or reincarnation might give the landscape religious meaning, in Central Asia it is almost invariably a tomb. Other religious sites—mosques and seminaries, for example—do not seem to have had the same hold on the imagination. The importance of the tomb shrine lies in its being a threshold or doorway to the spiritual world and to what lies beyond human experience. The shrine is most often, but not always, the burial place of a saint. It can also be the place where a saint was thought to have rested or set foot (analogous to or perhaps even imi-

tative of the rock within the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem from which the Prophet Muhammad began his miraculous night journey to heaven). In rarer cases, it could be a place where a relic is preserved. In Central Asian Islam, the most precious relics are the cloak of the Prophet and the Prophet's hair.

The sacred nature of the landscape can be deduced in part from its toponymy. In pre-modern writings, we often find the names of cities and large towns in Central Asia sacralized with unique epithets that identify their spiritual heritage. For example, the city of Balkh has for a millennium been known as "the cupola of Islam." Bukhara's epithet in the premodern period was "the spiritually noble." Sometimes a place name is simply a particularization of a generic term. The name of the city of Mazar-i Sharif, for instance, literally means "the noble shrine." In eastern Iran, Mashhad is a contraction of Mashhad-i Tus, "the shrine of Tus." Hundreds of village toponyms in Central Asia begin with the term *ziyarat* or *ziyaratgah*, meaning "the shrine of" someone. Other common toponyms are Sayyidan (the *sayyids*) or Sayyidabad ("the abode of sayyids"), which refer to the fact that sayyids (the term for lineal descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) are associated in some way with the place.[1] In the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, these names endured through the Soviet period. The religious meaning of some was transparent even to non-Muslim citizens—*ziyaratgah* or *mazar*, for example. Others had religious origins but could be glossed with secular meanings. For example, about two and a half percent of all villages in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have the word *khwajah* as part of their names.[2] Although the Soviet author who surveyed the frequency of the term as it occurred in toponyms gives its secular meanings,[3] she was probably well aware, though she does not mention it, of its religious resonance as a term by which members of Central Asian Sufi orders, the Naqshbandi in particular, were known and as a general term for holy men. When used as a local toponym, it probably derives from the religious sense and refers to a local saint and his shrine.

Other toponyms are not so readily evocative and often carry only local religious significance. The term *langar*, for example, appears to

have been used in Tajikistan in the compound form Langar-i Shah and Langar-i 'Ali to denote the grave of a saint. In both cases, there is probably a linking of the site to the fourth caliph and first imam, 'Ali b. Abi Talib. The term *shah*, an abbreviated form of *shah-i mardan* ("lord of men"), is a common epithet for him.[4]

Beyond assumptions made on the basis of toponyms and their meanings, we know from the extensive geographical material, which has come down to us from medieval times, that the sacred and spiritual associations of a place deeply interested those writing about it, sometimes in surprising ways. The sacred aspect of a place and the meaning assigned to it by historians, geographers, travelers, and others vary considerably from writer to writer; still, the religious significance of a place can usually be found in some form or another well into the modern period, even when the spiritual aspect of a place has been eclipsed by other ideological concerns.

The early geographical literature on Central Asia is vast and has been fairly well surveyed.[5] I would here like to review a few of the better- and lesser-known writers in the post-Mongol period and their interpretations of the Central Asian landscape.

Probably the most famous Muslim traveler to Central Asia in the pre-modern period was Ibn Battuta, a Moroccan judge whose journeys took him through much of Asia in the second quarter of the fourteenth century. He passed through Central Asia in 1333, more than a hundred years after the Mongol conquests. Thirty years later, when he recalled this visit for the secretary who wrote down his recollection of these travels, Ibn Battuta balanced his memories of the region between the sacred and the mundane. His real or imagined encounters with powerful men form an important part of his memoirs, along with his own personal affairs—his finances, his sex life, and his health. But another part of great concern to him when he narrated his tale of travels many years afterwards was the religious condition of the region. In describing the state of theological studies at Bukhara at this time, he bemoaned the fact that "there is not one of its inhabitants today who possesses any theological learning or makes any attempt to acquire it."[6] His modern editor explains away this characteristic hyperbole as arising from the fact that

Bukhara was, prior to the Mongol conquests, one of the centers of Muslim theological scholarship. So one should perhaps conclude that Ibn Battuta, expecting something quite different, reacted with disappointment at what he found, or at least later only remembered a feeling of disappointment. Part of his mental map of a place was his foreknowledge of its sacred history, the tombs of its holy men, the centers where religious learning had been advanced, and the buildings—the mosques, mausoleums, hospices, and colleges—that were concrete testimony to the truth of Islamic revelation. When, as in the case of Bukhara, he found these in a condition that did not coincide with his expectations, he naturally lamented the fact. But it was not just the structures that concerned him. He, like other men who followed him and who had geographical imaginations dominated by religious landmarks, was concerned about the very soundness of his faith. To him, the condition of buildings and shrines attested to the vitality and durability of Islam. When its physical symbols were in poor repair, he worried about Islam's essential condition. In his travels, which took him from Bukhara to Samarqand via Qarshi, then to Tirmiz on the Amu River and finally to Balkh, he apparently found good reason at each place to worry about the state of Islam in Central Asia.

A later writer, the seventeenth-century geographer and historian Mahmud, the son of Amir Wali, provides another perspective on the sacred geography of Central Asia. He spent most of his life in the region, except for a lengthy pilgrim's tour of northern India from 1624 to 1631. On his return, the ruler of Balkh, Nazr Muhammad, commissioned him to write a world history beginning with Creation and culminating, as was the convention, with the history of his patron's family. In this work, *Bahr al-asrar fi manaqib al-akhyar*, Mahmud also included a gazetteer on the towns and cities of Central Asia.[7]

One of its entries is Andkhud, today known as Andkhoy, a town in the far northwest corner of present-day Afghanistan. Andkhud is not, and has never been, one of the great cities of Central Asia, but its history is long and illustrious. Mahmud's description of it is a good example of the geographical imagination of the time.

Information about the town covers three distinct subjects: (1) its situation in terms of physical distance and administrative status within the realm of Nazr Muhammad; (2) its resources and economy; and (3) its sacred features.

> Andkhud is one of the six cities of Balkh. It is in the fourth clime and is situated four stages west of Balkh. The Jayhun [Amu] River lies to its north. Seven farsangs west of it is a desert called Chul-i Zardak, which is midway between the territory of Balkh and the territory of Herat. Andkhud's climate tends to be hot. Its soil is sandy; its water is from a river flowing from the mountains of Gharzuwan and Gharjistan. Fine foodstuffs are grown in Andkhud, in particular melons and pomegranates, which are the best of all its produce. There is a village there called the Village of the Sayyids. All the inhabitants of that place are sayyids. Two thirds of the revenues of that district comprise an endowment [*waqf*] for their subsistence. Andkhud has a small citadel. Around the citadel are residential quarters, a market, mosques, a hospice [*khanaqah*], and a college. Among the saintly tombs of that place is the mausoleum of Ata Sangu Jan Baba on the northern side of the citadel. The mighty Amir Timur Gurgan [Tamerlane] won many victories thanks to the blessings he received from his holiness, the saint [Ata Sangu Jan Baba], as is recorded in the History of the Gurganis. Among the people of this region it is widely known that the citadel of this town, as a consequence of the spiritual power of the sayyids and Ata Sangu Jan Baba, appears to its enemies to stand as high as the clouds.
>
> The spiritual mentor and guide of the mighty Amir Timur, Sayyid Barakah, God preserve his soul, was one of the sayyids of Andkhud. . . . Today this town is part of the territory belonging to 'Abd al-'Aziz Sultan, the eldest son of His Highness [Nazr Muhammad]. His territory includes many villages and agricultural areas. Thanks to the justice of His Sultanic Highness, all is cultivated and flourishes.[8]

Here, mundane facts about Andkhud are mixed with what often appears as the central message: the holy men and sacred places asso-

ciated with the city. Andkhud had a special meaning in Central Asia because of Timur's associations with its holy men. According to some reports, the Gur-i Amir, the great Timurid mausoleum in Samarqand, was originally erected at Timur's command to house the remains of Sayyid Barakah. Eventually Timur was buried next to him and the shrine became a family mausoleum. The sayyid's descendants also played an important role in the religious and political life of the region in later times; one of them is connected with the rediscovery of the tomb of 'Ali at Balkh. The Ata Sangu Jan Baba mentioned by Mahmud b. Amir Wali was another Andkhudi who at one point crossed Timur's path.[9]

The influence of religious imagination on geographical writing remains strong into the modern period and appears in varying forms. In our own time, ways of imagining the landscape in sacred terms sometimes emerge in unexpected places. Part of the legacy of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, for example, has been the introduction of new styles and new patterns in carpet weaving. Using the basic geometric patterns long associated with Afghan carpets, weavers have introduced compelling contemporary images that contrast with or complement the sacred elements. These new images include stylized renderings of instruments of war (AK-47s, troop carriers, helicopter gunships and hand grenades), the motifs of the so-called tank carpets.

The jacket of this book shows one of these new-style carpets, a runner with an unusual rendering of the landscape as sacred space. The landscape represented here is the city of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. (Pl. 1 is a detail from this carpet.) The carpet depicts recognizable features of the city: residences climbing the mountains that divide the city or bridges crossing the Kabul River, which runs through its heart, and at least one of the mountains within the city limits. These images are enclosed by a border depicting symbols of the war that had become the principal reality of life in the 1980s. But given primacy of place, outsized, and centered in the carpet to symbolize perhaps the moral center of the universe, is a rendering of the Shah Du Shamshira Mosque, the mosque of the "Shah of Two Swords." The mosque is an interesting and probably not a casual

Pl. 1

choice. The actual mosque (now substantially destroyed by the post-Soviet fighting for control of the city) is believed to stand on the site of the very first mosque erected in Kabul. It also stands near the shrine of the Shah of Two Swords, identified with the legendary figure of Layth b. Qays b. 'Abbas, whose grandfather was an uncle of the Prophet Muhammad. In local lore, Layth fought the infidel (Hindus) with swords in both hands and was martyred and buried here.[10] The most recent mosque on the site was built in 1927[11] by the mother of the Afghan amir Aman Allah Khan (r. 1919–29), whose name is also entwined with the full independence of the country from the British in 1919. The image of the mosque on the carpet conveys both spirituality and resistance and symbolizes the ultimate triumph of Islam over the infidel. The carpet thus represents a way of viewing the landscape in terms that would not be unfamiliar to either the fourteenth-century traveler Ibn Battuta or the seventeenth-century historian Mahmud b. Amir Wali.

But we should not assume that this way of imagining the environment as sacred space and as evidence of the truth of one's religious convictions was by any means limited to Muslims who visited or resided in Central Asia. Non-Muslims, too, could and did project their sacred imaginings onto its landscape. One of the more interesting non-Muslim conceptions of Central Asia as sacred space is found in *Through Central Asia*, a travelogue and memoir written by an English doctor of divinity, Henry Lansdell, about his visit to the region in 1882.[12] Lansdell reveals himself and his geographic perspective in the very first sentence of his book: "When passing through Yekaterinberg in 1879, I heard of a people in the south, wandering about in so primitive a condition with their flocks and herds that, when among them, one might fancy himself on a visit to the Hebrew patriarchs."[13]

Lansdell's work begins with this Biblical backdrop and develops it throughout. His trip to Central Asia was funded, in fact, by the British and Foreign Bible Society, and his justification for the trip was that, since the society had until then been able to send the Scripture only to one or two of the towns of Central Asia, "it seemed to me that a general distribution of such literature would be

a blessing to the people, and remembering that according to Russian law no foreign missionaries may labour in the Empire, there appeared to be the greater reason, from my point of view, for spreading the written word where the spoken word could not go."[14] This mission in and of itself is not what makes the detailed record of his travels around Russian Central Asia so interesting. Rather, it is the context within which he places virtually every scene he observes, every incident that befalls him, and much else besides. Once he reaches Central Asia, nearly every page of his book contains a footnote in which he compares what he sees to a Biblical passage. Thus, about the Kyrgyz he writes,

> The Kirghese women I believe are never veiled closely, as with the Sarts, but they sometimes so far cover the face as almost to screen it from observation. This half and half plan seems to have prevailed amongst the women mentioned early in the Old Testament. Thus Abraham said to Sarah, 'Behold now I know that thou art a fair woman to look upon' (Gen. xii, 11) from which we may suppose that Sarah did not usually wear a veil; now Rebekah when at the well she met Abraham's servant, though when about to meet her future husband 'she took a veil and covered herself' (Gen. xxiv,16, 65).[15]

His transposition of the sights he saw in Central Asia into a Biblical setting is sometimes seamless. In referring to a recently elected Kyrgyz leader, he writes: "Nogay Bi, whom we saw elected chief of the district (volost) was reckoned a fairly rich man; but not like Nabal, who had 3,000 sheep and 1,000 goats (First Samuel xxv, 2) or Job, with 14,000 sheep, 6,000 camels, 2,000 oxen and 1,000 she-asses (Job xlii, 12)."[16]

Lansdell provides a great deal of information about the Kyrgyz, perhaps because he considered that they were living the life of the Biblical patriarchs. He apparently had no familiarity with the Qur'an or, if he did, preferred not to mention it. His Biblical imagination is consistent and pervasive. A description of a guardroom in the Bukharan citadel, the appointment of the sons of the Bukharan amir as governors with their regents, a commentary on the works of earlier English travelers to Bukhara, references to unfurnished

rooms, a description of official escorts, or the disposal of corpses after executions—everything is glossed with a Biblical reference regardless of the subject matter.

A visit to the shrine of Baha' al-Din Naqshband, the holiest shrine in the greater Bukhara region, elicited this observation: "I cannot say, however, that I expected the shrine and its surroundings to repay me for the trouble of the journey. What I really wanted was to visit the poor lepers."[17] His disappointment was as profound as Ibn Battuta's: Not only was Lansdell unable to visit the lepers, he was apparently denied the joy of even seeing one. In fact, he never makes it entirely clear whether there were lepers at Baha' al-Din's shrine, or whether it was simply his Biblical imagination that required them. Like Ibn Battuta, Lansdell found his religious expectations by no means fulfilled in Central Asia.

There is something refreshingly straightforward, however, about his way of perceiving Central Asia and its people. It was not at all inconsistent for writers who had preceded him to see the Central Asian landscape as peopled by sacred characters and embodying spiritual truths. But lest we attribute Lansdell's way of constructing Central Asia to another era and another religious sensibility, it is worth noting here the way in which Central Asia today still satisfies the religious imaginings and yearnings of non-Muslims. Since 1991, a number of fundamentalist Christian groups have sent missionaries to Central Asia to satisfy, as one participant put it, "the Uzbeks' hunger for the Word." An American visitor to Uzbekistan in 1993 reported that eighty evangelical Christian missionaries were working in the Farghanah Valley under the umbrella of an organization called the "Central Asian Free Exchange." Unlike Lansdell, however, they are no longer hindered by Russian laws against missionaries.[18]

THE ETHNIC IMAGINATION

Seeing the Central Asian landscape in spiritual terms has given way to some degree, at least in the twentieth century, to other meta-

physical constructs. In the 1920s, the Soviets introduced the idea of ethnogenesis to Central Asia; this was a way of imagining the landscape and its peoples that was not so far removed from the sacred-mindedness of Ibn Battuta, Mahmud b. Amir Wali, Henry Lansdell, and the latter-day Christian crusaders. From the Soviet perspective, the landscape was organized not by sacred places but by ethnic or national places, an ancient and inviolate association of a distinct people with a specific territory. This assertion of inviolability was a new way of endowing geography with meaning. Places were to be significant not because of the holy men who were born, lived, or were buried there but in terms of collective peoples who had originated and developed a language, culture, and history in that region. This imagined construct led in the 1920s to the formation of political entities called "republics" whose organizing principle was not religion but an artificial ethnicity.[19] Although there have been recurrent reorganizations of the jurisdictional subdivisions within the republics since the 1920s, the boundaries established then have remained more or less unchanged. The only major changes involved Tajikistan, which was originally formed as a subdivision of Uzbekistan in 1924 but which gained full republic status in 1929,[20] and Kazakhstan, which ceded some territory to Uzbekistan.[21]

Since late 1991, when the Soviet Union was dissolved and the non-Russian republics became independent, the Central Asian republic boundaries have gained international recognition. Because the borders are linked to an imagined ethnicity, they are increasingly perceived as inviolate, and this has heightened the sense of belonging felt by the eponymous ethnic group (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek). Conversely, the sense of alienation experienced by the ethnic minorities living within these borders has also intensified. Further, and as noted earlier, migration patterns during the past five years indicate that individuals tend to gravitate to what they understand to be their ethnic homeland. One explanation for the sacrosanct character of the borders is rooted in part in the public attention the Soviet Union always paid to its borders, particularly after the German military violated them in 1941 and the Soviet Union was unable to defend them. Recently, the portrayal by the local and

Russian press of incidents along the Afghan-Tajik border has awakened latent feelings of vulnerability that were a cultivated part of the Soviet national psyche.

This way of seeing and classifying the landscape, of delineating it along ethnic and linguistic grounds, has shown little concern for the logic of certain realities—the location of water supplies, for example, or the sites of the cultural monuments that people imagine belong to their heritage. A harbinger of the kinds of problems the borders are likely to create in future now that these ethnic subdivisions of the Soviet Union have been transformed into nation-states was an incident in the spring of 1989 involving two villages, Oktiabr (October) and Samarqandak, on the Tajik-Kyrgyz border. Tajikistan includes a northern salient some 230–250 kilometers long and 25 to 30 kilometers wide that thrusts in a generally northeast direction across the Farghanah Valley, where it adjoins the southwest quadrant of Kyrgyzstan, which resembles a somewhat distorted horseshoe, its open end facing west. The inside of the horseshoe is the Farghanah Valley, mostly Uzbekistan, except for its western end, which is the Tajikistan salient. The border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan here meanders down from the mountains into the valley and gives rise to the kind of problem that the two villages experienced. Map 2

> In April 1989, Tajik villagers from Oktiabr were prohibited by the Kirghiz village of Smarakandyk (Samarqandak) from taking sheep and cows to pasture in the mountains on the Kirghiz side of the border. In response, residents of Oktiabr used rocks to block the Matchoi (Matchah) Canal which runs through their territory and provides drinking and irrigation water for Smarakandyk [probably off the Isfara River.] The dispute simmered for three months before the canal was cleared following a series of high-level negotiations involving both Tadzhik Communist Party leader Makhamov and the chairman of the Kirghiz Council of Ministers, Dzumgulov.[22]

These negotiations occurred at a time when the Communist Party still had power and Moscow was still in a position to instruct the parties involved to reach a solution. Disputes over water are a feature

of political and economic life in any arid region of the world, and the dispute between the villages of Oktiabr and Samarqandak probably would have existed even without the complicating factor of an administrative border, let alone an international one. But the sudden transformation of republic borders into international boundaries in Central Asia today has meant the disappearance of an overarching arbitrator.

On the cultural front, the cities of Samarqand and Bukhara and all the literary and scientific achievements associated with them in history are viewed by Tajiks as belonging to their past and therefore an indispensable part of their heritage. The fact that both cities are inside Uzbekistan is a cause of considerable resentment for Tajiks, because there is no site of comparable symbolic value in Tajikistan. Moreover, given the great disparity in size and military strength between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, there is little that the Tajiks can do to satisfy longings produced by the ethnic imagination. Under the umbrella of the Soviet Union, the administrative borders had far less significance than they do now, when such disputes have a much greater potential for mobilizing the instruments of force of an entire nation against another.

CENTRAL ASIA AS METAPHOR: SILK ROAD AND GREAT GAME

Outside Central Asia, particularly in the West, other ways of imagining the region have taken root and flourished. One of these is Central Asia as the site of the Silk Road, or as it is often styled, "the fabled Silk Road." Another is imagining Central Asia as the arena for "the Great Game," a place where world superpowers compete for influence and advantage. Titles of articles from well-regarded journalistic sources provide convenient evidence of these ways of perceiving the region. *The New York Times* of 16 March 1993 contained an article entitled "New Finds Suggest Even Earlier Trade on Fabled Silk Road"; the article discusses recently-discovered evidence from Egyptian tombs indicating that silk was transported to Egypt much

earlier than scholars had previously thought. In the summer of 1992, *The Wilson Quarterly* carried a series of articles on Central Asia under the title "Land of the Great Silk Road." The articles themselves carried equally evocative titles: "Caravans and Conquests," "The Heavenly City of Samarkand," "Comrade Muslims," and "Turkestan Rising." And *The Economist* of 26 December, 1992 captured parts of both the Silk Road and the Great Game constructs in a headline: "The Silk Road Catches Fire." These titles strike familiar chords in Western readers and tap into a shared way of imagining the region.

The Silk Road perspective features the region as a critical segment of the cultural highway over which the civilizations of the East (China and India) and the West (Greece, Rome, Byzantium) exchanged goods and ideas. The "Silk Roader" perspective imagines not only a throughway between East and West but also a road with unlimited access for Central Asian contributions to world civilization. The art treasures found in Scythian tombs, the frescos of Panjikent, architectural monuments like Tamerlane's tomb and the Rigistan in Samarqand, the scientific contributions made by scholars like the geographer al-Balkhi, the polymaths al-Biruni and al-Khwarazmi, the mathematician-astronomer al-Kashi, as well as the patrons who supported them, such as Mahmud of Ghazni and Ulugh Beg of Samarqand—these are all adduced to show the independent contributions of Central Asia. The visual evidence endures and fuels the Silk Road imagination in an especially powerful way.

Also significant, though not to the same degree, in shaping modern conceptions of Central Asia is the metaphor that perceives the importance of the region primarily in the context of international superpower struggles, i.e., the "Great Game." The "Great Game" mentality goes back a long way in history but has its most resounding moments with the collision of Russian and British imperial interests in the nineteenth century. The British, consolidating their commercial and political interests in South Asia, grew increasingly apprehensive as Tsarist Russia, which had emerged as the superpower rival to Britain when the French disappeared from the scene early in the century, extended its authority southeastward into Central

Asia. The Russians were equally apprehensive of the British, who sent several commercial missions to Central Asia in the middle part of the century and, notwithstanding a disastrous military setback in Afghanistan in the early 1840s, continued to exert considerable influence over Afghan diplomatic and political affairs throughout the period.

The Anglo-Russian phase of the Great Game lasted for more than a hundred years. After the Second World War, an exhausted Britain finally dropped out of the contest. Her place was assumed by the United States, and the Game continued, now under the rubric of the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, Afghanistan was a central arena for the Game, with the former Soviet Union having absorbed Central Asia north of the Amu River and the United States having assumed the British role as protector of part of South Asia.

In the nineteenth century, the Great Game's score was reckoned in terms of treaties signed, subsidies given, and concessions won. In the mid-twentieth century, the score was kept in terms of influence acquired, which was apparently thought to arise in part from the financing of large public works projects. On the Afghan playing field, the United States constructed the main road from Qandahar to Herat, while the Soviets built the Salang Tunnel, which opened the north to year-round road traffic. The Americans staffed the agriculture faculty at the University of Kabul; the Soviets built the engineering school, the Polytechnic. The U.S. trained the Afghan airline pilots; the U.S.S.R. trained the military pilots. The Americans built a large dam on the Helmand River; the Soviets countered with a huge irrigation project in Jalalabad. The Soviet Union built Kabul Airport, and the U.S. responded with Qandahar Airport, which was intended, according to one story, as a refueling stop for American bombers in the event of war with the Soviet Union.[23]

In the Cold War era, the Great Game spawned a prominent scholarly subspecialty—what might be called "soft underbelly theory." Its proponents imagined Central Asia, historically a Muslim region, as the Achilles heel of the Soviet Union and a breeding ground of anti-Russian (and therefore anti-Communist) sentiment, which could ultimately be decisive in the collapse of the Russian

position in the Great Game. These theorists relied heavily on demographic and sociological information, especially that having to do with religious affiliation.[24] Demography indicated that the indigenous Central Asian peoples would eventually overwhelm their Russian masters with their superior fecundity. Since the peoples of Central Asia were Muslim in practice and belief and since Islam and Communism were incompatible systems, once Muslims gained the demographic advantage they would overthrow Communism, at least in the Muslim republics. But, as it turned out, Communism was discarded not by those thought to be Muslims but by the non-Muslims, and there is considerable evidence that the features of Communism that prevailed in the Soviet Union for the past seventy years (a one-party system, controlled information sources, a loyal and dependent bureaucracy) will continue to flourish in Islam-minded Central Asia.

Both ways of imagining Central Asia—as Silk Road or Great Game—provide a useful focus. But they now appear irrelevant as an explanation of the problems confronting the region. Environmental crises—for example, the effects of cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan and the shrinking of the Aral Sea—or domestic politics (the so-called ethnic issues, the intra-ethnic contests, one-party rule, and inter-regional struggles for power) are not easily explained in Silk Road or Great Game terms, except in the most tenuous fashion. Feeding the population and providing essential human services (health, education, social security) are all issues of universal significance for which neither the Silk Road nor the Great Game constructs seem to offer much in the way of a solution.

Other ways of interpreting the region seem to offer a better understanding of the problems. Social and cultural anthropology, for instance, appear to provide more versatile and edifying ways to imagine Central Asia than do the approaches of the Silk Road and the Great Game. Anthropologists are principally interested in how individuals and societies make sense of their environment and themselves through patterns of thought and behavior, shared symbols, and social organization—the latter including issues of equality and hierarchy, gender relations, and political authority. Although the region formerly known as Soviet Central Asia has rarely been

accessible to anthropologists (even to Soviet anthropologists), much good work has been done in Afghanistan, especially northern Afghanistan.[25]

CENTRAL ASIA IMAGINED GEOGRAPHICALLY

Another approach to Central Asia involves the venerable, if somewhat neglected, field of geography—whether physical, social, or political. Geographers seem less tied to the preconceptions and *idées fixes* of Great Gamers and Silk Roaders. They ask questions about man's relationship to the natural environment, about spatial distributions of human settlements and about the spaces and transitional zones between human settlements. Like anthropologists they raise universal questions that relate conditions in Central Asia to other parts of the world.

In the world imagined by classical and medieval geographers, Central Asia was situated in the fourth and fifth climes, climes being imaginary lateral bands stretching across the known inhabited world. The fourth clime, being the middle of the seven that comprised the system, was understood as a region of temperateness and moderation, and therefore particularly suited to human habitation. Now, technology has given us the means (and thus the frame of mind) to examine on a global scale as well as in minute detail the environment of Central Asia. Satellite and shuttle photography, in particular, have enabled geographers to imagine the region as seen from a point somewhere out in space and thus to understand in a fashion different from our predecessors the possibilities and the constraints human populations have faced and will continue to face as a consequence of terrestrial features.

What gives the region coherence is its landscape and the history
Pl. 2 that has unfolded on it. As viewed from space (pl. 2), a number of distinctive features appear that help us imagine Central Asia and the limitations on human activity in it. The Caspian Sea to the west and the Iranian deserts to the southwest pose natural, easily surmountable limits. More formidable are the Hindu Kush Mountains to the

south and southeast and the Tien Shan (Celestial Mountains) to the east and northeast (map 1). Central Asia from space appears wide open only to the north, bounded there by featureless, barrier-free steppe, stretching eastward from the Don and Volga basins. Each of the features visible from space help "frame" Central Asia in our imaginations and, rightly or wrongly, suggest limits, but also possibilities for human societies. Map 1

Within this frame, the vast majority of the surface area is desert lowland. From the Aral Sea south, that is, south of the steppe, more than three-quarters of all the land area is desert. Here are two great sand deserts, the Kara Kum (Black Sand), lying south of the Aral Sea between the Caspian and the Amu River; and the Kizil Kum (Red Sand), stretching from the Aral Sea to the Tien Shan. The mountain ranges are themselves nearly equally barren, but they are crucial to Central Asia's ability to sustain dense human populations and to generate agricultural surpluses because they contain enormous and accessible reserves of water. The annual snowpack and permanent glaciers in the higher elevations have provided a reliable and steady source of water to the lowland oases for millennia. Overall, the region receives less than 25 cm of rainfall a year, and even this amount is very unevenly distributed. Winter rain briefly transforms foothill landscapes from barren, brown, treeless slopes to velvety green undulations. But the verdancy passes quickly and generally only sustains brief seasonal pasturage. In certain areas, it is possible to grow cereal grains in the valleys and on the lower slopes of the mountains without irrigation (pl. 3), but fruits and vegetables and commodity crops like cotton require it. Pl. 3

Mountains and Rivers

The mountains supply the water for two major river systems and several large secondary ones. These, in turn, have been for centuries the basis of large-scale irrigation systems and thus of human civilization. At the northeast end of the Tien Shan range is the Jungarian Gate, which divides Inner Asia from Central Asia (map 3). The Jungarian Gate is a narrow slot separating the Mongolian Tarbagatai Map 3

Mountains, the western end of the Altai range, from the Tien Shan. This corridor has historically given access to the oases of Central Asia for the caravan trade and for Inner Asian people on the move—people like the Huns and the Mongols. The Tien Shan range, which extends southwestward for some 2,500 kilometers, with peaks ranging up to 7,439 meters (Pobeda Peak), forms the border today between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and China. For our purposes, its role as a border is less significant than the fact that it contains more than 10,000 square kilometers of glacier, a vast store of fresh water.[26]

The Tien Shan terminates in the south in the Pamir Knot, which covers the Gorno-Badakhshan region of present-day Tajikistan and has many peaks over 6,000 meters high. The Pamir Knot is a huge hub from which the Tien Shan radiates northwards. The Kunlun and Karakorum ranges branch off to the east, and the Hindu Kush branches to the southwest. This latter range forms the southern border of Central Asia, a transition zone between the arid lowlands of Trans-Oxiana and the subtropical lowlands of South Asia. Its highest peak, close to the Pamir Knot, is 7,690 meters. The Hindu Kush gradually slopes away to the west, its peaks dropping to under 3,000 meters just east of Herat, where the range merges with the Iranian plateau.

Each of these three mountain systems contains numerous smaller ranges. Branches of the Pamir spreading out to the west and southwest like fingers from a hand are the Nur Ata, Aqtagh, Turkestan, Zarafshan, Hisar, Karategin, Wakhsh, and Khuretish ranges. Between these ranges lie the river systems that deliver the water stored in the mountains to the riparian oases of Khojent, Samarqand, Shahr-i Sabz, Karminah, and Herat, and to the great delta oases at their termini (Balkh, Bukhara, Merv, Khiva, and Tashkent).

The three major ranges and their river systems (the Tien Shan, the Pamirs, and the Hindu Kush) generate the two great rivers of Central Asia, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, known in classical times and later as the Oxus and the Jaxartes, and to the Arabs as the Jayhun and the Sayhun, respectively. The Amu begins high in the Pamirs (its upper course is called the Panj River) and today defines

Afghanistan's borders with three countries—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (map 3; pl. 4). Along its 2,500 kilometer course, it is fed by several major secondary rivers—the Qizilsu, the Wakhsh, the Kafirnihan, and the Surkhan—which flow down between the fingers of the Pamir branches and water significant areas before emptying into the Amu. Each of these basins supports self-sufficient urban centers with long traditions of political autonomy. The only rivers reaching the Amu from Afghanistan are the Kokchah, which flows down from northern Badakhshan, and the Qunduz, which drains western Badakhshan and waters the Qunduz oasis. Where the Amu turns northwest and enters Turkmenistan, a large aqueduct built in the 1950s and 1960s, the Kara Kum Canal, diverts water westward into the deserts of Turkmenistan.

Map 3, Pl. 4

For its last 400 kilometers, the Amu flows in numerous channels, and, for the last 150 kilometers, it forms a large delta.[27] The river reportedly once carried more sediment than any other river in the world, annually depositing more than 200 million tons of alluvium rich in phosphates, lime, and potassium. Damming and irrigation have substantially reduced both the flow and the sedimentary deposits. Very little water now reaches the final outfall, the Aral Sea. In 1959 some 40 cubic kilometers of water reached the Aral Sea; in 1989 only about a tenth of that was measured at the outfall. As a consequence, the Aral Sea is drying up and the lower reaches of the river, all in Uzbekistan, receive less and less water, and what is received is increasingly saline.[28]

The Syr, beginning in the Tien Shan Mountains as the Narin River, flows into the Farghanah basin, most of which lies in Uzbekistan. It then continues westward to Khojent in Tajikistan. Just beyond Khojent, the river re-enters Uzbekistan at Begabad, where it turns sharply north (map 2; pl. 5). At Begabad, the Southern Hungry Steppe Canal siphons water off for southern Uzbekistan, carrying it west through the Hungry Steppe Desert to Dzhizak (Jizaq) about 120 kilometers away. North of Begabad, the remaining waters of the Syr continue for about 100 kilometers in Uzbekistan, the course interrupted by the Chardarin Reservoir that lies on the Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan border. Two important feeders of the

Map 2, Pl. 5

Syr, the Angren and Chirchik, flow down from the Tien Shan to irrigate the Tashkent oasis before joining the Syr in the steppe. For its final 900 kilometers, the Syr flows towards the Aral Sea within Kazakhstan where its water has been for many years entirely consumed before reaching the Aral.

There are a number of important rivers in Central Asia that terminate at oases. The Zarafshan River flows from east to west draining the Turkestan and Zarafshan ranges. Its headwaters and upper reaches are in Tajikistan and it terminates in Uzbekistan. As it passes through the Samarqand oasis, it divides into many channels, then makes a loop to the northwest to skirt some 750-meter elevations before turning southwest, where it again divides into many channels
Pl. 6 to water the Bukharan oasis (pl. 6). Some 65 kilometers southwest of Bukhara it disappears in the sands west of Qarakul, halfway between Bukhara and the Amu Darya crossing at Charjuy (Chardzhou).

The Kashka Darya, which has its headwaters on the southern slopes of the mountains south of Samarqand, flows south and southwest, watering the oases of Guzar and Qarshi (Karshi).

In northern Afghanistan, there are three similar river systems, two of which, the Murghab and Hari Rud, begin in the western part of the Hindu Kush and flow in tandem between 80 and 160 kilometers apart. The Murghab drains the northwestern terminus of the Hindu Kush, the Paropamisus Range; the Hari Rud, the western elevations, the Safid Kuh Range. Once on the plain, the rivers turn due north, maintaining parallel courses about 150 to 160 kilometers apart. Before the Hari Rud turns north, it divides into numerous channels to irrigate the Herat oasis. To the north, the Hari Rud waters the ancient town of Sarakhs and continues on from there as the Tejen River to the oasis of the same name, north of which it disappears in the sands of the Kara Kum desert. The Murghab makes its northward turn at the Firuz Kuh spur of the Hindu Kush, and flows for another 300 kilometers to debouch on to the Merv (Marw, Mary) oasis, where its waters are wholly consumed.

The third of the major systems in northern Afghanistan is the Balkh River, which flows from south to north draining the north-central Hindu Kush. Its waters are put to work almost immediately

where it empties onto the plain—as can be seen in a satellite mosaic of Afghanistan compiled by the Department of Geography at the University of Nebraska (pl. 7). Seen from space, the irrigation system, long known as the "Eighteen Canal" (*Hazhdah Nahr*) system, looks like an oak tree in winter, its leafless branches the individual canals. The image reveals one of the historic patterns of river canalization in Central Asia, the delta form, and also shows the relationship of settlements to topography, the siting of settlements at the base of mountain slopes. Pl. 7

The picture that emerges from a study of the physical geography helps explain the antiquity of the region's urban sites, the unchanging nature of the lines of communication, and the constraints on urban and agricultural expansion. Physical geography has also had a major impact on the political geography. When the borders of the Soviet republics were delineated in the 1920s, the nationality issue rather than geography was uppermost in the minds of those responsible. Probably envisioning strong central control, the policymakers seem to have been indifferent to the potential for conflict over water. Or, if they were concerned, they apparently assumed that a strong central authority could mediate and resolve such disputes. But the political context has dramatically changed since the autumn of 1991, and formerly domestic disputes over water have been transformed into international ones.

The water of the Syr Darya is a case in point (map 2). The Syr originates in Kyrgyzstan, flows into Uzbekistan in the eastern Farghanah Valley, passes through the Tajikistan salient that pokes northward across the mouth of the Farghanah, re-enters Uzbekistan briefly, then flows into Kazakhstan, where it remains for the rest of its course. Four of the six Central Asian states thus have a stake in the use of its waters. Map 2

The Amu presents no less of a potential for international conflict. It has its headwaters in Afghanistan and then demarcates the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan for more than half its length, about 1,400 kilometers (map 3). Downstream, for the next 130 kilometers, it serves as the boundary between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. It then becomes the border between Turkmenistan and Map 3

Afghanistan for about another 80 kilometers. For the next 500 kilometers, the river lies entirely within the borders of Turkmenistan. It then intersects the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan border, which crosses from the right bank to the left bank. The border continues in tight proximity to the river for the next 160 kilometers and then veers off to the west. For the Uzbeks concerned about the health of the Aral Sea and the condition of the Amu Delta, Turkmenistan's water use is a major bone of contention. This is especially so because during the river's course within Turkmenistan, the Kara Kum Canal diverts much of its water westward into the heart of the republic. The fate of the Aral Sea is one major source of discord between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan arising from use of the Amu's waters. The Aral Sea is now less than half the size it was thirty years ago. Photographs of fishing boats stranded deep in the desert after its waters receded dramatize the profound ecological change the Aral has undergone.

As serious as the economic consequences of use of Amu water are the public health problems, evidenced by increasing respiratory problems and a rise in infant mortality rates in Uzbekistan—both attributed to airborne dust and salt stripped from the dessicated areas and carried by desert winds for hundreds of kilometers. Public statements by both Turkmen and Uzbek officials indicate the great division of opinion over the issue of water use. In 1987, the president of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, A. Babayev, wrote, "I belong to that group of scientists which considers the drying out of the Aral much more advantageous than its preservation. . . . It is the conviction of many scholars . . . that the disappearance of the sea would not influence the landscape of the region." And a deputy minister of Land Reclamation and Water Management is reported to have publicly stated, "the Aral should die beautifully."[29] For the Uzbeks, the death of the Aral Sea has serious consequences for the welfare of the people living in the delta. In the Soviet Union, such disputes could be appealed to higher levels of appeal and to arbitration. Now such disputes have become an issue of national pride and require international negotiations for resolution.

The Amu's resources may be further strained if northern Afghanistan, which has generally not made much claim on its waters,

demands more use in the future. In pre-Islamic times as well as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were major canalization projects on the left (southern) bank of the Amu in the vicinity of Imam Sayyid.[30] In the twentieth century, there were a number of attempts to grow cotton, drawing on Amu River water.[31] Should political conditions south of the river permit, the Amu's water would also seem to be a logical resource for Afghan (or Afghan-Uzbek) development.

It has been estimated that over 90 percent of all surface water resources in the former Soviet republics is contained within the Syr and Amu river systems.[32] Thus, the potential for conflict in the present fractured political environment is greatly increased where there is no longer a single central authority setting policy on water use.

* * * * * * *

These are some of the realities of the Central Asian landscape: limited habitable areas tucked in between vast inhospitable tracts of desert, mountain systems with a steady but finite supply of water, and the historic efforts by human beings to expand the usable land area through manipulation of the available water. But those realities also have to be viewed through the lens of the human imagination, which interprets such realities in various ways. The imagined landscape is a powerful force. Whether it is a place of religious or supernatural meaning or whether it is the place one thinks of as home, it exerts a powerful motivation to act. How the imagination shapes it helps set the course of human action—towards conflict or compromise, domination or submission, exploitation or conservation.

The landscape in turn shapes and limits the options for human action. In the following chapters we shall look at some of the economic, social and political aspects of this landscape and how the human imagination has created order within the constraints of the land.

CHAPTER TWO

Economic Fundamentals: Agriculture and the Accumulation and Preservation of Wealth

THE FOUNDATION OF CENTRAL ASIA'S wealth has historically rested on agriculture. The products of a fertile land—livestock (horses, sheep, camels and cattle), fibers (wool, cotton, flax, and silk), and foodstuffs (cereal grains, fruits, and vegetables)—have provided for the needs of its people and generated a surplus for trade since antiquity.

AGRICULTURE AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

We can trace Central Asia's participation in world trade from Achaemenid times (from the mid-sixth to the mid-fourth century B.C.) onwards.[1] Horses, handicrafts, dried fruits, and finished textiles were long-standing Central Asian contributions to international markets. Finished textiles remained important in export trade until the industrialization of textile production in Europe. Finished exports were then gradually replaced by the export of fibers for finishing elsewhere. Breeding and exporting horses was a significant part of the region's economy down to the age of the motor vehicle. As technologies have changed in the world, other hitherto unexploited resources, especially energy sources—coal, oil, and natural gas—have become increasingly important.

Central Asia remained a part of the global economy even while continental routes were being challenged by maritime ones in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It is a truism of Central Asian history that the opening of the maritime route linking the Indian and Atlantic oceans in the late fifteenth century dealt a severe blow to land routes through Central Asia and the economies that depended on them. V. V. Barthold, the greatest student of Central Asia in this century, characterized the eighteenth century history of "the whole of Muslim Asia" as one of "political, economical, and cultural decadence" resulting from the development of the maritime trade routes.[2] He was neither the first nor the last to draw such a conclusion.[3] There is little doubt that the development of maritime routes affect-

ed overland trade,[4] but there are several problems involved in concluding that the emergence of these routes was accompanied by a "decline" in the Asian overland routes and that the consequence of this was "decadence" in Central Asian political, economic and cultural life. One problem is in defining "decline" and "decadence" from data that are fragmentary. Another is in distinguishing regional trade from international trade and the relative importance of each to the trade routes, which, after all, served both regional and international markets.[5] A third is the fact that long after the maritime routes had been opened and maritime trading entities (especially the Dutch and English) had carved out their trading spheres, commercial interest in land routes remained strong in Europe.[6] A fourth problem is that with the rise of the Russian state and its gradual expansion eastward and southward beginning in the sixteenth century, new markets and transport opportunities for Central Asian producers and traders were created. When viewing the history of the Silk Road, perhaps the question should be how the network of trade routes evolved even as new markets and producers emerged, rather than why they declined.

Regardless of the issue of the routes and their fates, there is strong evidence that Central Asia remained closely tied to the global economy after the maritime routes opened. International demand for certain Central Asian products is one such sign. If we accept the common wisdom that farmers are conservative in choosing what they cultivate in a particular year, given the unpredictability of nature as well as the predictable uncertainty of market forces, then we would have to assume that an unfamiliar and non-native crop would need to be extremely attractive for a farmer to devote precious land, labor, and water to its cultivation. Expectations about a crop's prospects, especially in a global market, imply good lines of communications and thus a knowledge of the market.

The cultivation of tobacco is a good case in point. Tobacco was a New World crop, unknown in Central Asia before Europeans settled in the Americas. But by the late seventeenth century it was both produced and consumed in Central Asia. A document issued in Bukhara sometime in the latter part of the 1680s mentions a tobacco

drying shed or barn and a tobacconist's shop.[7] Another document from Balkh, dated 1712, mentions a tax on acreage planted in tobacco.[8] Is it only a coincidence that tobacco exports from the Chesapeake Bay region in North America to London had risen rapidly up to 1680, the year in which we find evidence of its cultivation in Central Asia? After a thirty-five year period of stagnation, exports from North America again took off and by the middle of the eighteenth century had doubled from the 1680–1715 level.[9] Could the introduction of tobacco to Central Asia by 1680 have been based on expectations about Europe's rising demand? If so, then we can reasonably assume that Central Asian merchants and producers had sufficiently reliable information about world markets to persuade them to undertake certain risks in agricultural investment.

Cotton represents a similar phenomenon. Cotton of the short-staple variety had long been grown in Central Asia, having been introduced there well before the Islamic period.[10] A British report published in 1865 estimated that cotton fiber and fabrics made up three-quarters of the value of all Central Asian goods exported to Russia in the period between 1840 and 1850.[11] There is evidence from Iran that the American Civil War (1861–65) provided an impetus to growers outside the American South, including Central Asia, to boost production, especially of the long-staple or "American" variety.[12] Eugene Schuyler, the American consul-general in St. Petersburg, toured Central Asia in 1883 and may have witnessed the consequences of the return of American cotton to the European market when he noted that cultivation of cotton had fallen off somewhat in Central Asia, a situation he understood was caused by a rise in the price of wheat and the allocation of more land to wheat.[13]

A sign that Central Asia remained linked to the global economy after the maritime routes were developed is the apparent effect that the flow of precious metals, especially silver, had in the region. I stress the word "apparent" here because, although it seems reasonable to suppose that there was an influx of silver into Central Asia (as one of the results of the flow of precious metals from the New World to the Old[14]) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries just as there was an influx into India and the Ottoman Empire at the same

time,[15] there is still no direct evidence that silver had yet arrived in Central Asia in the kinds of quantities one would expect. Nor is there evidence that silver produced a "price revolution," a rise in wages, or even inflation, as has been proposed for other regions of the globe,[16] although we have a few clues that this may have been the case. One clue was the evidently greater activity in the construction of public buildings (mosques, seminaries, hospices) in the second half of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries as compared with the half centuries preceding and following. There were also unusually large investments in commercial structures (warehouses, caravanserais, and markets).[17] It is probably safe to conclude, even with the sparse nature of the available evidence, that their location along global lines of communication has always made the Central Asian oases susceptible to changes in the world economy. It would seem, on the surface at least, to be unlikely that the region would not have been affected in some way by the world flow of silver in its direction.

But regardless of the degree to which Central Asia remained linked to and affected by global lines of communication after the development of the world maritime routes, regional and interregional trade remained active between Central Asia and India,[18] Iran, and the region called Moghulistan or Kashghar (including cities now in western China: Kashghar, Yarkand, and Aksu)—and that trade was agricultural—livestock, commodities, foodstuffs, and finished products.

Food Production

Central Asia's reliable and predictable water resources combined with the quality of its soil have historically meant a good base for food production.[19] The literary record is rich with descriptions of the produce for which the region was famous. In his memoirs, Pl. 8 Zahir al-Din Babur (pl. 8), the last of the Timurids in Central Asia, provides a good deal of information about the fruits and vegetables for which towns and regions were known at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Andijan, at the east end of the Farghanah Valley,



PLATE 1. The Kabul Carpet (detail)



PLATE 2. Composite Satellite Image of Central Asia (NASA)

PLATE 3. Dry-farmed (lamiyah) terraces of Afghanistan

PLATE 4. Amu Darya Along Tajik-Afghan Border Near Juncture of Wakhsh River (NASA)

PLATE 5. Western End of the Farghanah Valley (NASA)

PLATE 6. Bukhara (South at top of picture) (NASA)

PLATE 7. Balkh River and the Hazhdah Nahr Irrigation System (Department of Geography, University of Nebraska)



PLATE 8. Zahir al-Din Babur b. 'Umar Shaykh (1483–1530)

PLATE 9. Balkh and Its Agricultural Suburbs (1977)



PLATE 10. Agricultural Land (Afghanistan)

PLATE 11. Agricultural Village with Irrigated Land (Afghanistan)

PLATE 12. Harvesting Wheat (Afghanistan)

PLATE 13. Bazaar Shop with Local Products (Afghanistan)



PLATE 14. Contract of Sale and Discharge of Debt—Kabul, 1872



PLATE 15. Shrine of 'Ali b. Abi Talib (d. 661) at Mazar-i Sharif (1968)

PLATE 16. Naqshbandi Shrine, Bukhara (1977)



PLATE 17. Mukhtar Abdullaev, Imam of the Naqshbandi Shrine and Mufti of Tashkent



PLATE 18. Madrasah of Nadr *diwanbegi* Arlat at the Shrine of Khwajah 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar, Samarqand (1977)

PLATE 19. Takht at Ahrar's Shrine, Samarqand (1977)

PLATE 20. Ahrar's Tombstone (1992)

PLATE 21. Madrasah and Khanaqah at Char Bakr, Bukhara (1977)

PLATE 22. *Hazirahs* (tomb enclosures) at Char Bakr, Bukhara

PLATE 23. Acclaiming the Standards, from the *Babur-nama*

PLATE 24. Chingiz Khan at the Holiday Mosque, Bukhara

PLATE 25. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (r. 1880–1901)

PLATE 26. Carpet portrait of Amir Aman Allah Khan, the *ghazi* (r. 1919–1929)

produced "much grain, fruits in abundance, excellent grapes and melons," and there was reportedly no better pear than the Andijani *nashpati*.[20] Marghinan, west of Andijan, was known for its apricots and pomegranates.[21] The pomegranates of Khujand (Khojent) "are renowned . . . people talk of a Khujand pomegranate as they do of a Samarqand apple."[22] Almonds were widely grown in the Farghanah according to Babur; they were exported mostly to India and to Hurmuz on the Persian Gulf (probably for re-export to Iraq and points west).[23] Bukhara and Samarqand were both famous for their melons, but Babur favored those of Akhsi (or Akhsikat), at the western end of the Farghanah Valley. "The melons of Bukhara are famous," he writes. "When I took Samarqand I had some brought from there and some from Akhsi. They were cut up at a party, and nothing from Bukhara compared with those from Akhsi."[24] In Samarqand, he observes, "grapes, melons, apples and pomegranates, indeed all fruits, are good there; two are famous, its apple and its Sahibi grape."[25]

But Babur's description of the fruits for which towns in Central Asia were famous only scratches the surface of the variety of agricultural produce that was cultivated. About the time he was recording his opinions about the produce of Samarqand and the towns of the Farghanah Valley, another writer, Qasim, the son of Yusuf Abu Nasri Harawi, was compiling a manual of agronomy for the district of Herat. Completed in 1515, the work, *Irshad al-zira'ah* (Guide to Agriculture), is a mixture of information from classical sources and practical material gathered from at least one contemporary, a gardener named Mirak-i Sayyid Ghiyas, a man from a family of gardeners and landscape architects.[26] Harawi classifies and lists hundreds of garden plants and their uses and provides an important record of the types of garden plants and the numbers of varieties of them found in Herat in the early sixteenth century, although there is some question as to whether all the varieties listed in the work (for example more than ninety varieties of grapes) were actually grown in Herat.[27]

A collection of records from the middle of the sixteenth century gives us a more detailed and more localized idea of horticulture practices at the time.[28] From documents that record real estate purchases

in Bukhara and its environs by one family in the middle of the century, a fairly detailed picture of the morphology of agricultural villages around the city emerges. One particular village, Juzmandun, which lay just outside the western limits of the city and where the family invested heavily, had plum, apricot, peach, pomegranate, and white and red mulberry orchards; fields of alfalfa, wheat, barley, and rye; and vineyards of several different varieties of grape, in particular the Khalili and the Sahibi, which Babur had mentioned earlier in the century.[29]

In the 1630s, more than one hundred years after Babur wrote, Mahmud b. Amir Wali compiled an extensive catalog[30] of the best fruits and vegetables produced in Balkh. His purpose in writing about the region's horticulture was to show how his patron had supported agricultural development by introducing some of the choicest produce from distant regions. He divides his list into two parts: (1) produce from outside Balkh but now available at Balkh thanks to the farsightedness of his patron, Nazr Muhammad Khan, and (2) produce long cultivated at Balkh. It is not entirely clear whether Mahmud meant to suggest that all the introduced species were actually being cultivated at Balkh or that the produce was simply available for sale. In specific cases the former seems clearly intended. In any event, the list gives a good picture of the families, species, and varieties of produce available in the mid-seventeenth century in Central Asia. The fruits for which Central Asia is famed are well-represented in the list—melons, apples, peaches, apricots, cherries, pomegranates, mulberries, and grapes. Other less well-known species obviously worth the expense of transplanting and cultivating are eggplant, pulses, cypress, poplar, and the bitter orange.

It is difficult to compare the lists of cultivated plants found in Qasim's *Irshad* with those tabulated by Mahmud. It is not inconceivable that the latter inflated the number of varieties introduced by Nazr Muhammad to underscore his patron's civic-mindedness. And there is already some question as to whether all the varieties found in Qasim's work were actually cultivated in Herat. Moreover, there are several varieties (species?) in the *Bahr* list (the conifers *naju* and *shung*, for instance) that do not appear in Harawi's compilation.

In addition, Mahmud b. Amir Wali makes no mention of the staples—wheat, barley, sorghum, alfalfa—although we know full well from the Bukharan documents that these were widely cultivated, certainly in Balkh as well as on lands north of the Amu. The absence of these from his list strongly suggests he was interested only in crops that conferred an element of prestige on their grower or on the one who made their cultivation possible.

But, such minor quibbles aside, these works, taken in conjunction with Babur's recollections, the Juybari Bukharan documents, and the observations of later foreign observers like Vámbéry and Schuyler, provide an accurate picture of the diversity, productivity, and organization of agriculture in Central Asia in the early modern period.

Mahmud b. Amir Wali also gives us specific information about the process of introducing new crops. Nazr Muhammad introduced several varieties of food plants from India including kidney beans and "Divzir" rice as well as one food crop that was perhaps introduced into India from Europe, or at least so the name (*qalanfur-i firangi*) suggests. Whether or not the scale of Nazr Muhammad's recorded activities is representative, there is corroboration elsewhere that political leaders devoted some of their attention and money to agricultural experimentation. Babur tells of conducting successful experiments that would introduce three new varieties into Afghanistan—bringing the sour cherry to Kabul[31] and plaintains and sugar cane to a garden he constructed in the sub-tropical Ningrahar (Ningnahar) in eastern Afghanistan.[32]

The Relationship of Cities to Food Production

Central Asian cities have always been garden cities in which the food-producing suburbs were just an extension of the urban agglomeration. A Russian botanist, N. I. Vavilov, describing Herat in the early part of this century, wrote:

> The town of Herat merges with the fields; minarets, mosques and cemeteries are intermingled with orchards and fields. The

> walled town proper represents an insignificant area. The width of the valley is almost 30 kilometers near Herat, narrowing to the east and west. The entire oasis represents one continuous cultivated region; one village adjoins the next, creating as it were one huge unbroken town-orchard and town-field."[33]

All the great Central Asian cities—Bukhara, Samarqand, Tashkent, and Balkh (see pl. 9)—resembled Herat as described above, and still resemble it today, with orchards and vegetable gardens close to the city proper. Cereal grains, especially the winter wheat crops for which rain and snowfall provided sufficient water, were farther out, sometimes on terraced lands on nearby hill and mountain slopes (pls. 10–12).

Pl. 9

The region has not only been able to feed its own population over time but has made agricultural products, particularly natural fibers and animals, one of its chief exports. In the mid-nineteenth century, the British gave serious study to a proposal to establish an annual trade fair well up the Indus River at either Dera Ismail Khan or Dera Ghazi Khan, the site depending on the depth of water and the navigability of the river in a given year. The purpose was to encourage Central Asian merchants to buy English products by giving them an alternative to Orenburg and the Siberian fairs. The plan never materialized, but it led to market surveys of Central Asian products that might sell well in India. One such survey was prepared in 1838 by P. B. Lord for Alexander Burnes.[34] Lord's paper on the prospects for trade with Central Asia describes in detail not only products and their prices, but also the cost of transportation; and it includes an enumeration of the various customs posts and the duties charged on different goods. The appendix to this survey lists annual sales in the bazaar at "Koondooz" (Qunduz) and is a valuable source for the goods and products available, their place of manufacture or cultivation, and their relative prices.[35]

Pls. 10, 11, 12

In 1838, Qunduz was the principal city between Kabul and Bukhara. According to Lord's inventory, goods came to its market from Russia and China via Bukhara and from Kabul. Basic foodstuffs like wheat, barley, and rice were plentiful and cheap. Lord's

report was aimed at convincing its readers of the value of establishing an annual fair and some of the optimistic rhetoric in it should be read in that light. (An intelligence report filed by Munshi Gopal Das on the Afghan occupation of the southern part of the Qunduz region in June 1859 was much less sanguine about the economy of the region.)[36] What one can safely infer from Lord's report is that an extensive regional trade, especially in agricultural products, existed at a time of considerable political fragmentation, and Bukhara was the leading market.

This bare outline should give some sense of the long-term reality of Central Asia's agricultural foundations and its legacy as a food producer. But the issue today is not simply a question of the richness of the natural environment and the products that it generates. The complex web of human economic motivation and economic relationships, especially those involving access to and exploitation of the environment, is also critical in promoting the development of agriculture.

Pl. 13

THE CREATION AND PRESERVATION OF WEALTH

The creation and preservation of wealth has been a central value of Central Asian societies down through the ages. We know this not only from the evidence of how people acted, but from what they said as well. For our purposes, some of the more interesting observations on the accumulation and preservation of wealth come from the early sixteenth century. Fazl Allah b. Ruzbihan Khunji, a Sunni exile from Iran, spent a few years at the court of Muhammad Shibani Khan (d. 1510), the soldier and statesman who ushered in what is commonly called "the Uzbek era." Khunji recorded a number of discussions and debates held in the khan's court. In one of them, Shibani Khan touched on his views about wealth. The recorded conversation arises from what the author considered the khan's relatively modest economic circumstances, especially for one so politically powerful. Shibani Khan explained that he was not as

wealthy as other members of the Shibanid clan because when he was younger he spent more time hunting than herding. He admitted that he considered tending livestock to be extremely tedious, although he realized that herding was the usual way in which the people of his homeland, the Qipchaq Steppe, became wealthy.[37]

Such stories should be approached with a degree of caution. Modesty, probity, and reliance on God rather than the material rewards of this world were normative virtues; the writer, therefore, is using this story and Shibani Khan's words to underscore the moral fiber of his patron. It is not especially important, however, for us to know whether Shibani Khan was rich or not, or even whether he uttered these words. What is important is that the writer, in highlighting the moral character of his sponsor, uses as a backdrop the view that wealth is desirable and that the prevalent mode for achieving wealth was through agriculture, in this case animal husbandry.

The story told by Khunji is given an updating in a film entitled *The Kirghiz of Afghanistan* (1975), set in the mountain pastures of eastern Badakhshan in the period just before the Thawr (Sawr) Revolution of 1978. Among other things, the film shows how wealth can be created, accumulated, and preserved in a pastoral environment.[38] Social relations among the Kirghiz are structured by an economic system called *amanat*, or "entrusting," not unlike the medieval Islamic system of commendation or the sleeping partnership (*qirad*, *mudarabah*).[39] The protagonist in the film is the Kirghiz khan, or tribal leader, Rahman Qul, the owner of most of the wealth of his tribe. Under amanat he annually divided his flocks and allocated them to the shepherds dependent on him. In return for labor, each shepherd was entitled to a percentage of wool and lambs. A shepherd interviewed in the film complained that the amount earned was barely adequate and kept him dependent on the khan for a living. This dependency was intensified by the khan's acting as intermediary and translator between his people and the Tajik merchants who supplied the shepherds and their families with various manufactured goods, including narcotics. Amanat allowed the khan to create an enormous estate for himself, which he justified as necessary for the protection of his people, who could not survive, he claimed,

without his financial support. It is easy to imagine that the economic and social conditions depicted in this film would not have been so very different from those to which Shibani Khan referred when he spoke of the way in which his fellow clansmen became wealthy in the Qipchaq Steppe.

Until the early part of this century, private ownership was seen as the organizational means in Central Asia to best achieve the goal of self-betterment. After the Soviets were established north of the Amu River, the history of property ownership in the region diverged: north of the Amu private ownership of the means of production came to an end with collectivization in the 1930s; in lands south of the river, private property and land ownership continued to be governed by Islamic law, the Shari'a.

Since 1991, there has been a reversal in official policy to the long-standing prohibition of private ownership of the means of production in the former Soviet region. It has been some seventy years since most people of Central Asia have experienced real estate ownership; thus a brief reconstruction of the history of private property and ownership *before* the Soviet period may be worthwhile.

Property and Ownership: A Historical Perspective

The 1990s are not the first time that political changes have forced people to confront questions of land ownership and property rights. The rise of new governing groups has often precipitated a review of property claims and rights in the region. When the Uzbeks under Shibani Khan assumed political control of Central Asia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a major concern was the efficacy of establishing and affirming property rights, especially in cases of property held or administered by members and supporters of the previous regime. In the next wave of large-scale military occupation, when the Russian conquest of Central Asia was completed in the second half of the nineteenth century, similar concerns surfaced. At both times, surveys of property, reviews of property deeds, and the confirmation or suspension of rights took place. Today, many of the same kinds of questions are being asked about property, especially

that held by the state or the Communist Party. One assumes issues such as the establishment of individual rights in communally or state-owned property—for example, on the collective farm (the *kolkhoz*) or the state farm (the *sovkhoz*)—will remain open questions for some time to come.

Since the principles on which the property rights of individuals are to be based have not yet been worked out or protected by law, the situation in many ways is rather different today from similar occasions in the past. When the Uzbeks under Shibani Khan took control of the oases of Central Asia in the sixteenth century, there was an accepted legal framework (the Islamic codes embodied in the Shari'a) and a system for administering the law (the court of the *qazi*-judge). Similarly, when the Tsarist state took control of Central Asia in the mid-nineteenth century, it brought a system of legislative and legal administration that assumed jurisdiction in certain areas and simultaneously recognized the authority of the Islamic judicial system in others.[40] Today, statutory law, the legacy of the Soviet era, has lost legitimacy though it is still the basis of practice. Islamic law is seen by many, if not a majority, as legitimate, but its practice is not widespread.

In this period of transition, it is useful to look at the evolution of private property rights not simply as a means to an economic end. Private property creates wealth. Wealth brings status and prestige but also creates and maintains dynastic families, a subject to which I will return in the following chapter.

What is Private Property and Private Ownership? In Islamic terms, private property is generally designated by the terms *milk*[41] (usually restricted to immovable property) and *mal* (used for moveable possessions, especially livestock). I introduce the issue of legal terminology here not just as a reminder that Islamic law has predominated in the region for at least a thousand years (except for the brief Soviet period). In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Central Asia was the center of the Hanafi School of Law, and Central Asians today find great satisfaction in knowing that the legal tradition worked out by scholars in Bukhara, Samarqand, and Balkh in that period became

the basis for Islamic legal practice in most of the rest of the Muslim world. In addition, since the area and its thinkers take considerable pride in the contributions of their forebears to the development of legal thought in the pre-Soviet era, it is not beyond the realm of the imaginable that the earlier tradition of Islamic legal thinking will play a role in the formulation of new legal precepts concerning contracts, possession, and ownership.

As formulated by Central Asian legal scholars such as Burhan al-Din al-Marghinani (d. 1197), who came from the town of Marghinan in the eastern Farghanah Valley, private ownership consists of a number of rights—sale, donation, bequeathal, lease—held by an individual or individuals over something of value. There are also certain things of value that cannot be privately owned, called "exceptions (*mustasnayat*)"—such as mosques, cemeteries, public roads, rights of way, and land along waterways and around wells and springs. The relationship of government or the state to private ownership is, as one would expect, extremely complex and is based on a view of history in which certain past events legitimize the rights of a state to levy taxes. Indeed, the question even of final ownership of property, especially land ownership, is usually entangled in theological and historical issues. While the community of Islam as represented by its leader, the imam, is often theorized to be the ultimate owner, in practice neither the imam nor the community as a whole plays a significant role in day-to-day issues of ownership and its transfer.

In the early modern period, the Central Asian state appears to have been generally a relatively weak participant in real estate. Its role seems to have been primarily that of arbiter between contending individuals. (One indicator of the inherent power of any state to intervene in private property is whether or not it has the right of eminent domain; that is, the right to take possession of private property for public purposes in return for compensation. I have found no evidence in Central Asia that governments in the early modern period, at least, ever claimed such a right.)[42] Legitimate involvement by the state with private property comes mainly in the form of fiscal prerogatives; that is, the state's rightful claim, which developed out of the historic context of the Muslim conquests of the seventh

and eighth centuries, to some share of the productive value of property as realized through taxation.

Tax policy is, of course, an influential factor in the decisions the individual makes about the exercise of rights of ownership. Because of limitations of space and because my principal interest is the historical role and extent of private ownership in Central Asia, I propose to ignore the issue of tax policy and limit myself to property from the standpoint of ownership alone.[43]

Private Property (North of the Amu) from the Early Sixteenth Century to the Present: A Brief Sketch

There are two good reasons for using the early sixteenth century as the beginning of our survey of the history of private property north of the Amu. First, that time is traditionally seen as a watershed in the economic and political history of Central Asia. Economically, the period has been viewed as the beginning of the decline in importance of the overland trade routes; politically, it is seen as a point at which a new ruling class of nomadic origin and mentality took control of the agricultural region of Central Asia.

Second, the early sixteenth century is important because it marked a regime change that occasioned a full review of property ownership. After the Shibanids drove out the Timurids, they instituted property audits—in part to uncover which properties belonged to the preceding ruler, his family, and colleagues (and might thus be appropriated by the new rulers) and in part to discover how much revenue the new government could expect from the land now under its control.

The Setting.[44] By the spring of 1509, Muhammad Shibani Khan, an agnatic descendant of Chingiz Khan, had achieved through a series of military campaigns fairly firm control of most of Central Asia north of the Amu River. In April, the khan went to his summer palace in the resort of Kan-i Gil, on the northeast side of Samarqand, to relax and escape the heat of the city. There he convened a num-

ber of legal experts to discuss several critical issues, one of which was the status of property in Central Asia abandoned by the Timurids and their military supporters.

Our sole source, Khunji, presents a number of difficulties for a late twentieth-century reader. First, he was not a modest man and his writings on Central Asia are marked by a high degree of self-absorption and self-righteousness. Much of his book is devoted to describing public debates, a kind of intellectual recreation popular at the time, at which, to hear Khunji tell it, he had no equal. And when it came to advising the khan, he tended to present his counsel as the one that carries the day. Second, besides the constant trumpeting of his intellectual gifts, he also seemed to think the reader would find his health an enthralling subject. Neither the food nor water of Central Asia seems to have agreed with him; and he was continually getting sick—and making careful note of it. It all makes him a bit tiresome as an author—though interesting as a human being—and thus not wholly reliable as a source. But, as he is the only one who describes what happened at Kan-i Gil that spring, and as this is a particularly revealing moment in the history of property, we need Khunji.

The khan's question to open the discussion was this: Owners have abandoned their lands, the lands cannot be cultivated, the treasury suffers, and government cannot perform its function of bringing prosperity to the country and happiness to its people. Can property abandoned for more than thirty years be considered legally "dead" (*mawat*) and so be granted as private property to anyone who would restore it?

The first to respond was the chief judge of Balkh, 'Abd al-Ghaffar. He suggested that invalidating ownership would be extremely difficult, but, if an owner had turned his back on his land, surely the khan could permit someone else to cultivate it. The khan replied that simply granting use is not satisfactory for there is no way to compel anyone to cultivate abandoned land. It is far better to compel the owner to have it cultivated, since he is the one who owes the land tax, the *kharaj*. The point was argued for some time until finally—and here Khunji thrusts himself to center stage—the khan turned to

him and asked for an opinion. Khunji now uses the narrative to display his knowledge of history and law.

First, Khunji says contracts are the pivotal point of law. When a contract sets certain stipulations, the length of time that elapses is immaterial. Through a contract of sale, a buyer becomes the owner of private property. Even if a thousand years should pass, and he never takes possession, his ownership never lapses. Nor do changing political circumstances (and Khunji may well have been thinking about his own abandoned property in Iran) alter his ownership rights any more than does leaving it and going elsewhere. When others talk about "a permit to use," he says, what they have in mind are things of a trivial nature. For example, if someone were walking along a road and found that a date or a grape had fallen from a tree and that its owner had abandoned it, the prevailing view is that it is legal to take possession of such a minor thing, make it his own property, and consume it. But if he should come across a purse of money or valuable article of clothing, he does not become its owner by virtue of finding it. There are laws about this, and, if people were to treat the taking of such valuable things as trivial matters, then oppression would be the result. Taxpaying would cease and people would turn and flee from the exactions of the sultan. We know, he says, that many have fled Samarqand and cannot return to their homes because of injustice, and they cannot reoccupy their lands because of the many government levies.

Second, Khunji then proceeds to cite a story he recalled reading in the *Tarikh-i Wassaf*, a fourteenth-century work,[45] in which the Salghurid atabeg, Abu Bakr b. Sa'd b. Zangi, having conquered the Persian province of Fars during the Mongol period, ordered people to prove their ownership of land by presenting to his diwan documents that could trace ownership back at least fifty years. The land of anyone who could not do so was deemed of unknown ownership, and it would revert to the government. Khunji says this created great difficulty because most people could not produce proof that they had owned the land for even two years, let alone fifty. So their land was forfeit. The ulama did not dare stand up to the atabeg, except for one man, Mawlana Shams 'Umar, who was the leading scholar of his

time. Mawlana Shams 'Umar was attending a *majlis* in Fars at which a man could prove his ownership only for forty years and not more. Abu Bakr, the atabeg, asked the assembled scholars, "Has this man proven that he is the owner or not?" Mawlana Shams 'Umar answered, "May the atabeg live long. In ten years this man will become the owner of his own property, but today he is not the owner."

The atabeg realized how ridiculous this sounded and asked "How is it that a man cannot be the owner of his own property but will become the owner in ten years?" Mawlana Shams 'Umar answered, "There is a decree issued that owners have to show proof of ownership going back fifty years. His proof only goes back forty, therefore he is not the owner. If he is patient and waits ten years then it will be his." At this, says Khunji, the atabeg recognized that his decree made no sense and so rescinded it.

After hearing the story, Shibani Khan said, "If time has no influence on the question of ownership nor does abandoning it, what is to be done? How will it be possible to collect taxes and make the country prosper?" Khunji replied,

> If the owner is known, you should appeal to him, offer to reduce his taxes, and persuade him to come home. And, after his return, you should act kindly so that he exerts himself in his ownership and the country prospers and tax revenues increase. If the owner is not known and the land is of unknown ownership, then the padshah is required to take control of land of unknown ownership and make it prosper. In that case, what pertains is the rule, "The produce belongs to the producer even if he is a usurper." But he should expressly state that if the owner reappears, he will pay him a fair rent from the treasury, and, in this way, the whole country may benefit. Both the land tax can be collected and the right of ownership will not be violated. This will bring people back who otherwise might have feared the destruction of their property."

Khunji closes by noting, "the excellent mind of His Highness fully concurred with my advice."[46]

What is interesting here is not Khunji's role or the implied ignorance of the law that he imputes to the Central Asian scholars in

attendance, but rather the very issue itself—that the new regime was concerned about the long-term economic ramifications of changes in property ownership brought about by political events. He wanted posterity, at least, to recognize that it had approached the problem systematically and with full regard for the legal issues.

Besides reviewing the status of privately owned property abandoned by the Timurids, Shibani Khan also ordered a survey of all the endowments, the largest of which had been set up by these same Timurids.[47] Although no details are provided, the review of the endowments is indirectly a concern with private property. Since endowments could only be created from private property, those that might have been set up using state funds and lands could conceivably have been declared invalid. But there is no evidence that any invalidation of endowments occurred and most large Timurid endowments—the Gur-i Amir complex in Samarqand, the Ulugh Beg madrasah/colleges in Samarqand and Bukhara, various endowments created by the politician and writer Mir 'Ali Shir Nawa'i in Balkh and Herat, and the extensive endowments of the Naqshbandi holy man Khwajah 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar—seem not just to have survived but to have prospered through the Shibanid century, some lasting right up to the Soviet confiscations of the 1920s.

Extensive documentation available for the period between 1500 and the Soviet Revolution of 1917 provides a better understanding of the extent and nature of private property, how it was accumulated, the size of private agricultural plots, and how land was used. The documentation also indicates the small-scale character of land tenure that seems to have prevailed. Document after document in the Juybari collection enumerates small parcels of land being sold by individuals of modest backgrounds. One document, dated 1 December 1562, deals with two men, Baqi the son of Mir Yusuf and Tufan the son of Jalal al-Din, who register the sale of six parcels of land to Muhammad Islam Juybari. The sizes of four of the parcels are given: two and one-half; two; one; and three-quarters of an acre, respectively. These four parcels are described simply as "cultivable land"; grains such as wheat, rye, and barley were probably grown on them. The fifth piece of land contained a cistern, a vineyard, plum and

apple orchards; and the sixth, a vineyard, unspecified trees, another cistern, and unspecified buildings.[48]

In the sixteenth century, small-scale ownership (for which we have the most consistent documentation) seems to have been the norm.[49] For the village of Juzmandun in the Bukharan oasis, the purchase of more than fifty parcels of land over a thirty-year period is recorded. Most of the parcels are simply described as cultivable land, meaning that they were probably used either for grain or vegetables. Lands on which there were trees, vines, or shrubs were usually so described. Of these fifty parcels, the two largest were about twenty-two acres each and the next in size only ten acres. The majority of parcels fell within the range of one to four acres.[50] Vineyards were sometimes designated in terms of area (ranging from twenty-three acres all the way down to about a third of an acre) when the land and the vines were being sold together; or in terms of the number and type of vine when the land was not included in the purchase.

Large tracts of agricultural land do not seem to have been generally available, nor is there evidence that any effort was made to consolidate large holdings of small properties into larger farms. In fact, the evidence we have about the way in which lands were worked after their purchase indicates that, rather than consolidate properties and reorganize the way in which the land was cultivated, the new owners rented them out to be farmed as before.

Private ownership of real estate could take a number of forms. Ownership did not always imply possession. For example, one might own in freehold the land, the land and the buildings, or simply the buildings and plantations on someone else's land. Improvements were frequently owned by individuals other than the owner of the land. Once the right to develop a property (as an orchard, for instance) was contractually conveyed, the developer had full ownership rights over the trees of the orchard, subject only to the right of preemption; that is, the right of first refusal accorded to a co-owner, an abutting owner, or someone with a vested interest in the property. By allowing the property to be developed by others, the owner of land effectively lost control of it, although the right of preemption made it possible to regain control if the developer or his or her

heirs decided to sell. The ownership of shares in the water of an irrigation canal could also determine effective control of the land.

Real estate ownership was virtually universal in society. The vast majority of known Central Asian documents that are not royal decrees (farmans and yarlighs) pertain to property ownership and reveal much about the social status of buyers, sellers, and litigants. In the compilations of documents from the Juybari archive of Bukhara and the Samarqand qazi's court of the late sixteenth century,[51] for example, dozens of property owners are identified by profession and trade. Many emancipated slaves also appear as property owners; and, in the Juybari archive, women make up thirty percent of all owners of record.

Besides private ownership, there were two other ways in which real estate was held: by the state (*mamlakah* or *padshahi*) or by endowments (*waqf*, pl. *awqaf*).

State Ownership. State property included land that was reclaimed through state investment—for example, formerly uncultivated lands brought under irrigation at state expense—or property that reverted to the treasury when a proprietor died without heirs. State land was generally leased to contractors who would work it themselves or sublease it. The evidence for the period from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries strongly suggests that state land formed the least significant proportion of the productive land in Central Asia. The Soviets, of course, changed that radically, effectively transforming all land into state land.

Furthermore, even for the relatively small percentage of lands that were state lands, there appears to have been consistent and intense pressure toward privatization. Ol'ga Dmitreevna Chekhovich, who more than anyone else has publicized the rich documentary resources in Central Asia available to historians, studied the issue of the conversion of state lands to private property and has published documents from as early as the sixteenth century that assert the right of the khan, as "caliph of the age," to have jurisdiction over the direct sale of state lands, a right that is justified by referring to two

influential judicial manuals of the time, the *Fatawa Tatarkhaniyah* and the *Khizanat al-muftin*.[52]

Endowment Ownership. Endowment (waqf) ownership seems to have been the second most common kind of tenure on productive land—after private property—and was particularly important for capital accumulation and investment. Its importance was due to the nature of endowments: first, the tendency for the manager-trustees to accumulate holdings and, second, the relative security of endowment holdings from usurpation and forfeiture.

What limited evidence we have also suggests that, as a proportion of owned land, endowment-ownership steadily increased after 1500. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Shibani Khan ordered a review of all the endowments, but no register from that review is known to exist. Then in 1886, the newly-ascendant Russian administration in Central Asia conducted its own survey of endowment lands.[53] This review documented more than 7,500 endowments in the area of Turkestan alone. (Turkestan was the name of the province or government-general [*guberniia*] established in 1867[54] that included Tashkent, Samarqand, and the Farghanah Valley but not Bukhara and Khiva.)

Like state lands and private lands, endowment lands could also be developed privately. Individuals acquired the right to plant orchards and build structures on endowment lands, and those improvements were their private property. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—as late as the mid-1920s when Soviet administration began to be more forcefully asserted— Bukharan documents record the sale of these improvements on both state and endowment lands. Chekhovich published one such sale record dated 1924 and notarized by the "Qazi of the Bukharan Soviet Republic."[55]

Although I am not as familiar with the extent of private property ownership compared with state and endowment ownership in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries as I am with with that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, what I do know suggests that there was continuing conversion of state land to private ownership in the later period and an expansion of endowment prop-

erty as well. Nevertheless, it is difficult to generalize about the nature, extent, and changing conditions of private ownership until more study is done.

With the rise of local councils, or soviets, in the 1920s, new policies on land ownership were introduced north of the Amu River that took little account of past practice. Once in control, the soviets declared their authority over *all* property. But the local soviets were generally ill-prepared to provide the kinds of investments, e.g., seed, livestock, equipment, and labor, that the individual proprietor, whether working the land himself or leasing it, was used to providing; hence, the period was one of extreme shortages and famine. When the New Economic Policy (1921) was offered to restore limited land ownership as a means of combating the collapse of agricultural productivity, other problems arose. In Kazakhstan, for example, the problem of providing just enough land for economic self-sufficiency (but not enough to allow the enrichment of the peasant) was a major challenge, one aggravated by the racial antagonism that existed between the indigenous Kazakhs and Russian settlers.[56]

Property Ownership in Afghanistan

In contrast to the history of property in the region north of the Amu Darya, the Islamic legal system for the administration of property rights had been maintained in Afghanistan until 1978. After the Thawr (Sawr) Revolution of that year, the new government, committed to a Marxist-Leninist view of property rights, tried to promulgate radically new laws governing land ownership. These laws are far more interesting for their content and for what they say about the power of ideology over experience than for any practical effect they had on land reform in the country.

Although Afghanistan in 1978 was thought to be a country where small holdings predominated, half the rural population was probably landless. In December 1978, the regime in Kabul issued decree No. 8, which addressed the ownership of land. The purpose of the decree was to limit the amount of land any one family could own based on

the designated quality of the land. Excess land would then be distributed first to the tenant farmers who worked it, then to seasonal agricultural laborers.[57] The decree established seven grades of land. The highest grade included irrigated farmland producing two crops a year, orchards, and vineyards, whereas the lowest was unirrigated land cultivated not more than once every two years. The decree limited the amount of land any family could own to about fifteen acres of first-grade land, with proportionately greater amounts as the quality of land decreased. It was unspecific as to whether the trees and vines were also to be distributed or just the land.

On 12 February 1979, the *Kabul Times* reported that 308,709 *jarib*s of land (or about 150,000 acres) had been distributed to 30,124 peasant families. In celebration of "chain-breaking" decree No. 8, the government-controlled newspaper reported that peasants were "dancing and shouting slogans such as 'death to feudalism', 'death to imperialism' and 'long live and healthy be Noor Mohammad Taraki'."[58] (Taraki would be assassinated within the year.) The *Kabul Times* of 23 April 1979 further reported that the land reform program had by then put nearly three-quarters of a million acres of land in the hands of some 138,300 deserving people.[59] In June, the number of reported beneficiaries had risen to 233,000.[60]

In 1980, Afghan wheat production hit a record low, but whether that was due to the land reforms or other factors is not clear.[61] The Soviet invasion had taken place at the end of 1979 and brought with it enormous national disruption, and the fact that an armed insurrection was already widespread in the countryside while the reforms were supposedly being implemented makes it difficult to imagine that any redistribution of land ever took place except in the most token fashion. Indeed, by August 1981 a series of amendments to the articles of the land reform law were issued that seemed to retreat substantially from the tenor of the law itself. One such amendment exempted religious scholars ("mosque imams, preachers, khatibs, and religious leaders"). "Religious leader" was a general term that many people, especially well-off land owners, might have been able to claim for themselves in order to qualify for an exemption from the land reform.[62]

The Disposition of Property and Property Rights after Death

Property and property rights in Central Asia have long been subjects of interest, though mainly to Soviet scholars. These scholars have been inclined to view private ownership, if not inherently evil, as the principal means by which individuals exploit other individuals. Soviet scholarship finds in the historical record a progressive amassment of small holdings in the hands of a few wealthy individuals, who become generally subsumed under the rubric "feudal." While there is no denying that wealthy people did accumulate land, death was one certain and predictable reality that limited, and often reversed, the accumulation of real estate in any one family—but not always.

The following examples show the kind of disintegrative pressure to which an estate was subject and how individuals tried to foresee the effects of death and to counter the dispersal of an estate. The first example comes from a document dated July 1872 that was drawn up and notarized in Kabul, Afghanistan; it gives us some of the human dimensions of private ownership and a fairly realistic picture, I believe, of the natural lifespan, absent any preventive measures, of individual property-holding.

Pl. 14 This document (pl. 14) treats two separate transactions: The first section covers the sale of a house in the Bala Chawk section of Kabul for 580 Kabuli rupees; the second, penned in the margin of the sale document, details a lawsuit over an outstanding debt owed by the property owner and the resolution of the suit.

Documenting a sale was a formal and conventional procedure. Conclusion of a valid sale contract did not require documentation, but the practice of recording contracts in court with court witnesses was standard practice. Often, the only surviving records of sales are the certifications (*iqrar*, *qabalah-namah*) executed in court.

The first section of the 1872 document describes in detail the property being conveyed. It is a house or residential compound called a haveli (*hawili*) located inside the city walls in Bala Chawk.

The house is described only as comprising "numerous" rooms and storerooms. As is characteristic of such documents, the object of the sale, the house, is identified by the abutting properties. On the east, the compound adjoined a house belonging to a man named Hamid Hakim, the son of Mulla Muluk, and a house belonging to the estate of Mulla 'Abd al-Rahim, a perfume seller and druggist. On the west, the compound's ground floor abutted the workshop of a weaver; its second story adjoined the upper floor of a haveli belonging to the estate of Rahman Naqib. On the north, the compound was partly contiguous with the public way, which led to a caravanserai belonging to the estate of Zardlu Khan, and partly with the wall of the caravanserai itself. Its south side abutted a haveli belonging to Hajji Muhammad, a hatmaker and the son of Ahmad Qasim, who was from Najaf in Iraq.

The sellers were 'Abd al-Karim, Muhammad Jan, and Ahmad Jan—the three sons of Mulla 'Abd al-Rahman and the grandsons of Mulla 'Abd al-Razzaq, who was originally from Kashmir. Mulla 'Abd al-Rahman is described as "martyred," and his death was the occasion for this sale. 'Abd al-Karim, one of his sons, also held power of attorney in the sale for his stepmothers: Sahib Jan, the daughter of Mulla Rahmat Allah; and Zahra Begum, the daughter of Muhammad Mir.

The buyers were a father and his son: Mulla Gul Muhammad, son of Mulla Ramadan and grandson of Mulla Ya'qub; and Mulla Muhammad, Mulla Gul Muhammad's son.

Although the selling price in the document is set at 580 rupees, the margin contains a claim of a 440 rupee debt owed to Mulla Gul Muhammad by the deceased owner of the house. The marginalia includes the claim, the denial of the claim by the sellers, the verification of the claim by four witnesses who are named, and the consequent discharge of the debt through the sale of the house. This is a typical example of how an estate might be settled when obligations incurred by the deceased have to be satisfied and how property might pass out of a family's possession. Equally typical was the family's retention of the property in the form of shares held by the heirs

according to the rules of estate division. The adjoining haveli owned by the estate of Rahman Naqib and the caravanserai held by the estate of Zardlu Khan, are probably examples of this.[63]

The Preservation of Wealth at the Time of Death

On the surface at least, the preservation of wealth over generations seems to be a real problem in a society ruled by the Shari'a. This is principally because the Qur'an has unambiguous formulae for the distribution of estates, establishing who inherits and in what proportional amounts. It also limits discretionary bequests. Since maintaining property intact is often critical to its value, all propertied families and individuals have to work out ways to protect their wealth against these prescriptions of the law, if they think that such is desirable. One way, as mentioned above, is keeping the property intact as an "estate." In that case, the income from the property would be divided according to Qur'anic rules, and each heir would receive his or her fractional share instead of selling the property and dividing the proceeds. Another alternative is to establish a trust or endowment. Favored heirs can be named the beneficiaries of a trust, virtually without restriction, as long as the trust has an ultimately pious purpose. Heirs might also be named to manage the trust as well as be its beneficiaries. The property that would otherwise have been divided then remains intact, and the income it generates can go to the heirs either as managers or beneficiaries or both. Wealth may thus be transferred more or less intact from generation to generation in a perfectly *shar'i* (legal) manner. (In the next chapters, we shall explain in more detail the historical continuity provided by this form of transference of wealth.)

Occasionally, we find efforts made to pass property on to an heir or group of heirs in ways that appear to clearly violate the spirit if not the letter of the Islamic rules. For instance, a deed of gift from Bukhara dating to August-September 1716 (Ramadan 1128) shows the steps one highly-placed figure, a Bukharan court official named Allah Yar Bi, took to disinherit his female heirs and the sons of one

of his wives.[64] In the deed, he gives forty-five properties in the Samarqand area—some of which he had bought and some inherited—to three of his sons by a single wife. He specifically excludes the other sons, the half-brothers of the designated recipients. For his daughters, who should have been protected under Qur'anic rules and entitled to share in the estate at a proportion one-half that of their brothers, he specifies that they shall receive life incomes from the properties he is giving the three sons—on condition that they do not attempt to claim those properties after he dies. He also entails the property to his grandsons and their sons "generation after generation." Should his sons have no male heirs, then the property would revert to the initially excluded half-brothers and their male progeny. He also declares in the document,

> After the deaths of these three sons, let not their mother, sisters or wives come forward and say, "This is our legacy." Their mother has already been granted moveable and immoveable properties and has waived any further claims. If no male heirs should survive in the line of the step-brothers, then the property should revert to [my] daughters and the sons of [my] daughters.

Attached to the affidavit is another one signed by Allah Yar's mother, which conveys ownership by gift of twelve villages that were her property and had been given to her by her father-in-law. She wanted two of them donated to the endowment of the shrine of Shah Abu Talib Sarmast in Samarqand; the other ten she was giving to her grandsons, the same ones named by Allah Yar. Such gifts meant that the donor was willing to cede ownership and possession of the property in his or her lifetime, although it is reasonable to think that Allah Yar, as pater familias, could have retained effective control if he had so desired. What such a document suggests is, first, that individuals did accumulate substantial real estate holdings with an eye to preserving them intact, despite Qur'anic rules to the contrary and, second, that legal devices enabled them to do so or, at least, allowed them to expect such efforts to have some chance of surviving legal challenges.

* * * * * * *

Whether the post-Soviet Central Asian states seek answers in their history to analogous problems faced today or not, the past nonetheless provides a rich store of experience. Legal institutions and mechanisms concerning property-holding and property rights and an old and venerable system of judicial administration could provide solutions for some of today's problems. What makes the administration of Shari'a law attractive today, of course, is the fact that it is Islamic, the one ideology with ancient roots and long-standing loyalties common to all of Central Asia. As such, it has the potential to carry with it the moral authority necessary to engender legal consensus about, and submission to, a rule of law without which economic activity remains the prisoner of arbitrariness.

CHAPTER THREE

Society and Community: Shrines and Dynastic Families in Central Asia

IN THE FIRST TWO CHAPTERS I outlined two environments in which human activity in Central Asia takes place. One is the land and what it offers in the way of opportunities for human ingenuity. The second is the way in which humans have organized the use of the land. Individuals and societies invest the landscape with importance in a variety of economic, spiritual, and political ways. Because three-quarters of the land is desert, pressures on the use of land in regions with a regular supply of water have been enormous and have given rise to sophisticated mechanisms for allocating rights to the ownership and use of that land.

In this chapter and the next, I shall endeavor to show how the reality of the landscape and the way in which its use was organized gave rise to two other environmental layers: (1) a cultural layer producing feelings of solidarity, belonging, continuity, a sense of purpose, and institutions for mediating conflict, and (2) a political layer, in which scarce resources are allocated either by mutual consent, mediation, arbitration, or coercion. (The cultural layer has religious, ethnic, and national elements, but I shall deal here only with the religious; the political layer will be covered in the final chapter.)

THE CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT: SHRINES AND SHRINE DYNASTIES

Much of the information available to Western readers about Central Asia focuses on causes and sources of conflict rather than on institutions producing feelings of solidarity and common purpose. Here I would like to examine briefly one particular institution, the Islamic shrine, which has had a profound influence on the development of regional and local feelings of community. The importance of shrines in society is not, of course, unique to Central Asia, but they are particularly prominent in Central Asian history and con-

tinue to be so today, although their importance is not widely recognized. Because of the power they have come to hold over the imagination, the discovery, creation, and preservation of shrines make them centers of cultural, economic and, on occasion, political power.

Shrines represent many things. They show a reverence for history and thus for the founders of Islam. They symbolize the mysteries of human existence and death. They also represent the individual's hope of access to the power of the divine to make things right, or at least better, in this world. In the Islamic context, shrines may represent and serve as an accessible surrogate for the Ka'bah at Mecca. Fulfilling the duty laid on every Muslim to perform the hajj pilgrimage to Mecca has always been difficult for Central Asians; thus, local traditions have arisen that allow the believer to feel some sense of fulfillment by performing substitute pilgrimages to more easily reached shrines.[1]

Shrines have been known by a variety of Arabo-Persian terms in Central Asia. These include: *mazar* or *ziyaratgah* (both from the same Arabic root meaning "visit"), "a place (*gah*) one visits" on a pilgrimage; *qadamgah*, a "stepping place," the site where a holy figure or saint is believed to have set foot or rested; *rawzah*, "garden, enclosure, precincts," a metaphor for Paradise or the next world; *dargah* or *astanah*, "doorway or threshold," the place where one symbolically passes from the mundane to the sacred or supernatural world; *mashhad* and *nazargah*, a "place of witness" or testament (to the power of God); and *marqad* or *mazja'*, "a bed" or resting place. There are other terms that occasionally appear (*qabr* and *langar*, for example, meaning grave or tomb), but the preceding are the most common.

Shrines appear in a variety of forms. In its simplest manifestation, a shrine may be nothing more than a mound of stones over a gravesite. Often, stuck in the ground are wooden poles to which pieces of votive cloth, string, or yarn may be attached. At the other end of the spectrum are building complexes surrounding a gravesite or reliquary where holy days are celebrated and hundreds or thou-
Map 4 sands of pilgrims hosted every year, and this is what I shall be concerned with here.

More than any other institution in Central Asia, shrines are thresholds that both separate and connect the mundane and the sacred, the living and the dead, the needy and those who can fulfill need. The people associated with shrines themselves assume a degree of sanctity and power from that affiliation. They are the caretakers, the managers, who often serve as living embodiments of the spiritual qualities for which the interred saint or, less frequently, the relic is revered. Shrines have also formed a focal point for public works and, like non-profit organizations today, have long served as vehicles for channeling government funding into welfare services.

In tracing the history of shrines in Central Asia, the former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) present a somewhat different case from the Afghan part of the region. The history of Afghan shrines has followed a consistent and uninterrupted path. North of the Amu, the Soviet period interrupted and altered the history and meaning of shrines. While promoting atheism, the Soviet government was often ambivalent and contradictory in its policy toward shrines. It preserved many of the major shrine centers (sometimes as museums) while at the same time prohibiting or deriding their use for religious purposes. But despite the rhetorical antipathy, the Soviet state did spend money to maintain, refurbish, or simply protect shrines against vandalism. Whether these expenditures were rationalized on the grounds of promoting tourism or preserving the material culture of a particular nationality or people, the fact remains that important shrines were preserved and protected. Recent reports of a return to earlier religious practices, especially pilgrimages, and the corollary private and public investment in the revival of shrines indicate that a considerable degree of popular religious sentiment survived the Soviet era along with the physical structures to which that sentiment is attached.

Shrine Societies

Shrines are important for obvious reasons (as pilgrimage destinations and as burial grounds) and for less obvious ones (as objects of

political patronage and as the means by which locally prominent families were created and survived for long periods). These "shrine" families evolved in the Central Asian context as leading mediators of ethnic, national, class, and sectarian conflict—combining sacred functions with economic and political influence.

Anthropological work in Afghanistan has shown how shrines generate their own social worlds. Robert Canfield, for example, links local shrines in Afghanistan to what he calls a "pir network,"[2] a spiritual community consisting of a learned or holy figure and his followers. An example of such a pir network with its associated small shrine was described by Richard Scott in the 1970s. It was
Map 4 located in the village of Aynak, in the Helmand Basin near Nad Ali (northwest of Lashkargah).

> At [Aynak] . . . there is a village of Sayeds (descendants from the Prophet Mohammed) called Sayedad [Sayedan[3]]. Nearby is the tomb of Mir Salim who founded the village when he was given land and settled in the area some 400 years ago by the resident Barakzai tribe. He was the local Pir (religious leader or guide) and had a wide following. His tomb is a place of pilgrimage. His descendants presently inhabit the village and the highly fragmented nature of their land holdings reflects this heritage. They still serve their religious function with an old and respected patriarch taking the lead with much dignity, although presently being nearly infirm. Other members of this lineage stated that they make yearly treks to some of the northern provinces of the country where they receive religious dues from displaced Pashtun tribal villages that apparently accepted continued obligations of support for the role of the Pir after these many decades.[4]

This is as good an example as any of the relationship of shrine and shrine administration (in this case the descendants of the founding pir) with the local community. It also indicates the wider geographic linkages possible. The family's annual trips to the north to receive religious offerings give some sense of its sphere of authority. The family of Mir Salim is also a good example of the way in which local dynastic families originate as shrine managers. In this case, it is the

family members, descendants of the saint buried at the shrine, who serve as managers and caretakers of the shrine. But sometimes the caretakers are members of a family with no claims of descent from the saint whose shrine they tend. These guardian or fiduciary families, whether legitimized by virtue of their descent from the interred saint or by virtue of their historic affiliation with the shrine as managers, become locally prominent, with all the political and economic authority that goes along with social prominence, particularly where state institutions are weak.

A different example, one where the shrine houses a relic rather than a saint, is the shrine of the Prophet's Cloak, the most important shrine in Qandahar, in southeastern Afghanistan. The relic was brought to Qandahar by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the founder of the modern country of Afghanistan, as part of the spoils of his campaign in the north in 1768 and became an element in the aura of his legitimacy as founder of the Durrani dynasty. From virtually the time the cloak arrived in Qandahar, it was placed under the guardianship of a family that came to be known as the Akhundzadah Alikuza'i family. A royal decree from 1873 confirmed the rights of this family as guardians, and, in a book published in the 1960s, a modern Afghan historian provides a family tree showing the lineage of the guardians down to the mid-twentieth century.[5]

In terms of their enduring economic and political influence, locally prominent shrine families may be compared, if we allow for the different contexts, with those lineages that George Marcus and Peter Dobkin Hall have styled "dynastic families" in an American setting.[6]

What characterizes the dynastic family in the view of Marcus and Hall is its ability to transform hereditary wealth into capital through legal instruments (particularly the trust). The transformation of hereditary wealth into capital, they believe, also transforms the nature of the family. In Marcus's words, the "legally devised plan to transfer and conserve patrimonial capital in one generation becomes in the next generation an organizational framework for extended family relations—actually a formal model or surrogate of the family, with law, rather than the founding entrepreneurial patriarch as its source of authority."[7] In the context of American law, the various

forms of the trust serve as the basis for the "legally devised plan" to conserve and transfer capital, but there need be no ultimate charitable purpose. In the Shari'a context, the trust or waqf is also the means used to conserve capital, but there is one significant difference: The Shari'a requires that there be an ultimate charitable purpose to the trust, a condition that tended to bind the fortunes of dynastic families to charitable institutions, like shrines and the various facilities they provided.

Hall refines the formulation about capital preservation and its transfer from generation to generation and introduces an element of particular relevance to the Central Asian case.

> The mere fact that a family has been able to transmit land, money or an occupation over several generations does not make it a dynasty. The family's activities must be framed—and be viewed as being framed—by an overarching sense of purpose, an interest or concern. A dynasty is as much a matter of continuity of intention and identity as of fortune or fame.[8]

For the families that we will examine, the shrine and its charismatic tradition provide the identity and purpose fueling that dynastic impulse.

In Marcus's view of dynastic families in the United States, the evolution of their wealth is a force separate from the family that generated the wealth and can be passed on to those who administer it. "The dynastic will in such an organization—the desire to keep going," he says, "gets displaced onto the corporate bureaucratic affairs of producing and reproducing patrimonial wealth." Legal and administrative arrangements "become an integral dimension of family relationships themselves."[9] In addition, "the fiduciary, the professional agent acting for the benefit of another, is in fact the committed heir to a founding family's dynastic ambition." This formulation provides a useful way of looking at Central Asian shrines and the managerial families associated with them. It does not, of course, account for an element missing in the American context, the sanctity of the endowed institutions and how the protection of that element also figures into the "dynastic will" of its guardians. But it

is nonetheless useful when we look at shrines, especially large and wealthy ones, in helping us understand the relation between the shrine's economy and the formation of prominent lineages from the managerial class, the *mutawallis* and *nazirs*, regardless of whether or not they are descendants of the interred saint.

Financial Basis of a Shrine

Many of the most prominent shrines of Central Asia today have records stretching back half a millennium or more. Such longevity can be explained in large part by the existence of substantial economic means, competent management, and a stable legal environment. These all provide the setting for a spiritual tradition to flourish. The spiritual tradition, in turn, helps generate new sources of wealth, e.g., gifts for the shrine. New sources of funds promote and validate the managerial claims of competence and legitimacy, which in turn weigh heavily in the political sphere, conferring on the shrines and their caretakers the authority to arbitrate and mediate social conflict.

The initial basis for the economy of any of the large old shrines was real estate. The shrine usually acquired its first real estate by donation or endowment and then added to it by soliciting additional donations and endowments or by using its own funds to purchase real estate. Besides real estate and the rights associated with it (tax privileges, rights to water, development rights), a shrine's economy was bolstered by the votive offerings (*nuzurat*)—gifts of money and valuables—brought by pilgrims.

In general, the Shari'a required that trusts and endowments could only be established out of an individual's private property. There is some evidence to suggest that state properties, or state prerogatives such as the collection of certain taxes, were also donated on occasion. But even in such cases care often seems to have been taken to transform state property into private property before its conveyance to waqf.[10]

Endowments were encouraged both by altruism and by the Shari'a rules that govern probate. As was mentioned toward the end

of the previous chapter, private property is subject to strict formulaic division at the death of the owner. Shari'a regulations establish two mandatory classes of heirs whose rights must be satisfied, and they set forth specific share-rights for the two classes, depending on the degree of relationship between decedent and heirs and on the gender of the heir.[11] If not countered by other options, this division of property at probate leads to the fractionalization of property ownership with each passing generation.

But there *are* other options. One, already mentioned, is for the heirs to hold undivided shares in the property—rather than to dispose of it and divide the proceeds. As one generation succeeds another, such shares can become exceedingly minute. In sale documents from sixteenth-century Bukhara, for example, there are many purchases of "undivided" shares in a property, shares which in all likelihood were created at the division of an estate amongst the heirs. [12]

Another option is to establish an endowment or trust and place one's property in it. The conditions of the endowment must meet the requirements of the Shari'a; that is, the endowment has to be irrevocable (after the death of the founder) and ultimately serve some charitable purpose. Such a trust would preserve the integrity of property, particularly if the donor specified in the endowment deed that it would not be sold or otherwise divided. If the donor also wished to provide for his or her relatives or friends, the trust could serve as a source of income for them, either as its administrators or, as was often the case, as co-beneficiaries with the charitable object.

Hence there were legal as well as altruistic reasons why private property, especially in the case of large estates accumulated by one individual or family, was often put in trust. These endowments had several consequences: In Central Asia, one of them was to lay the foundations for dynastic families like the Ahraris of Samarqand, the Juybaris of Bukhara, and the Ansaris of Herat and Balkh. Another consequence was to create engines of investment, that is, concentrated amounts of capital that could be used for local investment in social welfare infrastructure (schools in particular, but also hospitals, orphanages, and hostels); commercial infrastructure (warehouses, shopping centers, and small factories); and agricultural infrastructure (irrigation systems, mills, and granaries).

The accumulation of capital in endowments provides us with something we might call an Islamic model of a redistributive economy (fig. 1). Endowments, especially large ones, offer the potential



Figure 1. An Islamic Model of a Redistributive Economy

Developer (patron) capitalizes (perhaps through sale of land, other real estate, development rights) construction of complex including commercial and cultural components and endows it. The cultural establishment (mosque, madrasah-college, khanaqah-hospice, zawiyah or mazar-shrine) serves three functions: 1) the investment rationale, (providing legal basis), 2) demand generator for services and goods to be supplied by the commercial, residential, retail sectors), and 3) property/fiscal management. The commercial component produces revenues (rents) for the cultural establishment which re-distributes them as salaries/stipends, maintenance expenses, capital re-investment.

for large capital accumulation. The wealth amassed by an individual during his or her lifetime is set up in a foundation whose structure is designed to keep the capital productive, provide for the social needs of the community, and preserve the capital from the disintegrative effects of inheritance law. A large endowment might include the cultural object, a shrine, a college or a mosque, along with the means to maintain it—agricultural properties and commercial real estate being the most common form. The income produced by the real estate properties flows through the institution and finances its upkeep and other specified uses. In the case of financing a college, for example, the income would provide stipends for students and salaries for faculty, a library, and other amenities such as a resident barber and water deliveryman. Thus, commercial and agricultural income is cycled through the institution and into the economy. In many cases, these public institutions are beneficiaries who are paired with individuals dear to the donor—for example, his family, or members of a religious order with which he was affiliated. In every case where the information is available, waqfs (endowments) are the foundation of the wealth of the great shrines of Central Asia.

THE GREAT SHRINES OF CENTRAL ASIA

For the remainder of this chapter, I shall focus on a group of the larger shrines, those commanding broad regional allegiances. The nature of the information we have about them varies considerably. Sometimes there is detailed financial information for certain periods but none for others. In some cases, we know a good deal about the physical evolution of the shrine but little if anything about the fiduciary families associated with it. And occasionally there is extensive information on the families and little on the shrine itself. Out of this disparate information, certain patterns emerge, and, in the absence of more specific information, trends discernible in one instance may be tentatively considered applicable to others.

I will discuss five shrines here: Two of these shrines are today within the borders of Afghanistan: the shrine of the Hanbali mystic

'Abd Allah Ansari (d. 1089) at Gazur Gah near Herat; and the shrine of the fourth caliph and first Shi'ite Imam, 'Ali b. Abi Talib (d. 661) near Balkh (the site of the tomb is now the present-day city of Mazar-i Sharif). The other three shrines lie within Uzbekistan today—the shrines of Baha' al-Din Naqshband (d. 1391) and Imam Abu Bakr Ahmad b. Sa'd (d. 970–71) at Bukhara and the shrine of 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar (d. 1490) in the southern suburbs of the city of Samarqand.

Some Features of Central Asian Shrines

Besides producing locally prominent families, these shrines have a number of other characteristics in common. First, their location seems to have been a major factor in their growth and development. All were established outside the city walls or urban centers proper, usually a few miles out in the garden districts. (When the shrine of 'Ali b. Abi Talib was founded, it lay some twelve miles to the east of Balkh, in the village of Khwajah Khayran, now Mazar-i Sharif.) The fact that these five shrines were all founded in suburban settings may be mere coincidence. Many lesser shrines were established inside the cities. But the fact that the suburban shrines grew wealthy and expanded over the centuries would seem to be at least partly due to location. It may be, too, that other demands on urban property made it easier to develop the suburban shrines. In addition, as suburban shrines they were attractive retreats from the hustle and bustle of the town.

Another feature they shared in common was their very public and often very lavish patronage from individuals belonging to the ruling classes. This tight relationship between shrines and politicians, so evident after the middle of the fifteenth century, was probably not a new, post-Mongol phenomenon. But economic conditions—that is, ample surpluses accruing to the political class either through its ownership of private property or tax privileges—enabled politicians, military men, and other wealthy individuals to make relatively large donations to shrines. These donations are most noticeable over the period beginning in the first half of the fifteenth century and con-

tinue down to the end of the nineteenth century. An association with a shrine during a politican's lifetime sometimes insured his posthumous association as well. The meaning attached to burial "at the head" or "at the foot" of a saint placed great demand on the acreage around the saint's tomb, and the wealthy and the powerful used their patronage as a means to secure such a place. The Prophet Muhammad's tomb at Medina, in Arabia, was the model for this relationship and, when possible, burial there was the goal of those who could afford it. At least three ruling khans in the seventeenth century—Imam Quli (r. 1612–1642); Nazr Muhammad, his brother (r. 1642–1645); and Nazr Muhammad's son, 'Abd al-'Aziz (r. 1645–1682)—abdicated in order to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and to spend their final days and be buried there. (Two of the khans made it all the way to Mecca; Nazr Muhammad died enroute.) But the logistics of such an arrangement were complicated, and for most of the Central Asian sovereigns their own great shrines were seen to serve as satisfactory surrogates for the holy sites of Arabia.

A third feature these five shrines shared was a major if not dominant role in the local economy, as significant regional investors and employers. (In the mid-1880s, for example, the 'Alid shrine at Mazar-i Sharif employed some 109 people and another 168 or so received stipends in one form or another from it.[13] It is doubtful that any other enterprise in the region at the time employed as many people, with the exception of the army.) Shrines also could bring into a region significant amounts of money from pilgrims. Many of the shrines were sites where Muslim holidays were celebrated or had specific festivals associated with them. Finally, shrines could also have a major impact on local agriculture by virtue of the trust lands they leased out and their control of irrigation systems.

Other Shrines of Central Asia

The five shrines discussed so far are, or have been, among the largest, the wealthiest, and, therefore, arguably the most important ones. But there are many other comparable shrines:

1. The shrine of Ahmad Yasavi (d. 1166), famed for his success at converting the Turks of the steppes to Islam, is located at Yasi on the Syr River north of Tashkent, at the edge of the steppe.

2. The shrine of Sayyid Ata (who lived in the first quarter of the fourteenth century) is at Baqirqan, in the Amu delta region of Uzbekistan. Sayyid Ata was renowned for converting the tribes of the Qipchaq Steppe to Islam in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries; the tomb remained a pilgrimage goal for centuries, and the survival of a Sayyid Ata "cult" was noted by a Soviet researcher as recently as the late 1960s.[14]

3. At Old Urganch in the Amu River delta, the tomb of Najm al-Din Kubra (d.1220), the eponymous founder of the Kubrawiyyah Sufi order, was a site of pilgrimage for centuries even after the Kubrawiyyah order had disappeared from the region. Pilgrimage to the tomb was said to continue even in late Soviet times.[15]

4. Another shrine, that of one of Najm al-Din's disciples, Sayf al-Din Bakharzi (d. 1221), still stands in Bukhara; his descendants benefited from its endowments for at least five centuries.[16]

5. An important shrine site is at Yamghan or Hazrat Sayyid in Afghan Badakhshan, the location of the tomb of Nasir-i Khusraw (d. ca. 1075), author of a famous medieval travelogue[17] and the man who brought Isma'ili Shi'ism, an important factor today in the politics of Tajikistan, to the region.[18]

6. Between Samarqand and Bukhara lies the town of Karminah, the site of another celebrated shrine, that of Qasim 'Azizan.[19]

7. Just north of Samarqand, in the village of Dahpid, the shrine of Khwajah Ahmad Kasani survives;[20] from that shrine center, missionaries carried Islam and Naqshbandi Sufism into Chinese Turkistan.[21]

8. In the first chapter, I mentioned the Andkhud (Andkhoy) cult of Ata Sangu Jan Baba; his shrine is in that town.[22]

Virtually every town had its shrine or shrines. From the fifteenth century onward, local shrines appear to have been more important when describing a town's features than its mosques or colleges. At all times, these shrines were revered. They do not seem to have gone in and out of favor, and, from time to time, wealthy individuals, some-

times local figures, sometimes national ones, transferred substantial amounts of money or property to them.

What sets apart the five shrines I have chosen to discuss in detail is their apparently greater wealth relative to others (or the relatively greater wealth of the dynastic families affiliated with them), their long histories, and the scale of patronage they received from the ruling khans (in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), amirs (in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), and presidents and prime ministers (in the twentieth century).

In what follows, I will consider the five shrines from three perspectives: (1) their physical evolution; (2) the formation of "dynastic families"; and (3) their functions as legitimizers of political organizations and mediators between those organizations and their subjects.

Given the long but not equally well-documented history of these five shrines, I can only sketch here those facets of each that touch on these three perspectives and suggest where further research might lead.

1. The Gazur Gah Shrine of 'Abd Allah Ansari at Herat

Gazur Gah, the shrine of 'Abd Allah Ansari (d. 1089), stands on the northern edge of the Herat oasis.[23] Famed as a Hanbali specialist in *hadith* literature and as a mystic and an ascetic who supposedly slept with a brick for a pillow, Ansari is also remembered for his rigorous advocacy of the idea of the indivisibility of the nature of God. His writings condemned the worship of saints, but, in a nice twist of fate, he has come to be known as the patron saint of Herat.

In the eleventh century, Gazur Gah was already a place of local spiritual importance as well as the burial place of Ansari's own teacher and other holy men. For the next two centuries or so, his tomb and the tombs of other mystics there were visited by pilgrims of all kinds, but no major investments were made to turn it into a shrine center.[24] Other nearby places, Jam in eastern Khurasan[25] and Chisht to the east of Herat, were more popular until the fifteenth century, when Herat became the center of a great flowering of artistic and intellectual activities under the sponsorship of the Timurid

family. Timur's successor, Shah Rukh (r. 1405–1447), made Herat his capital and invested heavily in the city's reconstruction, including the construction of a major shrine building at the tomb of Ansari. The Timurid historian, 'Abd al-Razzaq Samarqandi, described the building in some detail:

> On the east side was the entryway—a large aywan flanked by two stories of arcaded rooms. On the north and south sides, a similar layout of two stories of rooms with arched recesses opening into them and divided in the middle by a large aywan. On the west side the architecture was similar but instead of two stories of rooms flanking the aywan there is a vestibule flanked by two two-story assembly halls.[26]

The building still stands despite the long war and the intense fighting in Herat in the 1980s. A conference held in Paris in 1988 on damage to monuments in Herat caused by the Soviet occupation mentions Gazur Gah in its proceedings, but, because the shrine was next to a military garrison and inaccessible in the 1980s, the report says nothing of any damage.[27] A year later the façade of the shrine was featured on an Afghan postage stamp, and in 1994 an American visitor to Herat reported that the shrine was in fine condition and that "the reverent life at the complex continues."[28]

Besides the building, Shah Rukh provided the shrine with a large endowment of agricultural land in Herat, and, again according to Samarqandi, the sultan diligently visited the shrine every Thursday afternoon when he was in Herat. These "sabbath eve" visits were important in the cultural life of the cities in which such shrines were located. It was common throughout Central Asia for literary men and scholars to congregate at suburban shrines on Thursday afternoons for discussions, recitations, and debates. At these gatherings, the ruler and his advisers could evaluate the qualifications of potential office-holders or recipients of patronage, while aspiring scholars, artists, or would-be officeholders could display their intellectual and rhetorical talents and so try to win appointments, promotions, or rewards. There is no doubt that Shah Rukh wanted to be closely identified with the Ansari shrine, and he presumably derived a satisfac-

tory amount of prestige from his patronage.[29] It has been suggested that, when he first invested in it, the Ansari cult was not particularly important and that the Timurid ruler wanted to revive it and identify his family with its revival.[30]

Various smaller additions were made to the shrine over the course of the rest of the fifteenth century. Then, in the latter half of the century, Sultan Husayn Mirza Bayqara (r. 1469–1506) made a bid to connect Gazur Gah and the Timurid family more permanently and more overtly. He exhumed the bodies of his father, brothers, and uncle and reburied them in a family sepulcher, a large raised platform called a *takht*, in the center of the courtyard of the shrine. An expert on the shrine, Lisa Golombek, interprets this reburial as an effort to assert the primacy of one of the until-then marginalized lineages of Timur—the line of his son 'Umar Shaykh.[31]

The political importance of the shrines as the burial place of rulers and of other prominent figures in Central Asia is fairly evident through all the sources.[32] Burial at or near the shrine of Ansari was prized by others besides the Timurids. Those who could afford it erected great mausolea and other facilities or contributed to the endowment. One of the more significant non-Timurid endowments was made by a leading military figure, an amir of the Barlas tribe, Shuja' al-Din Muhammad, in 1500. The endowment is recorded in an inscription affixed to the entrance of Shah Rukh's building.[33] It comprised twenty-three pieces of real estate, including a residential compound, cultivable land, a vineyard, a bath, shops, mills, canals, and water rights located in various places, some as far away as Nishapur to the west and Shibarghan to the northeast. Remote resources of a shrine also placed a burden on political authorities to ensure that the shrine administration had access to them. The administration of these remote endowments thus inevitably injected the economic concerns and policies of the shrine into the politics and economies of those places, so that the interests of shrines and states sometimes coincided in unexpectedly expansionist, or even irredentist ways.

The Ansari cult and the shrine continued to flourish long after the Timurids had disappeared from the scene. In the late seventeenth

century, a branch of the neo-Chingizid Tuqay-Timurid family, exiled to Herat from the Tuqay-Timurid lands to the north, became major patrons of the Ansari shrine. One of the exiles, a woman known as Mahd-i 'Ulya (d. 1683 or 1684), spent a large sum to repair a cistern at the shrine. And many of her relatives at Herat lavished money on elaborate sepulchers there.[34] Fikri Saljuqi, an Afghan writer who studied the shrine, records burials of members of this expatriate neo-Chingizid line well into the eighteenth century.[35]

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Afghan amir Dust Muhammad died in Herat and was buried, presumably in accordance with his own wishes, at Gazur Gah.[36] It is the last instance, to my knowledge, of a major political leader choosing to be buried at Gazur Gah.[37]

Although the patronage record of the Timurid period has been well-researched, the administrative record for that period and after remains obscure. Unlike the other shrines discussed here, the family or families that managed the Gazur Gah shrine and its endowments over the centuries have yet to be clearly identified.[38] We know of one shrine dynasty family known as "Ansari." But it is connected with the shrine of 'Ali b. Abi Talib in the present-day Afghan city of Mazar-i Sharif not with the Gazur Gah shrine.

2. The Noble Shrine of 'Ali b. Abi Talib at Mazar-i Sharif (or Balkh)

At the same time that Sultan Husayn Mirza Bayqara, the Timurid ruler at Herat, was turning the Ansari shrine into a family cemetery by re-interring the remains of his father, uncle, and brothers in a new funerary platform there, he was also investing heavily in the revival of the shrine of 'Ali b. Abi Talib (pl. 15), the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, a few miles east of Balkh and about 650 kilometers northeast of his capital. Pl. 15

The details of the story of the discovery and rediscovery of the tomb of 'Ali are told elsewhere.[39] But the general outline is as follows: Like the Ansari cult at Herat, the 'Alid cult at Balkh dates to the pre-Mongol period. The 'Alid tomb was first discovered in 1135,

some fifty years after Ansari's death, and like Ansari's cult at Herat it remained of only local significance and unremarked in textual sources until the fifteenth century. In 1480, with much fanfare, Sultan Husayn Mirza Bayqara announced the rediscovery of the tomb of 'Ali, endowed it with enough resources to insure the revival and durability of the cult at Balkh and built a large mausoleum, a college, and a *khanaqah*-hospice[40] on the site. Why he did so remains uncertain, but the project may have been part of a Timurid political program that aimed at reinforcing (or perhaps re-inventing) the image of its own sovereignty and political legitimacy.[41] And like Gazur Gah, the shrine has continued to be politically important, long after the Timurid era faded into historical memory.[42]

In the sixteenth century, two major structures were added to the shrine complex. Around 1540, the Shibanid who governed Balkh, Kistan Qara Sultan (d. 1544), built a large mausoleum for himself at the shrine. Then, in the mid-1590s, it appears that the last Shibanid khan, 'Abd al-Mu'min, who governed Balkh from 1583 to 1598, had "the outer dome" (the shrine is a double-domed building) built, perhaps paying for it with his share of the booty from the successful Shibanid/Uzbek campaigns of 1587–89 in Khurasan against the Safavids.[43]

Throughout the seventeenth century, the rulers of Balkh lavished attention and money on the 'Alid shrine.[44] When the Afghans eventually gained control of the region in the eighteenth century, they too spent considerable sums on the shrine. The nineteenth-century amir and son of Dust Muhammad Khan, Shayr 'Ali Khan, is buried in a mausoleum he built for himself there, as is another son, the hero of the First Afghan War (1839–42), Wazir Muhammad Akbar.[45] Later in the nineteenth century, the governor of Afghan Turkestan, Muhammad 'Alam Khan, set about renovating the shrine. He established a ceramic tile factory on site and recruited a master craftsman from Samarqand, Ustad Sami' Khan, who was then working at Balkh, to oversee the remodeling. This craftsman may have been at work on another shrine, the fifteenth-century mazar of Abu Nasr Parsa, one of the few buildings still standing in Balkh by that time. Ustad Sami' Khan spent the next four years overseeing the produc-

tion and application of new tilework, much of which still remains today. Later governors continued the work of restoration.[46]

For the people of the region, the shrine has long served as a pilgrimage site and a place for celebrating holy days. In the early seventeenth century, one contemporary author tells us that pilgrims to the shrine came year round but especially during the first ten days of Muharram (the first month of the Muslim calendar) and on Thursday afternoons during the seventh month, Rajab.[47] The shrine has also hosted the region's major festival, the forty-day celebration called "the Rose" (Gul-i Surkh), since the early nineteenth century or before. The Rose begins on New Year's Day (Nawruz—March 20) with a flag-raising (*bala jandah*) ceremony in the courtyard of the main building.[48] The holiday attracts visitors from all over the region, especially diseased or handicapped pilgrims hoping for a cure.

Shrine Administration: The Emergence of the Ansari Family. By the middle of the seventeenth century, one family, the Ansaris, had established itself as having a historic right to administer the shrine and its endowments, a right they claimed dated back to Sultan Husayn Mirza Bayqara. A document from 1668 even gives us the name of the first Ansari trustee of the shrine, Mirza Abu al-Hasan Ansari,[49] but information contemporary with the founding of the shrine in the late fifteenth century provides no corroboration of the Ansari claim.

Khwandamir, the earliest source to name the first administrators, mentions two—Sayyid Taj al-Din from Andkhud, a descendant of Timur's spiritual mentor, Sayyid Barakah (d. 1403–4),[50] and Shams al-Din Muhammad from Ghazni, whom the author links to the early Khurasan mystic, Abu Yazid Bastami. These two were appointed to the shrine offices of *naqib* and *shaykh*, respectively, which seem to have been the top administrative positions at the time, although we do not know precisely what functions the offices performed.[51]

There were at least two other appointments of which I was unaware until quite recently.[52] Like the officials named by Khwandamir, neither of these can be linked at this point to Gazur Gah or 'Abd Allah Ansari and so be connected to the family at the Mazar-i

Sharif shrine. One official, Qiwam al-Din Abu al-Qasim, who had been a middle-level bureaucrat in Herat and left that position to go to Balkh, is described in an undated decree (*farman*) issued by Sultan Husayn Mirza Bayqara as director of construction and supervisor of agriculture for the shrine.[53] The farman was a directive to him to fulfill certain unspecified conditions regarding the excavation or perhaps re-excavation of the Shahi Canal. The Shahi Canal was the core of the shrine endowment established by the Timurid ruler. Another official was Haydar Muhammad, who was appointed professor (*mudarris*) at the Royal College (*madrasah-i humayun*), which had been built at the shrine and endowed by Bayqara.[54]

From the standpoint of verifying later Ansari claims, neither Khwandamir nor the documents provides any evidence to tie any one of these four men with the shrine of Gazur Gah or the "Saint of Herat." Khwandamir does, however, refer to a group of anonymous officials, "trustworthy functionaries" (*'amalah-i amin*), who came from Herat at the time of the revival of the shrine tradition. It may well have been out of this group that the family calling itself Ansari eventually rose to control the shrine.

In 1615, Mahmud b. Amir Wali reports the appointment of a "Mirza Sanjar" as chief trustee of the shrine. According to this account, he was said to come from India, and his genealogy is linked not to 'Abd Allah Ansari but to the then-khan's mother, who was from Mashhad and from a family claiming descent from the Eighth Imam, 'Ali b. Musa al-Rida.[55] There is no question that a family calling itself Ansari was recognized as the legitimate trustees by 1668. But the source of that legitimacy must have been open to question for some time. At what point the Ansari family came to exercise full control of the shrine and its endowment is unclear. It is not until 1668 that a source first names the above-mentioned Mirza Abu al-Hasan Ansari said to have been "descended by seed [i.e. on the father's side] from Khwajah 'Abd Allah Ansari and by womb from Sultan Mawdud-i Chishti"[56] and appointed during the time of Sultan Husayn Bayqara.[57] But his existence cannot be verified at this point. A codicil to this document drawn up in 1721 does mention a Mirza

Sanjar Ansari, perhaps the same figure mentioned by Mahmud b. Amir Wali, whose affiliation with the Ansaris is uncertain.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the shrine possessed considerable resources, which had grown over the years. In 1480, Sultan Husayn Mirza Bayqara established the first major endowment, perhaps with the financial help of Mir 'Ali Shir Nawa'i. This endowment included the Shahi Canal, mentioned earlier, a shopping center, a public bath, and the madrasah and khanaqah. Large additions to the endowment were made during the period from 1615 to 1660. These included water rights and real estate throughout the region. By 1668, the entire eastern region of the province of Balkh was recognized by the political administration as being included in the endowment of the shrine.[58]

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the region was divided into a number of petty amirates,[59] the shrine had enough income to maintain a military force of perhaps as many as 1,000 horsemen. The Ansaris, who were the administrators, themselves emerge in this period as wielders of enough military power to maintain the shrine as an autonomous political entity.[60]

These resources were probably at the root cause of a struggle for control of the chief trusteeship in the middle of the eighteenth century. In *Waqf in Central Asia*, I argued that the division of the Ansari family into two lines at this time could best be explained as the result of such a contest. The 'Azizi branch of the family won control of the trusteeship (*tawliyat*) sometime in the second half of the eighteenth century and held it at least until the end of the nineteenth century. The rival Ni'mati line, while not banished from the shrine or excluded from its right to income from the endowment, assumed a secondary position and was barred from holding the top administrative post. By the late nineteenth century, when Ansaris were identifying themselves as either Ni'mati or 'Azizi, 'Azizis had control of a majority of shrine offices and a disproportionate share (in terms of their numbers) of the income.[61]

However modest its beginnings, the family's long connection with the shrine had in effect transformed its image to the point where recognizing the hereditary right of the Ansaris first to the

trusteeship of the shrine and its endowments and then as the direct beneficiaries of the income from the endowments apparently presented no particular dilemma to higher authorities.

Another transformation in the role and image of the family also accompanied its long tenure as trustees. Since the late nineteenth century at the latest, the family had also added the mantle of spiritual heir of the legacy of 'Ali b. Abi Talib to its status as financial beneficiary of the shrine. In other words, the family was effectively sacralized by its long affiliation with the shrine. This latter stage in the transformation of family members from minor bureaucratic figures to chief fiduciaries to beneficiaries to quasi-saintly figures is symbolized by the blessing that the head of the family is now expected to give to pilgrims who come to the shrine on New Year's Day (Nawruz) when the Festival of the Rose is celebrated.[62]

The Ansari family fits the Marcus and Hill model of a dynastic family particularly well. If we think of the shrine's endowment and its management as analogous to the kind of "legal plan" Marcus describes as a "model and surrogate" for the American dynastic family, then the mid-eighteenth century struggles for control of the administration of the shrine and its endowment resemble the kinds of succession struggles wealthy American families have engaged in for control not only of patrimonial capital but also of the "intention" and "purpose" of the family. For the Ansaris, the meaning of family and membership in it came to be defined first in terms of the endowment and the right to benefit from it and later from the mantle of sanctity such affiliation conferred.

3. The Shrine of Baha' al-Din Naqshband at Bukhara

The history of the Naqshbandi shrine at Bukhara is somewhat more difficult to track through history, in part because, during the seventy years of Soviet rule, its administrative continuity was severed and its archives apparently dispersed. Little money seems to have been spent during that time, either to maintain it or transform it into a tourist attraction. Still, the shrine has left enough traces in the historical record for us to piece together the outlines of its his-

tory up until the Soviet period. Interest in the shrine revived (or long-existing interest was again made public) following independence in 1991 and has stimulated scholars to study it anew.[63]

In 1989, the crew of the NASA space shuttle photographed the Bukharan oasis. In the photo (pl. 6), one can see a large reservoir on the northeastern side of the oasis. On Soviet maps, the reservoir is called the "Mazar Reservoir" after the great shrine whose cemetery once spread over the area just west of the site. At the center of this necropolis are buildings that comprise the shrine of Baha' al-Din Naqshband (d. 1391), the eponymous founder of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Pl. 6

Baha' al-Din Naqshband died at the beginning of the Timurid era. Although numerous buildings were erected around his tomb in the intervening years, all that survive today date from either the sixteenth or nineteenth centuries, except for those built since 1991.[64] The main building still surviving of this complex is a khanaqah, or hostel (pl. 16), built in 1544–45 by the Shibanid ruler at Bukhara, 'Abd al-'Aziz Khan.[65] Another structure built by 'Abd al-'Aziz at the same time was a hazirah (an unroofed enclosure for individual or group burials).[66] Hazirah compounds were often used as family cemeteries. It is not clear to me that 'Abd al-'Aziz's hazirah compound can be distinguished today amidst the expanse of mounds and broken stones that surround the Naqshbandi shrine unless it is identical with the sepulcher described by Nekrasova.[67] Pl. 16

From later times, we know that Abu al-Fayz Khan (r. 1711–47), the khan at Bukhara, buried his mother just outside 'Abd al-'Aziz's hazirah.[68] There are other references to what might have been part of the Shibanid compound. When Henry Lansdell visited the shrine in 1882 in hopes of seeing lepers, he was shown what his guide perhaps thought should be of more interest to him, the takht (burial platform) of the Jani-Begids, the Shibanid clan that ruled much of Central Asia in the second half of the sixteenth century. The significance of the site was apparently lost on Lansdell, but he says he photographed the takht. What he published, however, is not a photograph but an engraving, perhaps after the photo, of the tomb of 'Abd Allah Khan b. Iskandar Khan b. Jani Beg (d. 1598). From

this, we know that the Shibanid necropolis was still intact as recently as a century ago.[69] The sketch shows a grave inside the large rectangular platform (the takht), which itself lies inside an enclosure, perhaps the hazirah attributed to 'Abd al-'Aziz.[70]

The Naqshbandi shrine was particularly important in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a place where politicians and other dignitaries would stop and pay respects when visiting Bukhara or embarking on some affair outside the region. In the chronicle written for 'Abd Allah Khan, there is a particularly full record of visits to this shrine. 'Abd Allah did not, however, restrict his homage to the Naqshbandi shrine. He gave shrines in other cities the same attention: in Karminah, the shrine of the 'Azizan shaykhs; in Tashkent, the shrine of Shaykh Khawand Tahur (latterly called Shaykhantawr); in Samarqand, the shrine of Khwajah 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar and the shrine of Qutham b. 'Abbas (better known today as Shah-i Zindah);[71] at Balkh, the 'Alid shrine as well as the shrine of Abu Nasr Parsa; at Herat (which 'Abd Allah b. Iskandar captured from the Safavids and held for ten years at the end of the century), Gazur Gah; and in Mashhad, which he held for some eight years, the shrine of the Eighth Imam.[72]

The great hall of the khanaqah of Baha' al-Din served as an excellent auditorium for *majlise*s (large meetings) presided over by the reigning khan. Such gatherings had several related functions. They provided a venue and sounding board for discussions of policy and a way for the khan and his military supporters to test the waters of public opinion. For the intellectuals who attended, it was a forum in which to display forensic skills and scholarly credentials and so, perhaps, at some point to win appointment to a judgeship or professorship or some other government appointment. The Iranian expatriate Fazl Allah Khunji describes one such majlis at the Naqshbandi khanaqah, which Shibani Khan presided over in 1508 on the eve of a campaign against the Qazaqs.[73] Among other things, the following question was posed: "Is the campaign against the Qazaqs a personal obligation (*farz 'ayn*) on each Muslim or an obligation that a sufficient number could satisfy for the rest (*farz kifayah*)?" (Khunji, never

modest about his own rhetorical skills, tells us how he successfully argued the first premise.)

The Naqshbandi shrine was also important on one occasion in the transfer of power within the Jani-Begid family. In late June 1583, the reigning khan, Iskandar b. Jani Beg, died. His body was first taken from his residence in the citadel in Bukhara to the Great Mosque, the Masjid-i Kalan, which was close by. There, the funeral service was performed. He was then carried out to the Naqshbandi shrine and buried in the great takht, which he himself had built when his father, Jani Beg, died.[74] (This is the funeral platform that was shown to Lansdell three hundred years later.)

As was customary, Iskandar Khan's eldest son, 'Ibad Allah, the only son with him at the time of his death, ordered that Qur'an reciters (*hafiz,* pl. *huffaz*) perform recitations of the entire Qur'an at nightfall and daybreak for an unspecified number of days. On the fifth day after his death, Hafiz-i Tanish tells us, a large banquet was held at the Great Mosque in Bukhara, which brought together "leaders and notables and market folk and commoners." On the seventh day, another banquet was held at the Naqshbandi shrine and again the city's leaders and notables sat down to eat with members of the army and the general public while the Qur'an-reciters performed in the background. Funeral ceremonies like this brought together politically influential elements of society, and we have to assume they provided an opportunity to discuss the question of succession. Such occasions also served as token or substantive gestures of solidarity and common purpose with the businessmen and laborers of the city. Using the shrine as the setting for part of the funeral ceremonies underscored its role as a link between the rulers and the ruled. As depicted, these were egalitarian affairs, military leaders and "commoners" eating together, although one assumes there was some distinction by rank when the seating arrangements were made. The use of the shrine was also an affirmation of Jani-Begid regard for the Naqshbandi tradition[75] at a time when other major streams of Sufism vied, or were at least available, for political patronage. And, since such occasions usually brought donations to the shrine and distribu-

tions of food and gifts to its residents and officials, these were also occasions for a welcome injection of resources into the shrine's economy. Hafiz-i Tanish's depiction of the ceremonies held after the death of Iskandar Khan indicates how shrines in general could be used to reinforce ties of patronage and, perhaps, smooth the process of political transition.

Although there are few references to the Naqshbandi shrine in the early seventeenth century, the shrine retained its importance for the rulers of Bukhara as a place of burial even after the Jani-Begid dynasty fell and another neo-Chingizid family, the Tuqay-Timurid, took its place. The first three Tuqay-Timurid khans, Jani Muhammad (d. 1603) and his sons Baqi Muhammad (d. 1606) and Wali Muhammad (d. 1612), were all buried in the "sultan's cemetery" at the Naqshbandi shrine.[76] But the next three khans—Imam Quli (d. 1643); his brother Nazr Muhammad (d. 1651); and Nazr's son, 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 1683)—wanted to be buried in the Holy Land of Arabia. Two succeeded: 'Imam Quli and 'Abd al-'Aziz both abdicated, lived out their last days, and were buried in the sacred soil of Medina. But Nazr Muhammad died en route to Arabia and his body was returned to Central Asia.

With the seventh Tuqay-Timurid khan, Subhan Quli, who was another son of Nazr Muhammad, we have our first hard evidence of khanly patronage of the shrine after the Jani-Begid period. In 1693, Subhan Quli donated a large endowment for a mausoleum that he had built for one of his wives. The endowment supported four attendants, two men and two women, for day and night duty, as well as two Qur'an-reciters who were to recite one *juz* (a thirtieth) of the Qur'an every day on site and give full recitations on holidays. The endowment also was to pay for an evening meal of bread and soup to be served every Friday and Monday. In years when the income from the endowment sufficed, sweets and fruit were to be distributed after Friday and Monday eve prayers. The endowment consisted of three pieces of agricultural land totaling a little over 500 acres, a tobacco barn, and an abbatoir. The fiduciary's fee was set at 10 percent of the net revenues after expenditures were made for maintenance of the endowed properties.[77]

From the end of the seventeenth century to the present, information about the shrine remains scanty,[78] although I expect that the state archives of Uzbekistan and a careful reading of the many unpublished eighteenth- and nineteenth-century indigenous narratives will flesh out its history for this period.

During the late Soviet period (in 1977), I visited Bukhara and was able to talk a reluctant taxi driver into taking me out to the shrine. There, I was warned off by a guard but not before wandering around the ruins and taking a few photographs. The shrine was unkempt and there were no visitors or permanent staff that I could see except the guard. Back in Bukhara, Rahmatulla Qasim Osman, an Uzbek from the town of Osh and an Arabic instructor at the Mir-i 'Arab Madrasah, told me that the Soviet government had authorized the re-opening of the Naqshbandi shrine and had promised to build a new mosque there. I am not aware that this anticipated Soviet plan, if there indeed was such a plan, to re-open the shrine and invest in it had made any progress before independence in 1991.

The years since independence have given new significance to the shrine and those associated with it. A visitor to the shrine in the fall of 1993, Dr. Robert O. Freedman, reported that the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, had appropriated state funds for refurbishing the shrine.[79] A project sign standing outside the shrine in 1993 listed Egypt and Saudi Arabia as other contributors to its renovation. A museum of the Naqshbandi order (a neat conflation of Soviet and Islamic sensibilities) also opened at the shrine. In 1994 an imam from the Naqshbandi shrine, Mukhtar Abdullaev (pl. 17), was appointed mufti of Tashkent by the Uzbek government,[80] marking a revival of official interest in the shrine as a center of Muslim cultural activities. The financial appropriations that give tangible meaning to this interest continue a long history of political patronage.

Pl. 17

The Shrine Administration. The presence of a dynastic family at the shrine is more of a mystery than is its role as a burial place or object of patronage of the mighty. Unlike the case of the 'Alid shine at Mazar-i Sharif, where we have relatively detailed information on the family most closely associated with it over the centuries, we know

very little about the administration of the Baha' al-Din shrine. In his *Sharaf-namah,* Hafiz-i Tanish describes the funeral ceremonies for Iskandar Khan, but neither of the two religious figures named as leading the services have any known affiliation with the shrine.[81]

The first evidence of a Naqshbandi family of shrine administrators is found in the 1693 endowment-deed of Subhan Quli. In it he names Hajji Gaday Khwajah the son of Mirza Khwajah Naqshbandi as chief trustee (mutawalli) of the endowment. It is not unreasonable to suppose that this Hajji Gaday Naqshbandi was already performing the same function for other endowments at the shrine. This assumes that the administrative situation at the Naqshbandi shrine was similar to that at Mazar-i Sharif, a hypothesis for which we have no corroboration at this point. The deed itself tells us that the mausoleum being endowed was situated on waqf land belonging to the shrine. This is some indication, not unexpected, of the existence of an endowment fund at the Naqshbandi shrine, and where there is an endowment there is always an administration.

From the middle of the nineteenth century on, there is some very slight evidence that there was possibly a dynastic family administrative tradition at the shrine. In 1863, when the Hungarian adventurer Vámbéry visited the shrine, he saw "sheikhs, descendants of the first saint, who keep watch in turn before the tomb."[82] Vámbéry shows no sign of having been familiar with the genealogies of these men, and he simply may have assumed a lineal tie from their use of the relational form "Naqshbandi" as part of their names. There is still no real evidence that the administration of the shrine and its endowments had been in the hands of a single family or that that family established a dynastic tradition.

4. The Shrine of 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar (Khoja Ahrar) at Samarqand

The U.S. Army Map Service issued a map in 1960 showing a village named "Khodzha Akhrar" five kilometers south of Samarqand.[83] This is the site of the tomb complex of the Naqshbandi shaykh, Khwajah 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar (d. 1490) or, as he is generally known

in Western sources, Khoja Ahrar. As a mythic figure in Central Asian lore, he stands on a on a par with Baha' al-Din Naqshband and 'Abd Allah Ansari. A man with an extraordinary and charismatic personality, Ahrar was trained in law and pursued the Naqshbandi tradition of Sufism, but his life is now only visible to us through the filter of hagiography and the prosaic documentation of his vast property holdings.[84]

What distinguishes him from the crowd of intellectuals and holy men of his time is the immense political influence he is said to have wielded. Abu Sa'id (d. 1469), Timurid ruler of Samarqand in the latter part of the fifteenth century, was especially under his sway. Other Timurids seem to have been no less susceptible to his charisma. He was present in 1484 at the birth of Babur, the last major Timurid figure in Central Asia and founder of the Moghul (Mughal) Empire of India, and although he died when Babur was only six, Ahrar nevertheless exerted a powerful lifelong grip on Babur's imagination. In his memoirs, written some thirty years after the death of Ahrar, Babur recalls a dream in which the khwajah appeared and predicted the Timurid prince's recapture of Samarqand from the Shibanids in 1500.[85] He showed his regard for Khoja Ahrar's posthumous intercessory powers in several forms. One was his versifying a transcription of Ahrar's *Risalah-i Walidiyyah*.[86] Another was his sending Ahrar's great-grandson a copy of his (Babur's) memoirs.[87] In death, at least as much as in life, Ahrar enjoyed a large place in the popular imagination.

Although Ahrar was born and raised in Tashkent and maintained very close connections with that city, he chose Samarqand as his burial place. In spite of a generous endowment, his shrine seems to have been fairly modest in scale up until the early seventeenth century. The bulk of the endowment income apparently went to his descendants.

Baqi Muhammad, the Tuqay-Timurid clan member who briefly controlled Samarqand (1598–99) before making Bukhara his capital, is, I believe, the first politician to have sponsored building at the shrine. His contribution was a holiday mosque (*'idgah*) on the road to the shrine, part of a larger project to link the shrine with Samar-

qand by a landscaped avenue. Writing some seventy-five years after Baqi Muhammad's builders had completed the mosque, Muhammad Badi' who was a native of Samarqand, painted a fairly clear picture of what one would see on the way from the city to the shrine along this approach. I summarize his description here:

> The shrine of Ahrar is located on the southwest side of Samarqand. The distance from it to the walls of the city is about one *farsakh* [six kilometers]. Pilgrims go out to the shrine through the portal called the Karistan Gate. Passing through the gate, the traveler is immediately confronted by the sight of green fields watered by springs, a sight comparable to that of the land along the Zayandah River in Isfahan and along the road leading from Herat to Gazur Gah, both of which the writer has seen. After crossing a bridge built by Nadr *diwanbegi* [Arlat], one passes along an avenue lined with trees. Before arriving at the end of the highway, a luminescent dome built by Baqi Muhammad Khan comes into view. This is the holiday mosque of Samarqand. Along the road, pleasure gardens (*chahar baghat*) become more numerous; they are like the Garden of Eden with buildings matching those of Paradise. As one heads for the holiday mosque, one sees straight ahead the entry arch (*taq*) and dome of a madrasah-college. At first, one enters a street of shops [*rastbazar*]. There, workers of all kinds are busy at their trades. One has not proceeded very far along this street when one's eyes encounter a feast-house (*dar al-bazm*), which is a polite way of saying opium den (*kuknarkhanah*). Opposite it stands a place of worship (*ma'bad*) built by Khwajah Muhammad Yusuf, the son of Khwajah Muhammad Ya'qub [Ahrari]. Then the road continues past reservoirs, a mosque, a bath, caravanserais, and intersecting streets and alleys until one comes to the madrasah built by Nadr *diwanbegi* Arlat [at the entrance to the shrine.][88] [pl. 18–20] [Verses follow] Entering the courtyard of the shrine, one sees stone platforms [*suffah*] on each side, engraved panels, vaulted halls (*iwan-ha*), and benches (*nashiman-ha*) along each side. In particular, there is a vaulted hall with gold inlay work. Above the shrine rises an azure (*lajawardi*) dome. Earthquakes have caused the collapse of the gold-leaf ceiling (*saqf zarnigar*). [In the courtyard] there is a cistern with life-prolonging waters. Around the shrine precincts trees of all kinds have been planted. There is a large sycamore

Pls. 18, 19, 20

> standing at the head of [Ahrar's tomb]. Around his grave are buried many of his sons and [spiritual as well as lineal] descendants, including Mawlana Muhammad Qazi, his successor (*khalifah*).[89]

In the nineteenth century, a summer mosque was added to the shrine complex. Like the tomb of Baha' al-Din at Bukhara, Ahrar's shrine at Samarqand became an important pilgrimage and burial spot.[90]

The Ahrari Administration. By the time he died in 1490, Khwajah Ahrar had made clear how he wanted to dispose of his vast estate. Between 1470 and 1490, he drew up three trust deeds that detail the endowments and their beneficiaries. All the deeds list his male heirs as principal beneficiaries along with three different institutions: the shrine complex in the village where he was buried, a madrasah in Samarqand in the Suzangaran Quarter (the fate of which is unknown to me), and a mosque and madrasah in Tashkent.[91] The entire endowment was given the name "Muhawwatah-i Mawali," which Chekhovich has translated as "the Abode of Friends."

From the record, one gets the impression that Ahrar's descendants consumed most of the income produced by the trust. Aside from the mention of the mosque financed by a descendant, Khwajah Muhammad Yusuf, money for the expansion of the shrine appears to have come mostly from sources outside the endowment.

Khwajah Ahrar named himself trustee for life and then entailed the trusteeship in the line of one of his sons, Muhammad Yahya. The foundation of the trust happened to coincide with the end of the Timurid era in Central Asia and the inception of a new dynastic order in the form of the neo-Chingizid Shibanids. Unfortunately, Khwajah Ahrar died before the final collapse of the Timurids and was therefore unable to work his charismatic influence on the newcomers. According to Babur, who was on the losing side and perhaps not the most impartial of sources, the leader of the Shibanids, Muhammad Shibani Khan, was hostile to the Ahrari family, and Babur blames him for condoning, if not ordering, the assassination in 1501 of four of Ahrar's progeny, including Muhammad Yahya.[92]

But the family was not liquidated nor did it lose its control of the endowment. It re-emerged publicly in 1514 when a grandson and namesake of Muhammad Yahya appeared before the qazi-judge of Tashkent to seek judicial confirmation of his right to manage the Ahrar endowment. He based his claim on being a lineal descendant of the first Muhammad Yahya.[93] In 1533, this same Muhammad Yahya appears again in court records, this time in Samarqand, as the defendant in a suit over the legal status of the properties conveyed by Ahrar to the "Abode of Friends." Such suits were sometimes instituted at the instigation of the defendant in order to get a legal decision about rights, a finding that could be used to fend off possible future litigation. The surviving document, the qazi's decision, affirms the fact that the property was a legally constituted trust and barred the plaintiff and others from any further claims.

Whatever Shibani Khan's personal feelings, it was probably not long before the ties between the Ahraris and the political authorities in Samarqand were restored. Under the appanage system by which the Shibanids ruled Central Asia, Samarqand belonged to one of the Shibanid clans, the Kuchkunjids, who, at least for most of the first half of the century, developed close relations with the Ahrari shrine and the family. In 1543, the reigning Shibanid khan, 'Abd al-Latif, himself a Kuchkunjid, issued a decree exempting Muhammad Yahya, who was still in control of the family's fortunes, from paying tax on a number of specified properties that he personally owned and that were not part of the "Abode of Friends" endowment.[94]

Three years later, in 1546, a new listing of the endowments was issued with additions made since Khwajah Ahrar set up the trust.[95] The first part of this document has not survived, and so we do not know who the trustee was who drew it up. It is possible that the inventory was compiled because of a change in administration that may have accompanied the death or retirement of Muhammad Yahya, who is last mentioned in 1543. The sixteenth-century documents on the Ahrari endowment available to Chekhovich end with this 1546 *waqfiyya*. Not until 1825 is there another published record of the endowment and its trustees.

Although the documentary record of the Ahrari endowment breaks off in 1546, other sources pick up the family story after a hia-

tus of thirty-three years. In the late winter of 1579, after a lengthy struggle, the Jani-Begid clan of the Shibanids managed to get control of Samarqand and oust the Kuchkunjid family. Despite their close association with the Kuchkunjids, the Ahraris seem to have made a smooth transition when, on 23 January 1580, the head of the Jani-Begid clan, 'Abd Allah b. Iskandar, transferred the hereditary office of *shaykh al-islam*, one of the leading religious posts in the city, from the Mirak Sayyid family to the Ahraris. The post remained in the family for at least the next century.[96] The Ahrari who accepted the title was Muhammad Hashim. An impression of his seal—his name appearing as "Muhammad Hashim al-Ahrari"—is found on the reverse of the 1546 document[97] along with that of two other men, 'Abd al-Rahman b. Sayyid Khwajah Muhammad and Ya'qub Muhammad b. Khwajah Mir. These last two may well have been the trustees who succeeded to the administration of the endowment after 1546, and one of them may have held the post between the administrations of Muhammad Yahya and Muhammad Hashim.[98]

Transitional moments in the political arena, when political power passed from one group to another, were delicate times for shrine administrations. Too active a support for the political fortunes of a ruling group could have unforeseen and unwelcome consequences for a dynastic family, or more usually for its leader, when a new ruling family took over. Saintly shrines were not at risk at these moments: their importance to the social life of the region assured that. But individuals affiliated with a shrine were not so protected. Their support for a loser or their failure to come out at the right moment for the eventual political victor could mean loss of their position and transfer of the trusteeship of the shrine and its endowments, either to a new family or, more likely, to another branch of the same dynastic family.

Sometime in early 1604, five years after the neo-Chingizid Shibanids had been succeeded by the neo-Chingizid Tuqay-Timurids (also known as Janids or Ashtarkhanids) in Bukhara, Samarqand, and Balkh, Muhammad Hashim found himself in just such a delicate position. Baqi Muhammad had just come to the throne and was facing a pro-Shibanid resurgence around Tashkent. He launched a campaign from Samarqand, but was unable to subdue the opposition and

was forced to retreat. Our one source on this, Mahmud b. Amir Wali, writing thirty-five years later, tells us that, although there was now a threat to Samarqand from Shibanid revivalists, Baqi Muhammad would not return there after his defeat because he was apprehensive of Muhammad Hashim, whose son-in-law he had killed in a campaign three years earlier.[99] But since the son-in-law was himself a political figure (a Timurid leader in Badakhshan) and his death occurred in the context of the struggle for that region, this does not seem a very convincing reason for Baqi Muhammad not to have returned to defend Samarqand.

More likely, the story is a reflection of the anxiety Baqi Muhammad presumably felt about losing Ahrari support in the aftermath of his failure on the battlefield. Mahmud b. Amir Wali proceeds to finish the story by telling his readers that when Muhammad Hashim learned of the khan's anxiety, he hurried off to meet him, allay his fears, and assure him of his backing. Muhammad Hashim, too, would presumably have been equally concerned by a rupture in relations. Whether the story as reported by the author of *Bahr* has any factual basis or not, it probably does accurately convey the constant attention that had to be paid to the relationship between shrine dynasties like the Ahraris and their political contemporaries.

Although there is no indication of any connection to Baqi Muhammad's ill-fated campaign against Shibanid rebels, the figure of Khwajah Amkanagi,[100] another Ahrari, emerges at this time. The context in which he and his son, Abu al-Qasim, appear vis-à-vis Muhammad Hashim suggests competition within the Ahrari family. For one thing, while Baqi Muhammad is reportedly "apprehensive" of Muhammad Hashim, Khwajah Amkanagi is portrayed as a great supporter of Baqi Muhammad and was rewarded for his help with many villages and hamlets bestowed on him as "private property (*milk*) and grants (*soyurghal*)."[101] His son, Abu al-Qasim, is said to have inherited both his spiritual and his material legacy as did Abu al-Qasim's son, Muhammad Zahid, after him.[102]

Yet the evidence is still somewhat ambiguous. After the death of Baqi Muhammad in 1606, the Tuqay-Timurid clan underwent a

major succession crisis. Imam Quli and Nazr Muhammad, the sons of the late Din Muhammad, fought their uncle, Baqi Muhammad's younger brother, Wali Muhammad, for the khanate. The status of Samarqand was at the center of the struggle. When Wali Muhammad sent a Qalmaq amir to assume the post of governor, other amirs, who felt the city had appanage status and should be assigned to one of the rebelling Tuqay-Timurids, opposed him. Again, our exclusive source, Mahmud b. Amir Wali, aligns both Ahrari lines of Abu al-Qasim and Muhammad Hashim with the dissidents: "When Muhammad Baqi Bi Qalimaq arrived in the 'Abode of the Throne' [Samarqand], a group of amirs . . . and others, with the backing of Khwajah Abu al-Qasim and Khwajah Hashimi, adopted an unremittingly hostile stance towards him."[103] Wali Muhammad was soon ousted, along with his governor at Samarqand, and his nephews took over the khanate. It is not clear how this immediately affected the two Ahrari lines, the Amkanagi and Hashimi, who, at least on the issue of Wali Muhammad's khanate, were briefly in accord. There is no information here or later of any shift in control of the chief trusteeship, the usual sign that one branch of the family has fallen from favor and been superseded by another. Such may have happened, however, given the paucity of information about the family for the rest of the first half of the seventeenth century; the only information we have is a reference to Muhammad Hashim's building activities at the shrine in the 1620s. But in the second half of the century, much more information comes out.

By the 1670s, the leading Ahrari figure is Khwajah Muhammad Yusuf Ahrari the son of Muhammad Ya'qub and builder of the mosque mentioned by Muhammad Badi' Samarqandi.[104] (I do not know at this point whether Muhammad Yusuf Ahrari was related to Muhammad Hashim, to Abu al-Qasim, or to another Ahrari branch entirely.) Muhammad Yusuf is immortalized by Samarqandi because he was the leading patron of poetry in Samarqand in the 1670s and 1680s. At that time, poetry was both an art and a sport in which all levels of Samarqand society seem to have taken part. Particularly popular were the contests to see who could extemporaneously compose the best *ghazal*, a short poem, after the host or someone else

present provided the opening line; the winners received cash prizes. Muhammad Badi' tells us that one of the liveliest and most lucrative competitions was sponsored by Khwajah Muhammad Yusuf Ahrari.[105]

At the beginning of the seventeenth century there are a few signs, but nothing yet definitive, that the Ahrari family was experiencing internal divisions. In the 1680s, however, the divisions became irreconcilable and the family found itself in a bitter internecine struggle for control of the shrine and its endowments. Our source again is Muhammad Badi' Samarqandi, a keen observer of the social scene in Samarqand. He writes about the struggle over the management as follows:

> Khwajah Ahrar had made these agricultural properties a trust for his descendants, with the condition that after him, the legal trustee would be his eldest son, Khwajah Yahya, and, likewise, his eldest son after him and so on until the Day of Resurrection. If other sons tried to change this, then eternal damnation would be heaped on their heads. Things went smoothly until the time of Khwajah Mahmud, son of Khwajah Muhammad Yusuf, when it was claimed that Khwajah Khudawand Muhammad, known as Sultan Khwajah, should be the trustee. But Khwajah Baha' al-Din 'Umar, who was a descendant of Khwajah 'Abd al-Haqq, another son of Khwajah Ahrar, told people he was one of the "corner-holders" (*gushah giran*) [here probably meaning someone with a stipendiary position at the shrine]. He lived in the village of Wars where he farmed. He had increased his farm holdings to the point that he now had 70 ox-yoke of land [about 3,500 tanabs or 1,750 acres] under cultivation. As a result, he was a very rich man and claimed that he should be shaykh of the shrine and trustee of the waqf. At this time, the kings and amirs were in such a low state that they were selling official positions. In short, the story is that Khwajah Baha' al-Din 'Umar gave out everything he had in bribes and was able to get the shaykhship and the trusteeship of the shrine and its waqf. But he suddenly died before he could take up the position. Whatever was left of his wealth after the payment of bribes, the khan, Subhan Quli, seized and whatever rightfully belonged to

his wives was fixed on them by decree (*raqam*) according to what was appropriate.[106]

This account tells us a number of things. First, despite being excluded from control of the "Abode of Friends" endowment, collateral, or nontrustee lines of the Ahrari family had remained involved with, or at least concerned about, the administration of the shrine. In all likelihood this was because, two hundred years after the foundation of the endowment, they were still beneficiaries and thus directly affected by the policies of its trustee. Second, a non-trustee line such as that of the 'Abd al-Haqqid could credibly claim, as in the case of Khwajah Baha' al-Din, the right to the trusteeship of the endowment and the shrine despite not being of Muhammad Yahya's lineage, a legal condition set forth by Khwajah 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar himself in the original foundation deed.

One might interpret Samarqandi's introduction of the bribery and corruption theme in several ways. One would be that some extraordinary element had to be introduced into the narrative to explain how the trusteeship could shift from the legally appointed line to a non-trustee line, even when the claim of greater merit and competency might not be disputed. (Muhammad Badi''s silence on the question of competence suggests that the man paying bribes was also the better qualified; otherwise, one would have expected Samarqandi to defend Khwajah Khudawand's right to the trusteeship. Or is it possible that Khwajah Khudawand's competence was not at issue and this was simply a move to usurp the trusteeship and so had to be condemned as the outcome of corrupt behavior? Whatever the case, it somehow seems unlikely the story as told should be taken at face value.)[107]

The episode also indicates how the story about an institution may evolve over time. In Samarqandi's eyes, Ahrar set up the original trust to benefit his descendants. No mention is made of the madrasahs in Samarqand and Tashkent, nor of the shrine complex itself—all prominent beneficiaries according to fifteenth-century documents. Perhaps support for the shrine was simply taken for grant-

ed here and did not bear on this particular story. Perhaps, too, as time passed, an increasingly higher percentage of the endowment income went to the descendants of the Ahraris at the expense of the institutions, and this in turn gradually changed the story about the purpose of the trust.

One can assume that the family, whether as managers or beneficiaries or both, continued to prosper through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, although taxes and the depredations of officialdom ate away at its income.[108] In 1825, for example, the Bukharan ruler, Amir Haydar, issued a short decree ordering a certain Katta Beg *ishik-agha bashi* to restrain his underling, Rahim Quli Beg Bi, from interfering with the Ahrari trust lands at Kamangaran, Samarqand.[109] In 1884, the Russian journal *Turkestanskie Vedomosti*, carried an important article on trusts in Turkistan, in which it reported on the tax burden of the Ahrari endowment. In the city of Tashkent alone, more than 800 tenants inhabited houses belonging to the Ahrari trust. These buildings had a value at the time of 300,000 rubles. In terms of assessed property in the city, they accounted for nearly a third of all property held by endowments. But the *kharaj* (then a tax based on revenue) and the *tanabanah* (a tax based on acreage) absorbed two-thirds of the income generated by the properties.[110]

The Soviet period brought with it the confiscation of the Ahrari endowments, and worked its influence on the story of the shrine. In the 1920s, the village of Khwajah Ahrar, where the shrine complex was situated, was home to several hundred people who claimed descent from Khoja Ahrar. Ol'ga Sukhareva, an ethnographer, collected information about this latter-day community of Ahraris during field work she did in Samarqand between the 1920s and 1940s.[111] One of her informants was Muhammad Dawran Ahrari, who was born in 1857. When she asked him to reconstruct a family genealogy, he produced a tree tracing his ancestry back to Ahrar in eight generations. The number of generations is utterly inadequate for the span of time (about 370 years between Ahrar's death and Dawran's birth), particularly since the first three generations (Ahrar, Muhammad Yahya, and Muhammad Baqi) were all deceased by 1501. What the exercise revealed is the fluid nature of genealogy and the sometimes

parallel, non-intersecting tracks of oral and written culture. Muhammad Dawran had a difficult time, according to Sukhareva, identifying the generations intervening between him and Khwajah Ahrar and was much more definitive on Ahrar himself and the first two generations after him than on anyone who followed.

This apparent memory loss regarding the Ahrari heritage was probably the inevitable outcome of severing the family (by removing its financial foundations, the endowment income, and thus ending its role as shrine administrators) from the "overarching purpose" that gave the family its impulse to continue. How the post-Soviet environment will affect the shrine and the many people who consider themselves Ahraris remains to be seen.

5. The Juybaris: Keepers of the Char Bakr Shrine of Imam Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Sa'd at Bukhara

The Juybaris offer a somewhat different case from the Ahraris and Ansaris. The family name, Juybari, came from the quarter of Bukhara in which they lived, rather than from an illustrious or saintly ancestor. They appear in a document of the mid-sixteenth century as beneficiaries of an endowment set up by a tenth-century scholar, Imam Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Sa'd, from whom they claimed descent. The document, referring to some agricultural parcels, describes these as "lands of the village of Sumitan, which the sultan of commentary-writers and hadith-experts. . . Imam Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Sa'd endowed for his male descendants, generation after generation, and which [Khwajah Sa'd Juybari] controls in accordance with the endowment deed."[112] Although we do not have the original endowment deed, it is clear that the endowment was intended to maintain Imam Abu Bakr's tomb, besides benefiting the Juybari family.

This tomb and its family of caretaker-beneficiaries is more thoroughly documented in the sixteenth century and seems to have derived much of its importance from the level of political patronage it received and not, like the shrines of 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar, Baha' al-

Din Naqshband, 'Ali b. Abi Talib, and 'Abd Allah Ansari, from the spiritual qualities associated with the interred saint. Unlike the Ansaris of Mazar-i Sharif whose origins are mysterious and whose local importance only gradually evolves, the Juybaris suddenly emerge in the mid-sixteenth century as already very influential local personalities. Links are asserted to Khwajah 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar through the father of the first Juybari figure, Khwajah Ahmad, the father of Muhammad Islam, and thus through him back to Baha' al-Din Naqshband, but those assertions develop in late sixteenth-century biographies commissioned by the family and are difficult to demonstrate from earlier materials.

What the evidence seems to show at this point is that the family was, indeed, acknowledged as the hereditary caretakers of the shrine of the tenth-century scholar of *hadith* literature, Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Sa'd.[113] Like the Ahraris, the Juybaris were affiliated with the Naqshbandi movement of their time, and like the Ahraris they remained a kinship-based organization rather than a Sufi-*tariqah* organization. People referred to in later times as Juybaris are not, I believe, members of a Juybari "sub-order" of the Naqshbandi tariqah as I have referred to them elsewhere, but are, or claim to be, lineal descendants from Muhammad Islam Juybari (1481–1563), the eponymous founder. At two different times, in the 1590s and then again in the 1670s, family histories were commissioned and compiled. The earlier one was written by an immigrant to Bukhara, Badr al-Din Kashmiri, on a commission from the family; the later one, by one of the members of the family itself, Muhammad Talib, great-grandson of Muhammad Islam. These works are extraordinary documents, and, as far as I know, no comparable work was produced for any of the other shrine dynasties.[114]

The Juybaris also left a relatively voluminous documentary trail. There is a large published archive of land transactions—more than 400—to which members of the family were party in the period between 1544 and 1577.[115] On the other hand, we do not have the kind of endowment deed, or summary of deeds, for the Juybaris, as we have in the Ahrari case—that is, the kind of legal plan that established the basis for later family relations—although one must have

existed.[116] From the document cited earlier and from other references, we know that the original waqf endowment was centered on the village of Sumitan where the tomb was located and that the Juybari family was believed to be the rightful beneficiaries and trustees.

The emergence of the family in the middle of the sixteenth century as both politically influential and extraordinarily wealthy is tied to the rise of the Jani-Begid clan of the Shibanids. The Jani-Begids succeeded in seizing control of Bukhara in 1557 from the Shah Budaqid clan and making it their capital for the rest of the sixteenth century. Exactly how the Juybaris, whose head at the time was Muhammad Islam, obligated the Jani-Begids to them is by no means clear. According to Jani-Begid and Juybari sources, it appears that Muhammad Islam helped the Jani-Begids take Bukhara.[117] Whether or not there is a direct connection, it certainly appears that the family's wealth dramatically increased after the Jani-Begid victory in 1557.[118]

Shibanid support for the family only partly carried over to the shrine. For the Shibanid family as a whole, including the Jani-Begid clan members, the tomb and shrine of Baha' al-Din Naqshband to the east of Bukhara had a special place. Although the Jani-Begids, 'Abd Allah Khan in particular, spent a great deal of money refurbishing the Juybari shrine of Char Bakr[119] (pls. 21, 22), they still chose to be buried at the feet of the "Great Khwajah," Baha' al-Din Naqshband. Pls. 21, 22

Family control of the Char Bakr shrine, construction of other public buildings, and creation of new trusts, again with the descendants as the principal beneficiaries, can be traced down to the end of the seventeenth century without much difficulty. More than other shrine families, the Juybaris were especially close to the khanly court and thus are frequently mentioned in conjunction with royal doings. Like the Ahraris at Samarqand, the Juybaris held the office of shaykh al-islam in Bukhara, a position they continued to occupy through the nineteenth century.[120]

The Juybaris were at the center of social and economic life in the city in the second half of the sixteenth century and thereafter. Involved in commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture, they sent

their agents as far as Moscow on trade missions; indeed, one of the earliest documents on Bukharan trade with Moscow is a letter from one of these.[121] They corresponded with many Central Asian politicians, including leaders in Kashghar and Khiva, and acted as mediators with the Bukharan court on sensitive political problems.[122] The family intermarried with the khanly lines, the Jani-Begids in the sixteenth century and then with the Tuqay-Timurids in the seventeenth.[123]

Because of its close ties to individual politicians, the family often faced difficulties when a ruler or dynastic group with whom it had been close was replaced by another. In the period of transition from the Shibanids to the Tuqay-Timurids, Khwajah Taj al-Din Hasan, son and principal heir of Khwajah Sa'd, is portrayed by his son and biographer as being as well-respected by the leader of the Tuqay-Timurids, Baqi Muhammad, as he had been by the last of the Jani-Begids, 'Abd Allah (r. 1581–98) and his son 'Abd al-Mu'min (r. 1598). But Taj al-Din's son tended to wax hyperbolic when describing his father's influence.[124] On one occasion, a brother of Taj al-Din Hasan, 'Abd al-Rahim, tried to get court protocol changed so that he could sit at court above the naqib, who was an Ata'iyyah shaykh. In the story, Baqi Muhammad refused to allow it, which suggests that the Juybaris did not exert quite as much influence with the Tuqay-Timurids as they did with the Jani-Begid Shibanids.[125]

Whatever vicissitudes the family may have experienced in its relations with the politicians who governed Bukhara, it never lost control of the Char Bakr shrine nor of the various family endowments. One of the largest foundations under its control was the congregational mosque and madrasah in the section of Bukhara known as Gawkushan. The trust supporting this complex was still quite wealthy at the end of the nineteenth century. The Russians, in their survey of endowments, recorded its annual income as 190,000 tangahs, the equivalent at the time of 28,500 rubles—a large sum but still only a fraction of the Ahrari endowment in Tashkent.[126]

The history of the family subsequent to Muhammad Talib, great-grandson of Khwajah Muhammad Islam, is yet to be studied in detail. One would expect, given the resources at the family's com-

mand as portrayed in *Rawzat al-rizwan* and *Matlab al-talibin,* and as revealed in the real estate documents from the middle of the sixteenth century, that the family remained a social and economic force in the city and its surrounding area. And there is good reason to believe that the later Juybaris were no less influential in Bukharan cultural and social life than their forebears had been. James Fraser, an early nineteenth-century traveler to Iran, wanted to visit Bukhara in 1821. While waiting at Mashhad for permission that never came, he spent some time collecting information about Bukhara. In an appendix on Central Asia ("Notices Regarding Mawur-a-ul-nehr"), which he included with the published account of his travels in eastern Iran, he noted, "The khaujahs of Jooeebaur are the greatest of these holy personages [the ulama]; they belong to a family, who are understood to be descended from the khaliph Abubekr, and derive so much weight from their large possessions, even more than from their sancity and descent, that they may be, in some measure, considered independent of the king."[127] Clearly, the family had lost little of its luster in the course of two and a half centuries.

Although the impression one gets of the Juybaris is that of a politically active and well-connected family, I have not found much evidence that the family underwent the kind of crises at times of family succession that beset the Ahraris and Ansaris. There are, however, one or two hints of a crisis that might have arisen with the death of Khwajah Sa'd. We know that Khwajah Sa'd had two brothers (both of whom appear as purchasers of property in the archival material), but neither of them seems to have played any kind of public role at all. After his father's death in 1571, Khwajah Sa'd remained the dominant family member until his own death in 1589. At that time, he had three sons, the eldest of whom, Taj al-Din Hasan (who lived until 1646), had long been groomed as his father's successor as head of the family and manager of the shrine and the family's waqfs. It is noteworthy that Taj al-Din's two brothers, 'Abd al-Rahim and 'Abdi Khwajah,[128] both emigrated to India at this time, and reports of their departures hint that they may have departed under duress. 'Abd al-Rahim is said to have left Bukhara "due to the lies (*taqallubat*) of a certain Qazi Mirza[129] while 'Abdi Khwajah is

accused of certain "unworthy (*nahinjar*) actions."[130] Their emigration may simply be a symptom of the process of succession in which the losing candidate had to remove himself or be removed from the scene to prevent future conflict.

* * * * * * *

A problem that all these dynastic families obviously had to solve in order to perpetuate themselves was how to preserve their wealth against the dissolving effect of the rules of Muslim inheritance law. This meant excluding collateral claims, either by establishing trusts and limiting beneficiaries and management to a specific line of descendants or, as seen in the preceding chapter, by outright ante-mortem gift to the chosen successor. The family shrine, therefore, could serve as a vehicle for preserving the wealth and social status of the group of descendants appointed to manage it. Individual families like the Ahraris, the Ansaris, and the Juybaris, among many others, were able to remain community leaders for generations because of their access to the resources of the shrine, moral and fiscal, that they controlled.

As an institution, a shrine was not subject to Islam's legal ordinances on succession and inheritance as an individual was. Moreover, the sources of the Shari'a have little to say about succession to office. A donor of an endowment could name whomever he wished as chief trustee, and that chief trustee, unless the office was entailed, could in turn appoint whomever he wished, subject to a qazi-judge's review, to succeed him.

The shrine, like other endowed institutions, was a means of preserving capital, whether that was the founder's aim or not. In Central Asia, a tomb or shrine often begat other institutions (madrasahs, khanaqahs), which in turn became part of the shrine and enlarged its function as a threshold between this world and the next. In addition, shrines meant pilgrims and, therefore, donations; votive offerings could sometimes amount to huge sums, even dwarfing the income from the endowment—as happened in the case of the 'Alid shrine in the nineteenth century.

For politicians, shrines were important both because they produced these influential families and because they embodied the religious sentiments of the people of the region. Paying homage at a shrine was tantamount to an expression of respect not just for those who were directly associated with it but for the people living in the region of the shrine for whom it was a focus of religious feeling.

CHAPTER FOUR

Law, Leadership, and Legitimacy: The Foundations of Political Order in Central Asia

SINCE THE WAY IN WHICH LAW, leadership, and legitimacy are interpreted at given moments is a product of the history of the region, we need some idea of those defining historical moments that serve as general points of reference. Although it is a truism that the past helps determine the present, it is probably at least equally true that the present helps define the past. The explanation of phenomena in the past—for example, the actions and sayings of a leader, a change of regimes, or a conflict and its resolution—highlight the concerns of those doing the explaining. This seems particularly true in the political sphere when it comes to the issues of law, leadership, and legitimacy.

DEFINING THE TERMS

Law takes many forms. It may be understood as a body of rules or standards that members of a political community accept as authoritative and invoke to guide and explain appropriate behavior and to resolve disputes. Or, law may be understood as a penal or disciplinary code. As defined by Hoebel, a law is a standard whose "neglect or violation is regularly met, in threat or in fact, by the application of physical force by an individual or group possessing the socially recognized privilege of so acting."[1] The rules that constitute either admonitory or minatory law do not have to be codified or written down and often are not; in some ways, this enables law to be interpreted and amended as political and social circumstances change, without a sense of its having been fundamentally altered or violated. There may often be more than one body of recognized law, but the realms in which each is considered authoritative are usually distinct. In any given period, the various corpuses of law taken together may be considered to comprise a constitutional system.

What I mean by *leadership* here should be self-evident. I would, however, stress that in order to perpetuate itself leadership must, at some point, be seen as legitimate. Certain sacred symbols must be

associated with it, and it must be seen as dependent on what these symbols represent. It thus becomes both a cause and a product of the way in which the past is interpreted. Hence the importance in the Central Asian context (as elsewhere) of genealogy, biography, and chronology as instruments of legitimacy.

Genealogy, i.e., the construction of a relationship to a real or mythic source of authority, is an imaginative and effective way of establishing a connection with a past that justifies the present. Genealogy may be validated by a historical narrative, or chronology, which sets present realities in the context of a reified past. But it is less important that genealogy be authenticated by independent means than that it match people's ideas of what is right and true. Biography and chronology supplement genealogy by linking the power of story-telling to the skeleton of mere kinship. All are important building blocks in the evolution of a sense of political community.

Legitimacy, particularly political legitimacy, is a somewhat mystical quality, the result of some consensus within a particular community about the way things should be—that is, what constitutes "right practice"—based on an interpretation of the way things have been. We find clues to debates on legitimacy scattered in narrative and documentary sources. These clues often emerge when something is being proposed or is being done that, in the author's mind, appears to contravene accepted norms. A writer might state, for example, that "although it is proper and fitting and in accordance with past traditions to do things in such and such a way, exigencies of the time compel us to do otherwise." The first part of such a statement contains an expression of the normative or the legitimate. The second part may be a clue to the direction in which ideas of what is legitimate are evolving. Such expressions are found in many different kinds of sources.[2]

In considering the history of Central Asia since the beginning of the sixteenth century, the way in which the historical record has been kept helps identify the norms and beliefs that have shaped ideas about what constitutes legitimate political behavior.

CHINGIZ KHAN'S LEGACY

In order to comprehend the ascendancy of legitimate political communities in Central Asia, one must begin with Chingiz Khan (Genghis Khan), whose influence on the political culture of Central Asia (and even on Russia itself) should not be underestimated. The image of Chingiz Khan that has been evoked over the centuries has two distinct aspects: the world conqueror/world destroyer and the world ruler/world law-giver. The former part of the image has remained powerful and sharply delineated. It is so thoroughly embedded that it can even be used humorously (fig. 2). In *Bicycling Magazine*, an advertisement for a mountain bicycle called the



Figure 2. The Wizard of Id
(By permission of Johnny Hart and Creators Syndicate, Inc.)

Karakorum conveys an image of rugged refinement with the heading "Imagine Genghis Khan after etiquette school." After describing the bicycle's features, the ad copy concludes, "Remember, always say 'pardon me' when laying foes to waste." The meaning in both these cases depends on a stock of shared images of Chingiz Khan as world conqueror. Otherwise, neither the cartoon nor the ad copy would be comprehensible, let alone funny.

In more serious ways, the image of Chingiz Khan as world destroyer thrives in the world's popular imagination. The American political phrase of disparagement, "so-and-so is to the right of Genghis Khan," or the Central Asian equivalent usage, "so-and-so is another Chingiz Khan," are both instantly evocative and require no further explanation.

But the image of Chingiz Khan as ruler and law-giver is practically unknown beyond the boundaries of those regions where his political legacy held sway, that is to say, outside Inner and Central Asia.[3] Besides references to Chingiz Khan's law, or Yasa (*yasa, yasaq, jasaq*), scattered throughout narrative materials from the thirteenth century onwards, its legacy survived at least as late as the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in political, ceremonial, and military terminology.[4]

For twentieth-century historians, the impact and legacy of Chingiz Khan on political communities and structures is a matter of some debate. One side of the issue, first articulated by Barthold[5] and more recently reworked and updated by Bernard Lewis,[6] posits that (1) the Mongol conquests of the early thirteenth century were followed by a "Mongol peace," the so-called *pax Mongolica*, that witnessed the linking of the vast territories conquered by Chingiz Khan's armies into one empire in which security and tranquillity reigned; (2) the Mongols brought certain steppe traditions of rule, including the idea of clan sovereignty rather than lineal sovereignty (the Iranian kingly model) or elective sovereignty (the Arabo-Muslim consultative model); and (3) Chingiz Khan created a body of law known as the Yasa, which applied at first in all spheres of human activity and then, after the Mongols were Islamized in the third and fourth generation, in the political and criminal spheres, leaving to Islamic law, the Shari'a, jurisdiction over personal and contractual matters.[7]

In 1978, Yuri Bregel summed up the arguments against these propositions in a lecture given at Harvard and later published.[8] First, he pointed to the dissolution of the Mongol Empire almost as soon as it had been formed, beginning with its division among Chingiz Khan's sons and then among their sons, as an argument against the notion of a *pax Mongolica*. Second, on the question of a steppe tradition of politics, he argued that there is little, if any, evidence that steppe institutions of government were imposed or functioned in any of the regions conquered by the Mongols; rather, he believes that the Mongols used and adapted government institutions already in place. Third, pointing to the work of David Ayalon, he said that

the body of laws called the Yasa was constantly circumvented from the very beginning. (More recently, David Morgan has argued that there is no convincing evidence that Chingiz Khan either created or even formulated a Yasa.)[9] Bregel then concluded,

> If Turkish and Mongol traditions, whatever they might have been, contributed to greater political stability in the lands conquered by these nomads, the effect should have been felt first of all in the region where the presence of Turks and Mongols was most noticeable—that is, in Central Asia. In fact, however, Central Asia had the least stable political order among all the Chingizid states; the constant wars between various branches of the ruling house and various tribal groups brought about its economic and cultural decay, probably even more than the Mongol invasion itself.[10]

But, if one considers how the past was interpreted by generations far removed from the immediate effects of the Mongol conquests, one is struck by how the name, law, and career of Chingiz Khan are invoked to account for contemporary conditions. "According to the Yasa of Chingiz Khan" or "according to the Chingizid *turah*" (another word referring to the Yasa) are ways of explaining and lending legitimacy to certain practices that might, in a Shari'a context, be considered questionable or at least unfamiliar.

In any event, by the end of the fourteenth century, a Chingizid political tradition had taken shape, creating certain conditions in the political realm that were taken for granted and understood as the way things should be. One of these conditions was that the highest political office was the khanate. Another was that the right to hold the khanate was exclusive to the agnates of Chingiz Khan. Any non-Chingizid with political ambitions, such as Timur (Tamerlane) and his descendants, had to work within that tradition. And the Timurids did so by making creative use of Chingizid symbols to assert their own power.[11] Another condition concerned the rights and the role of the non-Chingizid military groups, which explained and justified their positions in the period after Chingiz Khan on the basis of the roles their forebears played in his army during the period of world conquest at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

The career and "meaning" of Chingiz Khan provided a kind of constitutional framework for later generations within which to consider the evolution of the political environment of Central Asia—from his death in 1227 to, at least, the end of the eighteenth century. The Chingizid tradition or mandate evolved with the generations that adhered to it in varying degrees. By the end of the fifteenth century, some aspects of it, the khanate in particular, were in danger of losing all meaning. But at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a neo-Chingizid revival began, marking not so much a break with the past as a new phase for the Chingizid political legacy. It lasted for some two and a half centuries and returned Chingizid political values to center stage.

In this period, the descendants of Tamerlane, the Timurids, were deprived of what little power remained to them by this time and were ousted from Central Asia by a coalition of military forces under the leadership of an agnatic descendant of Chingiz Khan—Muhammad Shibani.[12]

Shibani, the son of Shah Budaq and grandson of Abu al-Khayr (d. 1469), who had been khan in the Dasht-i Qipchaq (the lands north of the Aral Sea and Syr River), was an experienced soldier and a skilled statesman. To his followers, he embodied the qualities expected in an heir to the mantle of Chingizid world rule. His allies included other descendants of Chingiz Khan—most of whom were of the Abu al-Khayrid line of which he was a member—as well as non-Chingizid military men who belonged to a number of organizations collectively styled "Uzbek."

The Uzbeks

The term "Uzbek" has traditionally been cast somewhat wider, embracing both the non-Chingizid groups of military men and the Chingizid clans who led them. The term was used in this way by outsiders, often pejoratively, to designate the entire political organization. When contemporary Safavid writers in Iran or Timurid/

Moghul writers in India wanted to designate the whole or a part of the political structure that governed Central Asia after 1500, they invariably used the generic term "Uzbek."

As used in the sixteenth century, however, the term really included two distinct and mutually exclusive elements. One element was the Shibanid family, whose leader was a direct descendant through Abu al-Khayr of the eldest son of Chingiz Khan, Jochi—or so the genealogies written down in the sixteenth century asserted. The legitimacy of the Shibanid family rested in the fact that its members could be called "true Chingizids," i.e., "born of Jochi," and presented themselves, and were seen by their supporters, as revivers of the glory of Chingiz Khan.

As Chingizids, the Shibanids were nominally upholders of Yasa, the body of law attributed to Chingiz Khan. But perhaps it is better to call them "neo-Chingizids" because they were also professedly devout Muslims—unlike Chingiz Khan and his early successors. In their governing practices they had to accommodate the authority of two bodies of law: the Islamic Shari'a, and the Chingizid Yasa.

The second element, or political grouping, also derived its political role from a Chingizid past, and may be thought of as the Uzbeks proper. The Uzbeks comprised a number of groups, each with a distinctive name (Table 2).[13] Only genealogy separated members of the Uzbek tribes[14] from the Chingizids. Neither in language, physical

TABLE 2:
SOME UZBEK TRIBAL NAMES
COMMON IN THE SIXTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Alchin	As	Bahrin
Durman	Jalayir	Kanikas (Keneges)
Kereit	Manghit	Ming
Nayman	Oirat	Onggut
Qal(i)maq	Qarluq	Qataghan
Qirghiz	Qunghrat (Kungrad)	Qushji
Saray	Ushun	Yuz

appearance, upbringing, nor recreational and intellectual interests was there anything to distinguish members of the Shibanid clan from members of the Uzbek tribes. The Shibanids, however, were agnatic descendants of Chingiz Khan and could legitimately lay claim to supreme leadership under the Chingizid constitution. The members of the Uzbek tribes—even though many of them, like Timur of the Barlas, could claim descent from Chingiz Khan through a female line—had no credible claim, regardless of individual power and charisma, to the khanate.

In the period of the Chingizid revival at the beginning of the sixteenth century, these Uzbek tribes derived their status not from an eponymous founder but rather from their association with Chingiz Khan, in particular from their claimed place in his military organization. As they understood the past, the army of Chingiz Khan and his political organization were one and the same thing; political status derived from military status. The Chingizid army was organized into a "left wing," a "right wing," and a "center." More than three hundred years later we find the association with a particular wing of the army still an important means of identification for individual members of these Uzbek tribes. Writing his memoirs in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, Babur observes, "Precisely as Chingiz Khan laid down his rules, so the Mongols still observe them. Each man has his place, just where his ancestors had it: right, right; left, left; center, center. The most reliable men go to the extreme points of the right and left."[15] Although he was referring to practices in the eastern region of Central Asia, known as "Mongol-land" (*Moghulistan*), what applied to the Mongols also applied to those called Uzbeks. At the end of the seventeenth century there are even two confederations of Uzbek tribes, identified simply as "left wing" (*sul*) and "right-wing" (*ung*).[16] The seating arrangements at court in the mid-seventeenth century also reflected the military formations of left, right and center.[17]

The Uzbeks of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries should not be confused with the modern-day citizens of Uzbekistan. In the sixteenth century, the word "Uzbek" was applied to the groups that supported the Shibanid claims to the Chingizid khanate in Central

Asia. When individual tribes, such as the Jalayir or Uyrat, supported other lines claiming Chingizid legitimacy, they are often differently named—"Moghul" when they support the Chaghatayid Chingizids and "Qazaq" for those who supported a rival line of Shibanid/Juchids. In this sense, the terms "Uzbek," "Qazaq" (Kazakh), or "Moghul" (Mongol) may better be thought of as political rather than ethnic labels. It was not until the 1920s, when Soviet authorities decreed the delineation of national homelands, that the terms "Kazakh" (Qazaq), "Uzbek," and "Tajik" took on the meanings they have today.

The Uzbeks of the early sixteenth century were the prime military support for the Chingizids who rose to prominence in Central Asia at that time. They and their leaders were thus very influential, often decisively so, in campaigns against rival Chingizids claiming the khanate. But it is important to stress that they operated within a constitutional framework, that they shared a common notion of legitimacy, and that their actions were shaped and directed by their loyalty to the Chingizid way.

The Yasa

When the neo-Chingizids and Uzbeks sought justification for their actions, or when writers described the context of their actions, the body of political law known as the Yasa was usually invoked. Whether Chingiz Khan himself actually authored such a code is immaterial; the politicians of later times believed that he had and justified their actions accordingly.

Since very little has been written about the existence of the Yasa, even among the political communities that derived their legitimacy from Chingizid origins, I would like to sketch briefly what we know about the way in which it was interpreted by the neo-Chingizid revival three hundred years after Chingiz Khan's death and the way in which this played out in the Central Asian context over the next several centuries. In reviewing the history of the Yasa, it is important to keep in mind two things: (1) the social environment in which

it operated was an Islamic one, accountable to the Shari'a, and (2) virtually everyone writing in or about this period was more committed to the Shari'a than to the Yasa.

Given the fact that the neo-Chingizids considered themselves Muslim, we need to be aware of how the simultaneous existence of the Shari'a and the Yasa was rationalized. The Shari'a is a divine, superseding law that does not recognize other legal systems. It does, however, recognize customary law as being necessary in specific local cases; but this only serves to emphasize the power that the Shari'a has to Islamicize local non-Muslim customs and traditions. For those who lived with and wrote about the two systems, however, there never seems to have been a question of Shari'a incorporating Yasa as customary law. To have done so would have diminished in some sense the legitimizing force of the Chingizid mandate.

The neo-Chingizids ascribed much of the court ceremony and protocol to the authority of the Yasa: the rank and seating of people at court, the protocol for drinking *qumiss* (fermented mare's milk), and the symbolic wearing of the quiver, among others.[18] They referred these practices, as well as political and criminal matters (from the reception of ambassadors to dealing with disobedience), to the authority of the Yasa and thus to Chingiz Khan. At the same time, they recognized the authority of the Shari'a in its own jurisdictional domains: the cult, personal status, and contracts.

The Yasa-Shari'a relationship is complicated somewhat by the fact that contemporary historians and biographers were committed shar'ists who could refer to practices governed by the Yasa but then in the same breath insist on the overriding authority of the Shari'a. They often seemed embarrassed by the durability of the Yasa and hard-pressed to explain why Uzbek leaders and their Chingizid masters adhered to it. We know this from the many references to Yasa and the ambivalent manner in which the shar'ists treat it. We can infer that they did not particularly like the Yasa, but they could not ignore it either.

Shar'i-minded writers broach the subject of the Yasa in different ways. One is admonitory, i.e., why it is advisable that one should abandon Yasa for the Shari'a. Another is simply descriptive (often

in a mildly derogatory way)—accounts of court protocol, e.g., that are attributed to the Yasa or the above-mentioned survivals from Mongol times.

The admonitory is often structured in a conventionalized narrative fashion. For example, a leading personality, often a politician with Chingizid connections, is either advised against adherence to the Yasa or is praised for having "abandoned" its usages. One such case, mentioned in the previous chapter, concerned Shah Rukh, the fifteenth-century developer of the Gazur Gah shrine. According to Jalal al-Din Qayini, a contemporary author of the *Shah Rukhid Book of Advice*, the Timurid ruler officially "abandoned" Mongol laws and Mongol ways in April 1411. Shortly after that, he performed certain other acts symbolic of this change of heart, dispensing with the Chaghatay Chingizid figurehead khan, forbidding the production and sale of wine in Herat, and purifying the Gur-i Amir (the tomb of his father, Timur) in Samarqand, of unspecified "pagan" features.[19] The fact that Babur has a good deal to say about the pleasures of wine-drinking at Herat fifty years later, suggests that there may have been more form than enduring substance to Shah Rukh's gestures of solidarity with the shar'ists.

A mid-sixteenth-century historian and chronicler of the Chingizids of Moghulistan, Haydar Dughlat, provides another admonitory-type narrative, which he sets in the first half of the fifteenth century in Samarqand. One of many stories in the work with the same theme, this narrative portrays one of the author's forebears, an amir of the Dughlat tribe, as a staunch upholder of the Shari'a. As Dughlat tells the story, Ulugh Beg, the Timurid ruler from 1447 to 1449, wanted to learn about the law of Chingiz Khan and asked the author's ancestor to teach him:

> There is no one who knows as much as you about the law of Chingiz Khan. I beg you to tell me all its regulations for I have a great desire to know about it." Haydar Dughlat then puts these words in his forebear's mouth: "We have completely discarded the infamous law of Chingiz Khan and adopted the Shari'a. If however, Mirza Ulugh Beg, in spite of his common

> sense and good judgment, approves of the law of Chingiz Khan, I will teach him it, that he may adopt it and forsake the Shari'a."

The author concludes the story saying that Ulugh Beg was much disturbed by the answer and showed no further interest in Chingiz Khan's law.[20]

A hundred years later, and more than two hundred years after Shah Rukh reportedly "abandoned" the Yasa, we find the same narrative theme being developed. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, court chronicler for Nazr Muhammad, the Tuqay-Timurid ruler at Balkh, feels bound to explain that when his patron came to the throne (by which he meant the appanage seat at Balkh) circa 1612, he did all in his power to root out "the ordinances [*rusumat*] of *yasa* and *yusun*."[21] Despite this, the same author then goes on to describe in detail a number of ceremonies sanctioned by the Yasa, which were still practiced at the court of this paragon of Shari'a loyalty. And there are other examples[22] that suggest the pattern of ongoing tension between the yasaists and the shar'ists. From the time of Qayini in the early fifteenth century up to at least as late as Muhammad Yusuf Munshi in the early eighteenth century, there is a consistent record compiled by shar'i-minded leading politicians, "abandoning, turning away from and rooting out" the Chingizid heritage.

There can be little doubt that these same politicians, who were praised by their shar'i-minded chroniclers for supposedly expunging the Yasa, must have had an ambivalent, or more rational, approach to Chingizid law. They understood full well that their legitimacy in the eyes of the Uzbeks in effect rested on their connections to, and reverence for, the legacy of Chingiz Khan. It was not so much that the Uzbek tribes had a brief for Chingiz Khan per se. It was just that the force of history and the power of a political consensus, which had been formed over long centuries into a constitutional framework, had made the symbol of Chingiz Khan politically indispensable.

We see a less self-conscious and less ambivalent view of the Yasa reflected in the early sixteenth-century writings of Babur. His mem-

oirs contain many references to things being done according to the Yasa. The following are typical. He describes a meal he had with a political rival and concludes with a description that deals with proper protocols of greeting and eating, of where people sat and the order of service: "Our forefathers, through a long space of time, had respected the Chingizid *turah* [a synonym for Yasa], doing nothing opposed to it, whether in assembly or Court, in sittings-down or risings-up. Though it has not Divine Authority so that a man obeys it of necessity, still good rules of conduct must be obeyed. . . ."[23]

In another place in his book, for which there is a late-sixteenth century miniature illustration (pl. 23), he describes a Mongol military ceremony. Pl. 23

> When, a few days later, The Khan heard that Tambal had gone up into Aura-tipah, he got his army to horse and rode out from Tashkint. Between Bish-kint and Sam-sirak, he formed up into array of right and left and saw the count of his men. This done, the standards were acclaimed in Mughul fashion. The Khan dismounted and nine standards were set up in front of him. A Mughul tied a long strip of white cloth to the thighbone of a cow and took the other end in his hand. Three other long strips of white cloth were tied to the staves of three of the nine standards, just below the yak tails, and their other ends were brought for The Khan to stand on one and for me and Sultan Muhammad Khanika to stand on one of the two others. The Mughul who had hold of the strip of cloth fastened to the cow's leg, then said something in Mughul while he looked at the standards and made signs towards them. The Khan and those present sprinkled *qumiz* in the direction of the standards; hautbois and drums were sounded towards them; the army flung the warcry out three times towards them, mounted, cried it again and rode at the gallop round them."[24]

Babur's belief that ceremonies were being followed as Chingiz Khan had laid them down is important to note. Underlining the enduring power of the tradition is the attitude that whatever was done "according to the Yasa" was what was done in Chingiz Khan's

time. But many practices had changed over the years. New ones had gained Yasa sanction and undoubtedly others had fallen away as they lost social meaning.

At any given time a practice could still derive authority if attributed to Chingiz Khan, even if utterly anachronistic. For example, the late sixteenth-century khan at Bukhara, 'Abd Allah Khan, performed the holiday prayers at the festival prayer grounds (*'idgah*) of Bukhara because, as his chronicler reports, this was "according to the Yasa of Chingiz Khan."[25] When he captured Bukhara in 1221, Chingiz Khan may have gone to the prayer ground. Indeed, there is a famous account by Juvaini and a miniature painting of the scene
Pl. 24 (pl. 24), but according to that mid-thirteenth-century historian, Chingiz Khan had no interest in prayer. He had assembled the leaders of Bukhara there in order to confiscate their wealth.[26] It is difficult to believe that it was this behavior that Hafiz-i Tanish, eulogist of 'Abd Allah Khan, was referring to.

The ability of the neo-Chingizids to keep both their yasa-minded and their shar'i-minded followers content was probably important, if not crucial, to the longevity of the neo-Chingizid states. Ultimately, the authority of the Yasa faded. But for five centuries, it was the final arbiter of proper political behavior.

Yasa Leadership: The Khanate

For our purposes, the first major issue that the Yasa legitimized was leadership of the political community. Supreme leadership and authority were vested in the khanate, an institution that long predated Chingiz Khan. But he gave special meaning to the title. After Chingiz Khan, only one of his agnatic descendants was believed to have a right to the title khan, and, by the beginning of the sixteenth century in Central Asia, this was understood to be someone who could trace his lineage back to Chingiz Khan through Jochi, through Jochi's son Shiban (the eponym of the sixteenth-century ruling family), and through Shiban's fifteenth-century descendant Abu al-Khayr, khan of the region north and east of the Caspian Sea from 1428 to 1468.

Filling the khanate was not simply a matter of checking a genealogy and finding the right person. It was a matter of merit as well, so that political leadership was a mixture of genealogical and historical justification and a record of accomplishment in the here and now. The ideal-type that Chingiz Khan represented—legislator and military hero—to some degree had to be realized by the living. This was obviously important when the military men who led the Uzbeks were confronted with succession to the leadership and had to balance the interests of their own constitutents with the contending claims of equally legitimate Chingizids. Merit was thus an important factor in deciding whom to support.

Accomplishment alone, however, could not carry the day. There were brilliant Chingizid leaders—men like the Shah Budaqid 'Ubayd Allah and the Jani Begid 'Abd Allah—who had to endure years of khanate leadership by less active and less competent men who had the weight of the Yasa on their side. So it was a combination of both political and military skill and Yasa sanctification that produced the acknowledged leaders, the khans. And the khan, once elected, was khan for life. During the two-hundred-year period from 1500 to 1700, very few reigning khans were deposed.[27]

But which of the many Chingizids did the Yasa sanction as khan? In the early sixteenth century, a refugee from Iran observed what seemed to him an unusual way of doing things. "They call all the descendants of Chingiz Khan 'sultans'," he wrote, "and the one who is eldest is designated 'khan'."[28] In general, therefore, the answer was the senior member of the royal clan, but which group constituted the royal clan was often a matter of contest, as we will see later. Once the royal clan was recognized, it was then understood that its senior member would be khan, unless the senior member explicitly declined the honor (as happened in the seventeenth century). Seniority as a basic principle of succession within any group was, and still is, widely accepted in Central Asia.

In Afghanistan, even as late as the middle of the nineteenth century, we find the issue of seniority again raised when Shayr 'Ali Khan, one of the many sons of the amir and ruler of Afghanistan, Dust Muhammad, succeeded his father. Justifying Shayr 'Ali Khan's

accession to the throne, his own chronicler wrote, "Even though the traditions of the noble Muhammadzai clan and of the elders of the country are inclined to place the name of the one who is *most advanced in age* [my emphasis] in the Friday sermon and on the coinage of the realm and place the crown and duties of state upon him, still the true creed of the Hanafis emphasizes justice and upholding the dictates of the faith and on these grounds, His Highness was best qualified."[29]

More recently, Robert Canfield described a conflict over succession in one of the "pir networks" in Bamyan. In this case, he cites the fact that the group supporting the right of the son of the deceased pir to succeeed to the pir-ship was Shi'ite—with its historic legitimation of lineal, rather than senior, succession. In the previous succession, this claimant had been bypassed in favor of the deceased pir's brother, which strongly suggests that even in such a Shi'ite context seniority was still seen as an important if not essential criterion for succession.[30]

Seniority as a qualification for leadership had both disadvantages and advantages, depending on the context. From the standpoint of the appanage state, one disadvantage was that age tended to reduce the likelihood that the supreme leader would undertake the rigors of serious campaigning and thus fulfill his clan's expectations of territorial expansion, a critical element in the viability of the appanage state. Indeed, it often happened that elderly khans did not take part in military campaigns. When other members of the clan campaigned, the absence of the khan removed one important element of unity. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, military campaigns conducted by the Shibanids and their successors, the Tuqay-Timurids, without the khan present often involved more negotiation between clan members and the sections of the army they commanded than actual fighting. When campaigns were protracted, cooperation often foundered. It was not uncommon for sections of an expeditionary force to pack up and go home before the campaign had ended or for individual clan members to refuse to participate in campaigns. A polity that depended to a large degree on continual expansion was

thus hampered by a policy of succession to supreme leadership based on age.

On the other hand, if seniority meant a less ambitious and less assertive khan, this was an advantage, since it fit well with the Yasa-sanctioned distribution of sovereignty within the ruling clan as a whole. Having a senior and perhaps even doddering figure as supreme leader, or as first among equals, helped preserve the balance of power among segments of the ruling clan and, as each segment received a region of Central Asia to govern, among regions.

Seniority accorded well with the regionalism that was the dominant historical and geographical reality of Central Asia. The landscape of compact oases separated from each other by tracts of uninhabitable desert and connected by river basins and the routes through them, at least seems to have been compatible with, if it did not actually encourage, the decentralized character of the political entities that evolved there.

YASA LEADERSHIP: THE ROYAL CLANS

A second issue in the political philosophy of the neo-Chingizids was that the Yasa legitimized the rights of the ruling clan as a whole. Since sovereignty was a clan right rather than an individual right, the clan had a claim on the territory as a whole. To realize this conception of sovereignty, the territory under the royal clan's control was distributed in the form of appanages, which were more or less autonomous regions given to eligible members of the royal clan.

When the Shibanids drove the Timurids from Central Asia in the early sixteenth century, each of the main subclans of the Shibanids (the sons of Abu al-Khayr) received an appanage. These appanages were the main oases of Central Asia and their dependent regions—Samarqand, Tashkent, Bukhara, Balkh, Shahr-i Sabz, and Hisar (near present-day Dushanbe). Theoretically, each of the subclans of the royal clan would distribute resources within its appanage among its own family members and Uzbek loyalists. But the system, while theoretically neat, left unresolved the question of the authority of the reigning khan within the appanages of other clan members. It

also begged the issue of demand, since the supply of appanages was clearly limited. To expand the supply meant military campaigns against other entities (the Safavids in Iran, the Timurids in Badakhshan and Afghanistan, for example), or it meant competition within Central Asia for dominance among clan members. Both options were explored in the course of the sixteenth century. The Shibanids and Tuqay-Timurids undertook campaigns against Khurasan, Badakhshan, Kashghar, Moghulistan, Kabul, Sistan, and the delta region of the Amu Darya in regular attempts to expand the appanage supply.

As new generations of Chingizids matured and demanded their birthright within the boundaries of a static territory, internecine conflict intensified. The first half of the sixteenth century is marked by fairly stable relations among the four main subclans and their appanages; the khanate passed from senior member to senior member, and the khanate seat moved, accordingly, from Samarqand to Bukhara to Tashkent back to Samarqand to Bukhara and then to Balkh. It was only at mid-century that the situation changed. The subclan at Balkh, the Jani-Begids, had their senior member move into the khanate and launched a successful effort to expand their appanage by seizing Bukhara. The third quarter of the century is then marked by a steady Jani-Begid expansion, led by 'Abd Allah, acting in the name of his father, Iskandar, who was declared khan in 1561 but was otherwise a political nonentity. 'Abd Allah attempted the consolidation of the Abu al-Khayrid appanages as well as outward expansion against non-Jani-Begid and non-Chingizid polities.

There were two lasting effects as a result of his efforts. One is that he acquired the means that allowed him to spend heavily on public works projects. His building activity was so extensive as to become mythic. Legend tends to ascribe to him virtually every major building erected in Central Asia and still standing. We know this from travelers like Vámbéry, C. E. Yate, and the Bible-peddler, Henry Lansdell, who, when they inquired about the name of the builder of a particularly noteworthy structure, would almost invariably be told it was 'Abd Allah Khan, just as all ruins were almost as invariably attributed to Chingiz Khan.

The second and more immediate consequence of 'Abd Allah's struggle against his fellow Shibanid clansmen was to destroy the authority of the Shibanid clan in Central Asia. The incessant drive to consolidate and thus eliminate or drive out other clan members weakened the ruling clan to the point of extinction. As fate would have it, there was another Chingizid clan, deemed suitable by Uzbek leaders, waiting in the wings in 1598 when the last significant Shibanid was killed. This group has been variously called "Ashtarkhanid" because of its reported origins in the city of Astrakhan on the lower Volga, or "Janid" after the reputed founder. Neither name evokes the Chingizid ties necessary in the late sixteenth century to garner military and political backing. Nor was either name used by the family, as far as I can tell.[31] Writing in the 1630s, their own chronicler uses the name Tuqay-Timurid, after the thirteenth son of Jochi, the eldest son of Chingiz Khan. The Tuqay-Timurids, too, were proponents of the neo-Chingizid constitution, elected their khan on the basis of seniority, and divided Central Asia into appanages. The first appanage distribution, which occurred in the spring of 1599, only included the territory of Bukhara, Samarqand, and the land between extending south to the Amu River. Within a few years, the Tuqay-Timurids expanded eastward into the Farghanah Valley and drove the Qazaqs for a time from Tashkent, claiming most of the cis-Amu region of Badakhshan, Balkh, and the region west of Balkh as far as the Murghab.

They and their Uzbek supporters, most of whom were former Shibanid/Jani-Begid loyalists, continued the neo-Chingizid constitutional system for the next century. The main difference in circumstances now was that the Tuqay-Timurid royal clan was considerably smaller than the Jani-Begid; thus, the resources available to each subclan were correspondingly greater. In practice, this meant that by 1612 Central Asia was roughly divided into two great appanages, Bukhara and Balkh. Bukhara included Samarqand and the territory south to the Amu. Balkh comprised all the land from the Murghab in the west to Badakhshan in the east.

The senior member of the clan made Bukhara the seat of his khanate. In Tashkent and the Farghanah region, his authority was

constantly challenged by the Qazaqs, another Chingizid group that had taken control of the Syr Darya basin from Bukhara by the middle of the seventeenth century.

For most of the first half of the seventeenth century, Bukhara and Balkh remained fairly stable regions, sometimes competing, more often cooperating. The two appanages were held by the brothers Imam Quli (who was titular khan) at Bukhara and Nazr Muhammad at Balkh. Following some mid-century turmoil after Imam Quli's abdication, the same arrangement continued through the second half of the century, with two sons of Nazr Muhammad, 'Abd al-Aziz at Bukhara and Subhan Quli at Balkh, upholding the neo-Chingizid constitution and maintaining the political status quo.

The Fading of the Chingizid Legacy

The stability of the regimes at Bukhara and Balkh gave rise to internal problems that could not be easily solved. As time passed, the two large appanages developed an inherent territorial integrity. The idea of territorial identity and coherence was enhanced by the assignment of the brothers' Uzbek supporters to regions where their own sense of territorial rights was allowed to develop and harden. As these Uzbek amirs became increasingly involved with the concerns and issues of their assigned regions, they developed local constituencies and clients whom they were loath to leave. The appanage system worked best in a fluid political environment where the ruling group was continually adding new territory and where there were frequent re-assignments of appanages and changes of venue for its members. But the system was far less attractive when the available territory was limited and the opportunities for expansion few.

What happened in the latter part of the seventeenth century was an increasing identification of distinct Uzbek groups with particular areas. For example, in northern Afghanistan (the Balkh appanage), the interests of the Qataghan Uzbeks became inextricably bound to the fortunes of the western Badakhshan area—an area granted them around mid-century, that is, the town of Qunduz and its surrounding region. In the west, the Ming Uzbeks likewise gradually came to

view Maymanah and the region surrounding it as their own territory. North of the Amu other Uzbek tribes were settling into similar patterns. (See Table 3.)

TABLE 3:
UZBEK TERRITORIAL AFFILIATIONS,
SEVENTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES

Durman	Qubadyan
Kanikas	Shahr-i Sabz
Kanikas	Khujand (Khojent)
Manghit	Bukhara, Qarshi
Ming	Maymanah, Khuqand (Khokand)

This process of Uzbek identification with specific territories coincided with a weakening of Chingizid authority. Indeed, this loss of authority may have been a direct result of the growing power of these regional Uzbek amirates. As early as the first half of the seventeenth century, some Uzbek amirs appear as powerful as, and in some cases more powerful than, the Chingizids to whom they owed allegiance. Nevertheless, it continued to be essential to the system, especially to the position of the Uzbek amirs within the system, to promote and maintain Chingizid sovereignty. For without Chingizids, there was no legitimate leadership. And without legitimate leadership, there was no source of mediation and peaceful resolution of disputes among rival amirs. In the early eighteenth century, the Uzbek amirs of Balkh were so desperate to maintain Chingizid sovereignty that a delegation went to Herat after the death in 1711 of the last Tuqay-Timurid figure at Balkh and recruited a replacement from among the descendants of the Rustamid subclan. This re-transplanted Tuqay-Timurid lineage lasted in Balkh for about twenty years and seems to have prospered.

In 1737, the Chingizid period came to end in Balkh, when an Iranian army, operating under entirely different political principles,

occupied the region and ousted the last Tuqay-Timurid figurehead. In Bukhara, however, the Chingizid political system retained its prestige, in spite of the fact that the khans' political authority was on the decline. There, the most powerful Uzbek tribe, the Manghit, maintained a Tuqay-Timurid legitimizer until 1785. It was not until then that the Chingizid legacy had lost enough of its meaning that the maintenance of a genuine khan was no longer worth the trouble and expense. By the middle of the eighteenth century, even the Uzbek tribal groups, whose identity was tied to a Chingizid past, had apparently come to realize that the khanate no longer fulfilled Chingizid ideals nor served a useful purpose. Although there were still individuals who could trace their lineage to Chingiz Khan through Tuqay Timur and Jochi and thereby derive a certain amount of social prestige, they no longer had the political support of the Uzbeks.

Despite the waning of the Chingizids, there was ambivalence about the institution of the khanate. In the Farghanah Valley, the Ming tribe decided to lay claim to it, and in 1798 one of them adopted the title "khan," the first time a non-Chingizid had done so since the thirteenth century. The Ming founded the Khanate of Khokand, which lasted for about a century, until annexed by the Russians. In Bukhara, on the other hand, there seems to have been some sentiment that adoption of the title of khan would be improper. In 1785, when the Manghit leader, Shah Murad, dispensed with the last Tuqay-Timurid figurehead, he took the title "amir," thereby founding the Amirate of Bukhara (sometimes mistakenly referred to as "the khanate of Bukhara"), which would survive until the Soviet revolution. During the last fifty years of its existence, however, it was subject to the overriding authority of the Russian governor-general of Turkestan.

In the delta region of the Amu, a parallel Shibanid state with basically the same constitutional system as the Shibanids of Bukhara emerged after the fall of the Timurids in 1500. It evolved in much the same way as the Abu al-Khayrid Shibanid and Tuqay-Timurid states did, and came to an end at about the same time as the others when, in 1804, a Qunghrat Uzbek amir dispensed with the last of the

Chingizid line there and, like the Ming in Khokand, adopted the Chingizid title "khan."

In approximately the same period, in what is now northern Afghanistan, small states emerged under new dynastic families, some of whom were shrine-centered (notably the Ansaris in Mazar-i Sharif and the Parsa'is in Balkh). These small entities included the towns of Maymanah (a Ming amirate), Qunduz (a Qataghan amirate), Balkh (a Parsa'i shaykhdom), Mazar-i Sharif (an Ansari shaykhdom), and Sar-i Pul and Aqchah (a Naqshbandi shaykhdom). The Chingizid khanate, however, was now very much a thing of the past.

The oasal geography of the region suited these petty states well. Stable water supplies provided agricultural self-sufficiency, and the nearby mountains offered summer pastures for livestock as well as a place of refuge from summer's heat for the well-to-do.

These small polities shared certain assumptions about political order. Based on their use of titulature and internal structure, they apparently continued to believe in the Chingizid way. But since there was no living representative worthy to don the Chingizid mantle and none had the power to impose for long their authority over others, the century between 1750 and 1850 was marked by continual contests among these petty amirates and shaykhdoms to control regional resources.

THE AFGHAN MODEL OF LEGITIMACY

In the meantime, other political communities with different legitimizing principles began to make their presence felt in Central Asia. The most important was the Afghan or Durrani Empire that coalesced in 1747 from units of an Iranian army immobilized, and then demobilized, after the assassination of its leader, Nadir Shah Afshar. Taking advantage of the opportunity left by the leadership vacuum, a charismatic figure, Ahmad Khan Abdali, forged a new military organization out of the remains of the Iranian force. His fellow Afghans bestowed the title "shah" on him, presumably in the expectation that he would assume the place of Nadir Shah as a

"world conqueror." In many ways Ahmad Shah fulfilled those expectations, conducting the kind of imperial campaigns—particularly in India—for which Nadir Shah was remembered. The symbolism of the title "shah" is important for it signified that the model political community for the Afghans was based on Iranian ideas of kingship, not Chingizid ones. These ideas dominated Afghan political practice until 1838, when Dust Muhammad altered this traditional claim to legitimacy based on the Iranian model.

Dust Muhammad (r. 1826–39 and 1842–63) also fit the model of "world conqueror." He extended the Durrani Empire northwards to encompass the former appanage of Balkh and made it part of Afghanistan. Then, in 1838 he discarded the title "shah" and the Iranian model of authority that it symbolized and adopted instead the title "amir." In the Afghan context, the title did not mean, as it did in neo-Chingizid Central Asia, a military leader of one of the Uzbek tribes. Instead, it was a contraction of the title "Amir al-Mu'minin" (Commander of the Faithful), the traditional title of the caliph, the leader of the Muslim community. Dust Muhammad chose it quite deliberately in order to project his claim to legitimacy—not as heir to the Iranian tradition but as a Muslim and, even more importantly, as a Muslim leader in a time of threats to the faith. To later generations, Dust Muhammad came to be known simply as "Amir-i Kabir," the Great Amir.

The context in which the title was taken is as follows: In 1838 Peshawar, which had been held by the Afghans for some seventy years, had been wrested from them by a new force in the Punjab, the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh. Sultan Muhammad, the ousted Afghan governor of Peshawar, came to his brother, Dust Muhammad, in Kabul and asked for his help in recapturing the city. Dust Muhammad agreed. Now we pick up the story as presented by Fayz Muhammad writing in the early twentieth century:

> Calling the men of the surrounding region into Kabul, Dust Muhammad declared a jihad and announced that the Punjab, Peshawar, and other regions would be regained from the Sikhs. The religious scholars, who consider jihad a religious obligation on every believer (*farz 'ayn*) and who consider killing and being

killed in the path of religion to be the catalyst of a better age and the way to obtain life itself, gathered joyously and declared, "the command to undertake jihad depends on the existence of an amir and the establishment of an amirate. Such a person then deserves to have the coinage struck and the Friday sermon delivered in his name and to raise the banner of jihad. Whoever should turn away from his command or prohibition, it would be like disobedience to the command of God and the Prophet. Others must render him obedience and punish those who disobey or fail to heed his command and prohibitions. In accordance with the prooftext, 'Obey God, obey the Prophet and the worthiest of command amongst you,' no one should disobey nor throw themselves into the abyss of disgrace and ignominy. At this moment the person most worthy of command is you [i.e., Dust Muhammad] for you have good common sense and clear ideas." So Dust Muhammad, thanks to this declaration by the religious scholars and the approval of the leaders of the people, began laying the foundations of his amirate. In a short time, he had put everything in order, ascended the throne, and his name rang out from the pulpits and was inscribed on the coinage. The following line appeared on his coins:

"Amir Dust Muhammad resolved to wage jihad and to mint coins, May God grant him victory."[32]

The title amir was linked specifically here to the act of jihad, or the struggle to defend the faith. Dust Muhammad was the first Afghan political figure to present himself as a *mujahid* (one who wages jihad) and to introduce the concept into Central Asia, or at least to the southern part of it, as a crucial element of political legitimacy. The resonance of the linked titles amir and mujahid increased with the growing encroachment of non-Muslim polities (the Sikhs and the Christian English and Russians) into Muslim domains. (In Trans-Oxiana, on the other hand, the title amir, as used by the rulers of Bukhara, was based on a long-standing tradition of membership in, and leadership of, one of the Uzbek tribes.)

After Dust Muhammad, the individual who most worked to publicize the legitimizing principle of jihad was 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (pl. 25), amir of Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901. He published two

Pl. 25

treatises on jihad, one entitled "Remarks by the Amir of the Country Concerning the Encouragement of People to Perform Jihad" and the other simply called "Rectifying Religion." Hasan Kakar, in his study of the administration of 'Abd al-Rahman, links the publication of these pamphlets with the amir's attempts to mobilize public opinion in favor of universal military service.[33] Kakar touches on some of the other domestic concerns of the amir in issuing these pamphlets and the texts themselves seem to reflect certain anxieties about the amir's own political position, as well as the fact that Afghanistan was nearly surrounded by Christian-controlled territory. (I mention these pamphlets here primarily to show the use and history of jihad in Afghan political thought.)

The recent long struggle over legitimate rule in the country has produced some remarkable images and symbols and has transformed at least one art form, the Afghan carpet. Prior to the Thawr Revolution and the Soviet occupation, Afghan carpets were characterized by abstract geometric patterns, devoid of any particular message; since 1979, they have been used as vehicles for political symbols.

One such new design is a full-figure portrait, on a prayer rug, of Aman Allah Khan, the amir of Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929. As a political symbol, the portrait of Aman Allah evokes contradictory
Pl. 26 responses (pl. 26).[34] A controversial figure, he is interpreted favorably by those who applauded his efforts as reformer, modernizer, and legislator, but those who saw his modernizing and Westernizing efforts as endangering the underpinnings of society and religion have interpreted him quite negatively. The rug represents a new, or at least rehabilitated, image of him. He stands in full military regalia and above his head, which fills the *mihrab* end of the rug, is the inscription "The Holy Warrior [*ghazi*] Aman Allah Khan." In Afghan political culture the title ghazi, a title conferred on the leader of jihad, has been a potent symbol.

To refer to Aman Allah as a holy warrior is not without some historical justification. As amir during the brief Third Afghan War in 1919, known in Afghanistan as the War of Independence, he earned the title ghazi for leading the country against the British. Until

recently, that aspect of his persona was overwhelmed by the failure of his modernist reforms and by his ignominious end, first fleeing Kabul when threatened by a local bandit and then abandoning the effort to re-take the city and the throne when it appeared that he had every chance of success.[35] Until the Soviet invasion of 1979 and the long struggle against that occupation, his symbolic value had been more or less nil. One would like to know more, rather than simply speculate from the obvious clues, about the circumstances in which this prayer rug was conceived, designed, and produced. But clearly the association of Aman Allah with jihad, as well as the knowledge that this aspect of his life would be instantly recognizable, must have been a principal motive in the decision to commission the weaving of the rug.

Jihad remains of prime importance in politics today. Except for jihad, the various groups contending for power have no other legitimizing symbols to invoke. Consequently, the public statements of all the main figures in Afghan politics invariably begin with a reference to the "fifteen-year jihad." It is not yet clear, however, how the power of this symbol can be harnessed for rebuilding the state and Afghan society.

The legitimacy of a Shari'a-minded ruler, as compared with a Yasa-minded one, lies first and foremost in publicly proclaiming the intention of protecting and advancing religion within the ruler's jurisdiction. In Afghanistan, the title of amir lasted almost a century—until the ouster of Aman Allah Khan.[36] After a brief interregnal period, Aman Allah's successor, Muhammad Nadir (Nadir Shah), revived the title of shah with all its connotations of lineal sovereignty. Nadir Shah probably drew inspiration both from the example of the founder of the country, Ahmad Shah, and from the Iranian example of his own contemporary, Riza Shah, who was, like Nadir Shah, the founder of a new dynastic line. But, as in the case of Iran, the Afghan revival of a shahdom ran its course rather quickly. (See Table 4.)

Today, although conventional titles like "president" and "prime minister" have been adopted for reasons of expediency by recent leaders such as Burhan al-Din Rabbani and Gulb al-Din Hikmatyar,

TABLE 4:
TITLES ADOPTED BY AFGHAN RULERS (IN KABUL)
1747 TO 1973

Name	Title	Regnal Date
Ahmad	Shah	1747–1772
Timur	Shah	1772–1793
Zaman	Shah	1793–1800
Mahmud	Shah	1800–1803
		1809–1819
Shuja' al-Dawlah (al-Mulk)	Shah	1803–1809
		1839–1842
Fath Jang	Shah	1842–1843
'Ali	Shah	1843
Dust Muhammad	Amir (adopted in 1838)	1819 or
		1826–1839
		1843–1863
Muhammad Afdal	Amir	1866–1867
Muhammad A'zam	Amir	1867
Shayr 'Ali	Amir	1863–66,
		1868–1879
Muhammad Ya'qub	Amir	1879–1880
'Abd al-Rahman	Amir	1880–1901
Habib Allah	Amir	1901–1919
Aman Allah	Amir	1919–1929
'Inayat Allah	Amir	1929
Habib Allah (Bachah-i Saqao)	Amir	1929
Muhammad Nadir	Shah	1929–1936
Muhammad Zahir	Shah	1936–1973*

*Republic declared in 1973.

to buttress their legitimacy, the title "ghazi," or even "amir" (if the latter were not so redolent of the past), seems more appropriate to the fundamental principles and sources these leaders seek to invoke in order to legitimize their positions.

* * * * * *

The future of the political process throughout Central Asia lies, as it always has, in re-establishing legitimate institutional forms. Legitimacy is expressed through the consensus of the governed, or those constituencies of the governed who count, and is formalized in written and unwritten laws and constitutions. Some Central Asian countries (e.g., Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) have introduced new laws and constitutions since 1991. Whether there is a consensus yet that will make these formalities authoritative remains to be seen. Other countries such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan are still grappling with the question of who is in control. The outcome in neither case is predictable. All one can say is that these issues have arisen before, been resolved for a time, and then been reopened. And that will probably continue to be the case.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. It has been accurately if somewhat wryly observed that "the term Central Asia tends to elude precise definition." (Gavin Hambly in the introduction to *Central Asia*, New York: Delacorte Press, 1969, p. xi.) But this has not stopped people from trying. The *Encyclopaedia Iranica* defines it as the region lying between 55° and 115°E and 25° and 50°N and further subdivides it into two distinct regions, a western and an eastern, noting that "most Western scholars apply [the term Central Asia] to [the] western" the region lying between 70° and 100°E and 25° and 45°N. (Eds. "Central Asia i. Geographical Survey," *Encyclopaedia Iranica,* Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1990, vol. 5, p. 160.) In Russian usage, "Tsentral'naia Aziia" refers to the eastern region sometimes also called Chinese Turkistan, while the term "Middle Asia" (Sredniaia Aziia) has long been the preferred designation for the western region. Both usages tend to exclude any part of Afghanistan. Defined culturally, Central Asia is the region marked for most of the last thirteen centuries by a literary culture that is predominantly Persian (Tajik, Dari), a religious culture rooted in Arabic and a military-administrative culture dominated by speakers of Turkic languages (Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Kazakh to give them their modern names). Although geographically situated in the northeastern quadrant of Perso-Islamicate civilization, the region has produced residents and institutions that have made important contributions to Persian literature, the mathematical and astronomical sciences, Islamic law and philosophy, and the operation of a continent-wide system of trade and commerce.

As used throughout this book, the term Central Asia is intended to cover the five former Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and northern Afghanistan. The geographical borders of this region are the Caspian Sea in the west, the Tienshan Mountains in the east, the Hindu Kush Mountains in the south and the steppe to the north and east of the Aral Sea.

2. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* (Washington, D.C.), April 14, 1993.

3. Carol Henderson, "Grass Roots Aspects of Agricultural Privatization in Kyrgyzstan," in *Central Asia Monitor*, no. 5 (Fair Haven, Vermont, 1993), pp. 29–37 gives a careful and insightful picture of the process of privatization in Kyrgyzstan.

4. In late 1994, a former American Field Service (AFS) exchangee, a young Kazakh woman from Almaty who spent 1989–90 as a member of

our family and as a student at Princeton High School in New Jersey, reported her perception that many non-Kazakhs had left Kazakhstan, but they were beginning to return because they found they were not welcome in their eponymous homelands.

5. I have generally followed here the analysis of Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "Causes and consequences of the Civil War," *Central Asia Monitor*, no. 1, pp. 10–14 and "The Tajik Spring of 1992," *Central Asia Monitor*, no. 2, pp. 21–29.

6. Robert Kaiser, "Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia" in Robert A. Lewis, ed., *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia* (New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 291.

Chapter One. A Region in Transition

1. It is not my intention to argue that the names indicate or even evoke sacred associations today, although they may and often do. Just as it would seem absurd to argue that the name San Francisco has anything but a vestigial connection to the saint from Assisi, so it would be misleading, without other evidence, to assume that, because a place is named after a saint, the name still carries sacred meaning for people associated with it today. My intent here is only to suggest the influence of religion, as evidenced in toponyms, on the way in which the landscape was imagined in the past and perhaps as it is construed in the present as well.

2. R. Ia. Rassudova, "Termin khodzha v toponomii Srednei Azii," in V. A. Nikonov and A. M. Reshetov, *Onomastika Srednei Azii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), p. 117.

3. R. Ia. Rassudova, "Termin khodzha," p. 116. The author maintains that the term usually means "elder" (*starshii*) or "head" (*nachal'nik*) but adds that the meanings differed from place to place, citing Kazakh and Kyrgyz usage as the title of a teacher in a "traditional" (*staromodny*) school, a person who would be called a "mullah" elsewhere.

4. A. Z. Rozenfeld, "Problemy regional'nosti i desemantizatsii v Tadzhikskoi toponomii," in V. A. Nikonov and A. M. Reshetov, *Onomastika Srednei Azii,* p. 67. On the frequency of the term "langar" in Afghanistan, see Muhammad Hakim Nahid, *Qamus-i jughrafiya-i Afghanistan,* vol. 3 (Kabul, 1335–1339/1966–1970, pp. 473–74).

5. See V. V. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasions*, 3d ed., ed. C. E. Bosworth (London: Messrs. Luzac and Co., 1968), especially chapter one. This work was first published in 1900 in Russian and in 1928 in English. See also Guy LeStrange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (1905; reprint London: Frank Cass and Co., 1966), especially chaps. 21–24. For

Persian geographical works discovered since the beginning of the twentieth century, see C. A. Storey, *Persian Literature: A Bio-bibliographical Survey*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (London: Messrs. Luzac and Co., 1958), pp. 117ff.

6. Ibn Battuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa 1325–1354*, trans. and comp. by H. A. R. Gibb (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 172.

7. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar fi manaqib al-akhyar*. This work was planned to have an introduction (*fatihah*), seven volumes (each with four parts), and a conclusion (*khatimah*); however, only part of volume one (the geographical portion) and volume six (Chingizid history) appear to have survived. On the scope and survival of the work, see C. A. Storey, *Persidskaia Literatura: Bio-Bibliograficheskii Obzor*, revised and expanded by Y. E. Bregel, 3 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), pp. 1135–36. Selections from the geographical segment relating generally to Central Asia have been published and translated into Russian; see Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *More tain otnositel'no doblestei blagorodnykh (geografiia)*, trans. by B. A. Akhmedov (Tashkent: Fan, 1977). Parts relating to India are being published *ad seriatim* in English translation by Dr. Ansar Zahid Khan, "Mahmud b. Amir Wali's Description of Towns, Cities and Regions of South Asia in the Bahr al-Asrar fi Ma'rifat al-Akhyar," in *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*. April 1990– (vol. 38, pt. 2–). See also Mahmud b. Amir Wali's, *The Bahr ul-Asrar—Travelogue of South Asia*, edited by Riazul Islam (Karachi: Institute for Central and West Asian Studies, University of Karachi,1980); the author's account of his tour of India (= fols. 389b–408a of pt. 4 of vol. 6, India Office Library [I.O.L.], MS 575), also contains much geographic information.

8. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *More tain*, pp. 2 (facsimile text) and 18 (Russian translation).

9. See V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, translated from the Russian by V. Minorsky and T. Minorsky, vol. 2 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), p. 20. Timur had arrived in Andkhud at the start of a campaign to Eastern Iran. He was greeted by Ata Sangu Jan Baba who hurled "a piece of raw meat from the breast of an animal" at his feet. Timur took this as a good omen for the campaign, declaring that it showed God would deliver Khurasan, "the breast of the earth," into his hands.

10. Muhammad Nasir Gharghast, *Rahnama-yi Kabul* (Kabul: Dawlati Matba'ah, 1345/1966), p. 98.

11. Ibid., p. 112.

12. Henry Lansdell, *Through Central Asia (with a map and appendix on the diplomacy and delimitation of the Russo-Afghan frontier)* (London, 1887; reprint, Niedeln/Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprints, 1978).

13. Ibid., p. 1.

14. Ibid., p. 3.

15. Ibid., p. 131.

16. Ibid., p. 160.

17. Ibid., p. 388.

18. Robert O. Freedman, "Notes on Islam in Uzbekistan: Observations of a trip to Uzbekistan—September 28–October 8, 1993," unpublished circular, 1993, p. 3. Other missionary groups working in Central Asia include the Unification Church and Jehovah's Witnesses.

19. In a recent study of ethnic difference in Central Asia, Maria Subtelny describes the contradictions that Soviet scholars have had to rationalize in explaining the meaning of the terms "Uzbek" and "Tajik." See Maria Eva Subtelny, "The Symbiosis of Turk and Tajik in Central Asia," in *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, ed. by Beatrice F. Manz (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 45–61. Subtelny also states that ethnogenetic theory asserts that modern Uzbeks, for example, are descendants of "all the sedentary peoples who had ever inhabited the territory" of present-day Uzbekistan (p. 53). This takes no account, as she points out, of the peoples called "Uzbeks" by contemporary sources. These were the nomads who came to the agrarian oases of Central Asia in substantial numbers in the early sixteenth century and gained political control from the Timurid dynasty.

20. Lee Schwartz, "The Political Geography of Central Asia: Integrating the Central Asian Frontier," in *Geographic Perspectives*, ed. Robert A. Lewis, p. 59, n. 7.

21. Ibid., p. 62.

22. Ibid., p. 64.

23. For a survey of the way the Great Game redux was played out during the Cold War, see Richard S. Newell, *The Politics of Afghanistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 124–39.

24. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt*, trans. Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. LaFarge (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1981) is a good example of the perspective of this school of theorists.

25. In the last two decades, Thomas Barfield, Robert Canfield, A. D. Davydov, B. Kh. Karmysheva, M. Nazif Shahrani, Audrey Shalinsky, O. A. Sukhareva, T. I. Sultanov, Nancy Tapper, and Richard Tapper have all made important contributions to, and substantially advanced the study of, Central Asian ethnography and anthropology.

26. Peter Sinnott, "The Physical Geography of Soviet Central Asia," in *Geographic Perspectives*, ed. Robert A. Lewis, p. 80.

27. Ibid., p. 83.

28. Ibid., p. 83.

29. Ibid., p. 89.

30. On the Bactrian sites, see Christine Flon, ed., *The World Atlas of*

Archaeology (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1985), p. 231. The canals were taken off the Kokchah and Qunduz rivers and used to irrigate the lowlands where those rivers approached the Amu. The Shibanid, 'Abd Allah Khan (d. 1598), is reported to have constructed a canal at Imam Sayyid in 1584 (see Hafiz-i Tanish, *Sharaf-namah-i Shahi*, India Office Library [I.O.L.], MS 574, fol. 432b). Sometime in the 1620s, Nazr Muhammad, the ruler of Balkh, is said to have marshalled 300,000 laborers to rebuild a canal at Aq Sarai near Qunduz, which Mahmud b. Amir Wali calls the reconstruction of a canal originally built by "Kay Kubad and his son Kay Ka'us," two legendary pre-Islamic "Kayani" kings. (Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar* [London: I. O. L.], fols. 215b, 313a.)

31. Daniel Balland, "Cotton iii. In Afghanistan," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (Costa Mesa, 1993), pp. 338–39.

32. Peter Craumer, "Agricultural change, Labor Supply, and Rural Out-Migration in Soviet Central Asia," in *Geographic Perspectives*, ed. Robert A. Lewis, p. 135.

Chapter Two. Economic Fundamentals

1. See J. M. Cook, "The Rise of the Achaemenids and Establishment of their Empire," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 2 (*The Median and Achaemenian Periods*), ed. Ilya Gershevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 252ff. on what is known about the integration of Central Asia into the early Persian Empire.

2. V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies*, vol. 1, p. 65.

3. See, more recently, Morris Rossabi, "The 'decline' of the central Asian caravan trade," in *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World 1350–1750*, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 351–70. The meaning of stability/instability, which plays a large part in the author's explanation of the "decline" of the caravan trade, lacks—perhaps cannot help but lack—a clear definition. If political instability in the region was the cause of the alleged decline of the trade, an attempt at explaining what constitutes baseline "political stability" would have been helpful. How far and for what duration must conditions deviate from that baseline to warrant the tag, "instability?" Are there conditions of political life that any well-informed and reasonable person would recognize as stable or unstable? Or is *stability* simply the way things usually are or are expected to be in whatever sphere of life is being contemplated, and *instability* when those expectations are not fulfilled? Is the idea of stability the same for contemporaries in different walks of life, say a businessman and a soldier, or a tax collector and a scholar? Finally, one would like to know whether the effects of such instability can

actually be traced to trade patterns and what one might reasonably expect the impact to be.

Finally, the statement (p. 369) that "it was the rise in transport costs that undermined and finally ruined the overland trade" begs for some reference to monographic or statistical evidence.

4. See Niels Steensgaard, *The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Company and the Decline of the Caravan Trade* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), who argues that the decline of overland routes was due to the ability of the European trading companies using maritime routes to "internalize protection costs." Asian overland routes were not necessarily more expensive but the level of protection costs encountered by any given caravan was unpredictable from year to year and place to place. It was this lack of transparency when it came to transportation/protection costs that made the land routes, in Steensgaard's view, less attractive.

5. Two excellent books on Central Asian regional and international trade are Audrey Burton, *Bukharan Trade: 1558–1718* (Bloomington, Indiana: Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1993) and Stephen Frederic Dale, *Indian Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

6. There were a number of initiatives to exploit the overland routes in the post-da Gama period. One of the most ambitious was the Russia Company, also known as the Muscovy Company, a joint-stock organization founded in London in 1553 by a group of 240 merchants interested in finding a route to India not controlled by the Portuguese. (See Thomas Stuart Willan, *The Early History of the Russia Company—1553–1603*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956, p. 1.)

7. O. D. Chekhovich and A. B. Vil'danova, "Vakf Subkhan-kulikhana Bukharskogo 1693 g.," in *Pis'mennye pamiatniki Vostoka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), pp. 223, 230.

8. R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480–1889* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 184.

9. Russell R. Menard, "Transport Costs and Long-Range Trade 1300–1800: Was There a European 'Transport Revolution' in the Early Modern Era?" in *The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade 1350–1750,* ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 254.

10. For a history of cotton in Central Asia before the nineteenth century, see V. V. Bartold, "Khlopkovodstvo v Srednei Azii s istoricheskikh vremen do prikhoda Russkikh," in V. V. Bartold, *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Moscow: Nauka, 1963), pp. 434–48.

11. "Report upon the Russian Trade with Central Asia," compiled by T. Saville Lumley and described by Arminius Vámbéry in *Travels in Central Asia Being an Account of a Journey from Teheran across the Turkoman Desert on the Eastern Shore of the Caspian to Khiva, Bochara, and Samarqand Performed in the Year 1863* (New York: 1865; reprinted New York: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1970), pp. 475–76. It should be noted, however, that Central Asian cotton production did not greatly impress Vámbéry. Despite the chart in his own book, which clearly shows its importance, he found fruits, cereal grains, and livestock production far more interesting and mentions cotton only in passing when describing the region's trade and manufactures.

12. Hassan Hakimian, "Cotton. ii. Production and Trade in Persia," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 6 (Costa Mesa, 1993), p. 335; and Daniel Balland, "Cotton," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica,* vol. 6, p. 339.

13. Eugene Schuyler, *Turkestan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkestan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja*, ed. Geoffrey Wheeler and abridged by K. E. West from the London 1876 edition (New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 151.

14. For a recent survey of the vast literature on the world-wide flow of precious metals and its transformation when the mines of Central and South America went into production, see Ward Barrett, "World Bullion Flows: 1450–1800," in *The Rise of Merchant Empires*, ed. James D. Tracy, pp. 224–54.

15. Aziza Hasan, "The Silver Currency Output of the Mughal Empire and Prices in India during the 16th and 17th Centuries," in *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, vol. 6 (Delhi: K. A. Naqvi, 1969), pp. 85–116, shows that mint output rose dramatically with the arrival of American silver in India by way of the Philippines. Halil Inalcik, in a study first published in 1978, "Impact of the *Annales* School on Ottoman Studies and New Findings," in *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History*, no. 4 (London: Variorum, 1985), documents the effect of the influx of New World silver on the exchange rate for gold in the Levant.

16. Wilhelm Abel argued early in this century that the so-called European price revolution precipitated by the influx of silver was largely a chimera. (Wilhelm Abel, *Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Centuries* [London: Methuen, 1980], especially ch. 4, "Farming and the standard of living in the 16th century.") Abel showed that while there was an average annual four percent inflation rate in grain prices in Europe in the sixteenth century, the price rise began well before the first silver ships landed. Moreover, the price of industrial commodities rose at a much slower pace than grain and real wages actually declined during the period of the greatest influx of precious metals. Ômer Lutfi Barkan, "The

price revolution of the sixteenth century: a turning point in the economic history of the Near East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, no. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 3–28, sets out the classic view of the phenomenon of a price revolution for the Ottoman Empire.

17. Again the evidence here is fragmentary and the conclusions are still largely impressionistic. (See my "Economic and Social Aspects of the Public Architecture of Bukhara in the 1560s and 1570s," *Islamic Art*, vol. 2 [Genoa: The Bruschettini Foundation for Islamic and Asian Art and New York: The Islamic Art Foundation, 1987], pp. 217–42 for a description of the burst of building activity that took place in Bukhara in the second half of the sixteenth century.)

18. For the early modern trade routes and products traded between India and Central Asia, see Irfan Habib, *An Atlas of the Mughal Empire* (Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pls. 1A-B and 2A-B. Habib's, "Merchant communities in precolonial India," in *The Rise of Merchant Empires*, ed. James D. Tracy, pp. 371–99, while not directly concerned with Central Asia, provides a model for the study of regional trade there.

19. Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, p. 469, writes, "Taken altogether, it is incredible how fertile all the cultivable land is in these three khanates" [i.e., Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand—the latter being the Farghanah region, soon to come under Russian control]. Schuyler, touring Central Asia ten years after Vámbéry, summarized the soil and water conditions of the region as follows:

> Cultivable land in Central Asia is of two kinds; that which lies along the mountains and is fertilized by the spring and autumn rains, called *lalmi*, and that which is watered almost solely by irrigation, called *obi* or *abi*. Although the *lalmi* lands, which are the most extensive, produce, especially in favourable years, large crops of grain, and are the main reliances for feeding the population, yet the irrigated lands, on account of their richness and fertility, the constancy of their harvests, and the variety of their produce, are by far the most important to the well-being and civilization of the country (*Turkestan*, p. 147).

20. Zahir al-Din Babur, *The Babur-nama in English* , p. 3.
21. Ibid., p. 6.
22. Ibid., p. 8.
23. Ibid., p. 9.
24. Ibid., p. 10.
25. Ibid., p. 77.

26. Jurgen Jakobi, "Agriculture between Literary Tradition and Firsthand Experience: The *Irshad al-zira'ah* of Qasim b. Yusuf Abu Nasri Harawi," in *Timurid Art and Culture in Iran and Central Asia in the Fifteenth Century* ed. Lisa Golombek and Maria Subtelny (Leiden, New York and Köln: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 201–8, deals with classical inspirations for Harawi's work. Maria Subtelny, in two important articles—"A Medieval Persian Agricultural Manual in Context: The *Irshad al-zira'ah* in Late Timurid and Early Safavid Khorasan," *Studia Iranica*, vol. 22 (Paris: L'Association pour l'avancment des études Iraniennes, 1993), pp. 167–216 and "Mirak-i Sayyid Ghiyas and the Timurid Tradition of Landscape Architecture: Further Notes to 'A Medieval Persian Agricultural Manual in Context'," *Studia Iranica*, vol. 24 (Paris: L'Association pour l'avancment des études Iraniennes, 1995), pp. 19–60—has documented the careers of Harawi's informant and his family in landscape design.

27. See Qasim b. Yusuf Abu Nasri Harawi, *Irshad al-zira'ah*, ed. Muhammad Mushiri (Tehran: Danishgah-i Tihran, 1346/1967), pp. 113–16. Jakobi, "Agriculture between Literary Tradition and Firsthand Experience," p. 204, questions Harawi's claim to having based his work on a personal survey of agricultural traditions on the grounds that he includes two species, olives and dates, the first of which is not independently documented for the region and the second of which is not adaptable to Herat's climate.

28. E. È. Bertel's [F. B. Rostopchin], *Iz arkhiva sheikhov Dzhuibari* (Moscow and Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk, 1938). This work contains more than 400 documents, most of which are court registrations or certifications (*iqrars*) of contracts for the sale of property. The buyers in the vast majority of these recorded transactions were Khwajah Muhammad Islam Juybari (d. 1563) and his son Khwajah Sa'd al-Din (d. 1589).

29. Ibid. Documents nos. 139–56, 158 record purchases of land in Juzmandun.

30. The published text, with Russian translation, is found in Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *More tain*. The folio numbers of the Persian text (a facsimile of MS 2372 in the Institute of Oriental Studies, Uzbek Academy of Sciences collection) are 142a–143b (pp. 4–5 of Akhmedov's edition). The Russian translation is found on pp. 25–26.

31. Babur, *The Babur-namah in English*, p. 203.

32. Ibid., p. 208.

33. Cited and translated by Maria Subtelny, "A Medieval Persian Agricultural Manual," p. 183.

34. P. B. Lord, "Prospects of Trade with Turkistan, in reference to the contemplated establishment of an annual fair on the banks of the Indus," in *Reports and Papers, Political, Geographical, and Commercial submitted to*

Government by Sir Alexander Burnes, Lieutenant Leech, Doctor Lord, and Lieutenant Wood employed on missions in the years 1835–36–37 in Scinde, Affghanisthan, and Adjacent Countries (Calcutta: G. H. Huttmann, Bengal Military Orphan Press, 1839), pp. 122–32. In 1834 Burnes himself published a three-volume travelogue (*Travels into Bokhara; Being the Account of a Journey from India to Cabool, Tartary, and Persia; also, Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus, from the Sea to Lahore, with Presents from the King of Great Britain; Performed under the Orders of the Supreme Government of India, in the Years 1831, 1832, and 1833*, London, 1834), which was an important source for economic conditions in contemporary Central Asia. Burnes was a vigorous advocate of the plan for an Indus River fair.

35. India Office Library, Letters, Private and Secret Series (L/P&S/5/130), pp. 493–514. I am grateful to Jonathan Lee for making his copies of this and the following document available to me.

36. India Office Library, Letters, Private and Secret Series (L/P&S/5/254), p. 768.

37. Fazl Allah b. Ruzbihan-i Khunji Isfahani, *Mihman-namah-yi Bukhara*, ed. Manuchihr Sutudah (Tehran: Bungah-i Tarjumah wa Nashr-i Kitab, 1341/1963), p. 149.

38. *The Kirghiz of Afghanistan*, director/producer Charlie Nairn; anthropologist, Nazif Shahrani; Disappearing World Series, Granada Colour Productions, 1975.

39. Joseph Schacht, *An Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 156; A. Udovitch, "Kirad," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, vol. 5 (Leiden, 1979), pp. 129–30.

40. See Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), passim, for discussion of both Russian legislation on land ownership and the role of Shari'a in Kazakh society. How the Russian and Muslim legal administrations interacted has not, so far as I know, been the subject of study.

41. The orthographically indistinguishable (in the Arabic script) word *mulk* is often used interchangeably, though inaccurately, with *milk*. *Milk* has come to mean both the abstract idea of ownership and the thing actually owned. (See A. M. Delcambre, "milk," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, vol. 7, pp. 60–61.) In judicial documents from the court of the deputy qazi in Samarqand the word used for ownership is *milkiyat* (see *Majmu'ah-i watha'iq*, Institut Vostokovedeniia Akademii Nauk, Uzbekistan, no. 1386 and selections published by R. R. Fitrat and B. S. Sergeev, *Kaziiskie dokumenty XVI veka* [Tashkent: Komitet Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 1937]).

42. Yet the state, through its judicial administration, did have the final say on public access and public rights of way. The roles of the municipal

engineer (in sixteenth-century Bukhara called the *mi'mar*) and the qazi in settling private disputes are documented in other parts of the Islamic world as well. For the early modern period in Egypt, see for example, Nelly Hanna, *Construction Work in Ottoman Cairo (1517–1798)* (Cairo: Institut francais d'archéologie orientale, 1984) where the *muhandis*-engineer played a role similar to the mi'mar in Bukhara. See also Galal H. El-Nahal, *The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the Seventeenth Century* (Minneapolis and Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1979), esp. p. 52.

43. For a wide-ranging survey of Central Asian taxes and tax policy in the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, see M. A. Abduraimov, *Ocherki agrarnykh otnoshenii v Bukharskom khanstve v XVI—pervoi polovine XIX veka*, 2 vols. (Tashkent: Fan, 1966–1970). The ideas of Ol'ga D. Chekhovich are found, among other places, in the introductions to the numerous collections of documents that she has published and are indispensable to any study of Central Asian tax policy.

44. What follows is based entirely on Khunji, *Mihman-namah*, pp. 295–99.

45. The actual title of the work by 'Abd Allah Shirazi b. 'Izz al-Din Fazl Allah "Wassaf" is *Tadjiyat al-amsar wa tazjiyat al-a'sar*, for a description of which see Storey, *Persian Literature*, vol. 1, pp. 267–70. The story Khunji retells is found, with minor variations, in the abridged version, *Tahrir-i Tarikh-i Wassaf*, edited by 'Abd al-Muhammad Ayati (Tehran: Mu'assasah-i Mutala'at wa Tahqiqat-i Farangi [Pazhuhishgah], 1372/1993), p. 97.

46. Khunji, *Mihman-namah*, p. 299.

47. Again Khunji, *Mihman-namah*, pp. 306–7, is the only source here for the review of the waqfs of Samarqand ordered by Shibani Khan. He says the khan appointed him to supervise the review.

48. [F. B. Rostopchin] *Iz arkhiva*, document no. 147.

49. O. D. Chekhovich, *Dokumenty k istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii v Bukharskom khanstve XVII–XIX v.*, vol. 1: *Akty feodal'noi sobstvennosti na zemliu* (Tashkent: Akademiia Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, 1954), p. iv, notes the large scale of land ownership and transfers in the selection of seventeenth-century documents she published. That there were large parcels of land owned and sold in all periods is not in question. But the sample from the seventeenth century is small and probably not representative of land transactions in the way the Juybari documents are.

50. [F. B. Rostopchin] *Iz arkhiva*, documents nos. 139–56, 158, for the transactions relating to Juzmandun.

51. R. G. Mukminova, *Ocherki po istorii remesla v Samarkande i Bukhare v XVI veke* (Tashkent: Fan, 1976) used the Samarqand court documents (the *Majmu'ah-i watha'iq*) and the Juybari documents (*Iz arkhiva*) as principal

sources for her comprehensive study of the manufacturing and service professions of Central Asia in the sixteenth century.

52. O. D. Chekhovich, "Bukharskie pozemel'nye akty XVI–XX vv," in *Problemy Istochnikovedeniia*, vol. 4 (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR,1955), pp. 234–35. See also her *Dokumenty k istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii*, pp. xv-xvi on the sale of state lands.

53. N. L. Mordvinov, "Bogougodnye i blagotvoritel'nye uchrezhdeniia (vakf)," in *Russkii Vestnik za 1899 g.*, no. 11, pp. 387–402. The results of that survey are kept in the State Archives of Uzbekistan in Tashkent and have yet to be published. Prof. Aman Musaevich Tashmukhammedov of the History Faculty of Tashkent State University shared some of his findings from his work on this survey with me, for which I am grateful.

54. On the Russian annexation and administration of Central Asia in the pre-Soviet period see Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 36 for the date of the formal establishment of the guberniia of Turkestan.

55. O. D. Chekhovich, "Materialy po terminologii istoricheskikh istochnikov," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, no. 6 (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp. 72–73.

56. Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, especially pp. 160–65.

57. Hugh Beattie, "Effects of the Saur Revolution in the Nahrin Area of Northern Afghanistan," in *Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives*, eds. Robert L. Canfield and M. Nazif Shahrani, Berkeley, 1984, p. 192; M. Nazif Shahrani, "Introduction: Marxist Revolution and Islamic Resistance in Afghanistan," in *Revolutions and Rebellions*, eds. Canfield and Shahrani, pp. 17–21; Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, *Newsletter*, vol. 7, no. 2 (New York: Asia Society, 1979), p. 22.

58. Afghanistan Council, *Newsletter*, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 22.

59. Afghanistan Council, *Newsletter*, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 42.

60. Hugh Beattie, "Effects of the Saur Revolution," p. 195, note.

61. Ibid.

62. Afghanistan Council, *Newsletter*, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 34. For a more complete treatment of the erratic course of land reform in Afghanistan, see Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 117–19, 142–43, and 172–73.

63. This document also reveals a good deal about Afghan judicial administration at the time. The case was processed at the Islamic Court (Dar al-Qaza) in Kabul during the reign of the Afghan amir Shayr 'Ali Khan. The seals on the document provide a glimpse into the structure of the court and its officers. The chief judge, the *Qazi al-quzat,* was a man named 'Abd al-Salam, the son of Sayyid Ra'is (the rest of the name is illegible). He was

assisted by another qazi, Sayyid Mir Hasan (whose father's name is illegible on the seal imprint) and three *muftis*, Shayr Ahmad, Sharif Anwar the son of Siddiq Ghulam Haydar, and Qiyam al-Din. Their seals bear dates ranging from A.D. 1845 (A.H. 1261) to A.D. 1872 (A.H. 1289), the year of the case. The dates, I presume, represent the date of appointment to the office named on the seal, the mufti, Sharif Anwar, having served the longest at the court—more than 27 years. Qazi Sayyid Mir Hasan's seal bears the inscription "Through the favor of the amir of the age" probably referring to his appointment by Shayr 'Ali Khan. Other documents from Afghanistan offer evidence of a consistent and firmly rooted bureaucratic tradition for the administration of justice in the cities and towns of the country.

Ashraf Ghani in "Islam and State-Building in a Tribal Society," *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 12 (London, Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 269–84 and in several unpublished papers has made extensive use of court records from the provincial town of Kunar in eastern Afghanistan. In addition, two court documents (in my possession) from Maymanah, dated 1907 and 1910, which cover property transfer, indicate that the Shar'i court administration was not only locally important but also under direct administrative control from Kabul.

64. O. D. Chekhovich, *Dokumenty k istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii* (document no. 27), pp. 130–35.

Chapter Three. Society and Community

1. For a study of local pilgrimage in the Afghan context, see Harald Einzmann, *Religiöses Volksbrauchtum in Afghanistan: Islamische Heiligenverehrung und Wallfahrtswesen im Raum Kabul* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977).

2. Robert L. Canfield, "Islamic Coalitions in Bamyan: A Problem in Translating Afghan Political Culture," in Canfield and Shahrani, *Revolutions and Rebellions*, p. 216.

3. Thus, on the 1:300,000 map (II-17-A) in Ludwig Adamec, ed. *Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan: Farah and Southwestern Afghanistan* (Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1973), Sayedan ("the sayyids") is situated about six kilometers southwest of the center of Lashkargah.

4. Richard B. Scott, *Tribal and ethnic groups in the Helmand Valley*, Occasional Paper no. 21 (New York: The Afghanistan Council, Asia Society, 1980), p. 19.

5. 'Aziz al-Din Wakili Fufalza'i, *Timur Shah Durrani* (Kabul: Anjuman-i Tarikh, 1346/1967). Both documents face p. 301. For more on the history

of the Prophet's cloak in Central Asia, see R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 222–27.

6. George Marcus, with Peter Dobkin Hall, *Lives in Trust: The Fortunes of Dynastic Families in Late Twentieth Century America* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).

7. Ibid., p. 15.

8. Ibid., p. 255.

9. Ibid., p. 15.

10. See R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 15–17.

11. For an accessible explanation of Shar'i probate, see J. Schacht, "Mirath," *The Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, eds. H. A. R. Gibb and J. H. Kramers (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), pp. 384–88.

12. See, for example, [F. B. Rostopchin], *Iz arkhiva*, documents nos. 339 (purchase of 3 of 9 shares), 341 (1.5 of 16 shares), 343 (.5 of 16 shares), and 344 (1 of 32 shares).

13. R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 307–8.

14. G. F. Snesarev, *Relikty do-musul'manskikh verovanii* . . . cited by D. DeWeese, "Ata'iya Order," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 2, pp. 904–5.

15. G. F. Snesarev, *Khorezmskie legendy kak istochnik po istorii religioznykh kul'tov Srednei Azii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1983), pp. 142–56. For photographs and plans see G. A. Pugachenkova, *Sredniaia Aziia: Spravochnik-Putevoditel'* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1983), pp. 115–17, 379. For a concise biography of Najm al-Din Kubra, see H. Algar, "Kubra" in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, vol. 5, p. 300–301.

16. Devin Deweese, "The Eclipse of the Kubraviyah in Central Asia," *Iranian Studies*, vol. 21 (New York: Society for Iranian Studies), 1988, pp. 47–48. O. D. Chekhovich, *Bukharskie Dokumenty XIV v.* (Tashkent: Nauka, 1965) published six documents spanning the period A.D. 1326–1829 which pertain to the endowment of Bakharzi's mausoleum.

17. Nasir-i Khusraw, *Naser-i Khosraw's Book of Travels*, trans. from Persian, with an introduction by W. M. Thackston, Jr. (Albany, N.Y.: Bibliotheca Persica, ca. 1986).

18. Louis Dupree, *Saint Cults in Afghanistan*, American University Field Staff Reports, South Asia. v. 20, no. 1 (Hanover, N.H., 1976), pp. 10–21, provides an account of the shrine as it appeared in the 1970s.

19. G. A. Pugachenkova, *Sredniaia Aziia*, pp. 99, 376 for photos and plans.

20. Ibid., pp. 126, 381.

21. On this order and its importance in Chinese history, see Joseph Fletcher, "Ching Inner Asia *circa* 1800" and "The Heyday of the Ching Order in Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet," in *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 10, part 1, *The Late Ch'ing: 1800–1911*, eds. Denis Twitchett and

John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 74, 87–90, and 361–66.

22. C. E Yate, who visited Andkhud in 1886, records an inscription from the shrine dating the death of the saint to A. H. 787 (A. D. 1386) as well as inscriptions recording renovation work done on the shrine in 1677 and 1873. See C. E. Yate, *Northern Afghanistan or Letters from the Afghan Boundary Commission* (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1888), pp. 346–48.

23. Here, I have closely followed Lisa Golombek, *The Timurid Shrine of Gazur Gah* (Toronto: Royal Ontario Museum, 1969).

24. Ibid., pp. 79–81.

25. See now, Lawrence Goddard Potter, *The Kart Dynasty of Herat: Religion and Politics in Medieval Iran* (Ph. D. diss., Columbia University, 1992), especially chapter four, "The Karts and the Sufis."

26. Lisa Golombek, *The Timurid Shrine*, p. 82, citing *Matla' al-sa'dayn*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Lahore: 1944), pp. 304–5.

27. Bernard Dupaigne, "Des monuments gravement endommages," in *Herat, ou l'art meurtri*, ed. Etienne Gille (Paris: n.d.) p. 23.

28. Nancy Hatch Dupree, "Herat: 18 Years After," in *Afghanistan Forum*, vol. 22, no. 6 (New York: Afghanistan Forum, 1994), p. 26.

29. Maria E. Subtelny,"The Cult of 'Abdallah Ansari under the Timurids," in *Gott ist Schön und Er liebt die Schönheit/God is Beautiful and He Loves Beauty/Festschrift für Annemarie Schimmel zum 7. April 1992 dargebracht von Schülern, Freunden und Kollegen/Festschrift in honour of Annemarie Schimmel presented by students, friends and colleagues on April 7, 1992*, ed. Alma Giese and J. Christoph Bürgel (Bern: Peter Lang, 1994), pp. 383ff., discusses in detail Shah Rukh's efforts at creating an Islamic image for himself.

30. Lisa Golombek, *The Timurid Shrine*, p. 83.

31. Ibid., p. 84–85.

32. For the Timurids, the practice can be traced back to the burial of Timur beside Sayyid Barakah, his spiritual mentor, at the Gur-i Amir in Samarqand and then to Ulugh Beg's development of the site as a family cemetery. Even the neo-Chingizids (the Shibanids and Tuqay-Timurids), who came from a tradition of burial within the "royal reserve" (*quruq*) adopted the Timurid practice of burial at a saintly shrine. See Devin Deweese, *Islamization and Native Religion*, pp. 179ff.

33. Lisa Golombek, *The Timurid Shrine*, p. 88.

34. Ibid., p. 93.

35. Fikri Saljuqi, *Gazur Gah* (Kabul: Dawlati Matba'ah, Mizan 1341/October 1962), pp. 68–78.

36. Fayz Muhammad Katib, *Siraj al-tawarikh*, vol. 2 (Kabul: Matba'ah-i Dawlati, 1331/1913), p. 249. See also Fikri Saljuqi, *Gazur Gah*, pp. 78-80 on Dust Muhammad's tomb and its inscriptions.

37. Khalili Afghan, *Athar-i Harat* (Herat: Matba'ah-i Fakhriyah-i Saljuqi, Dalw 1309/February 1931) vol. 1, pp. 61–62.

38. Khalili Afghan, *Athar*, vol. 1, p. 62 says that, at the time he was writing (1930), the administration (*tawliyat*) of the shrine complex was in the hands of Mir Ghulam Haydar Khan. But he then adds that the Mir Sahibi family had held the post for "a long time" prior to the appointment of Ghulam Haydar.

39. R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 26–36.

40. Although the early sixteenth-century historian, Khwandamir, provides a narrative of the discovery and mentions the mausoleum, his account is not very specific about the building program. (See Ghiyas al-Din Khwandamir, *Habib al-siyar fi akhbar afrad al-bashar*, vol. 4, Tehran: Khayyam, 1333/1954, pp. 171–73.) For a translation, see idem, *Habibu's-siyar. Tome Three. The Reign of the Mongol and the Turk*, trans. and ed. W. M. Thackston, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University, 1994), p. 439. By the late seventeenth century, one of the original buildings is described as a khanaqah and its construction attributed to Sultan Husayn Mirza Bayqara; see Muhammad Yusuf Munshi b. Khwajah Baqa, *Tarikh-* (or *Tazkirah-i*) *Muqim Khani*, (London: Royal Asiatic Society), MS 160, fols. 165a–167b.

41. Maria E. Subtelny, "The Cult of Ansari," pp. 379–80, links Shah Rukh's public displays of reverence for an Islamic past to a conscious effort on his part to reject the Chingizid heritage and promote a "return to Islam" policy. The symbolic aspects of this took the form of publicly embracing and lavishly patronizing historically unambiguous figures like 'Abd Allah Ansari and 'Ali b. Abi Talib. Subtelny views this policy as crucial to a transition from a nomadic empire to a sedentary state.

42. A typical example was that of the Afghan president Burhan al-Din Rabbani's visit and votive offering to the shrine on 16 October 1992. Returning home from a state visit to Uzbekistan, he stopped at Mazar-i Sharif to confer with his then-ally General 'Abd al-Rashid Dustum. He performed ziyarat at the 'Alid shrine and is reported to have made an offering of 10 million Afghanis to the shrine and one million to its administrators. *Kabul Times*, vol. 30, no. 50, p. 4.

43. Hafiz Nur Muhammad, *Tarikh-i Mazar-i Sharif* (Kabul: Matba'ah-i 'Umumi, 1325/1946), p. 94; R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, p. 68.

44. For details, see R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 88–90 for Wali Muhammad's projects; p. 103, for Nazr Muhammad's landscaping

work; and pp. 119–26 for the endowments made by seventeenth-century Uzbek amirs.

45. Hafiz Nur Muhammad, *Tarikh-i Mazar-i Sharif*, pp. 98–99 for photos of the mausolea.

46. R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 270–71.

47. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar* (London: I.O.L.), fol. 319a.

48. For a description of the ceremony, see Nancy Hatch Dupree, *The Road to Balkh* (Kabul: Afghan Tourist Organization, 1967), p. 54; for a photograph of the ceremony taken half a century ago, see Hafiz Nur Muhammad, *Tarikh-i Mazar-i Sharif*, p. 93.

49. Hafiz Nur Muhammad, *Tarikh-i Mazar-i Sharif*, p. 139.

50. Khwandamir, *Habib al-siyar*, vol. 3, p. 521 gives the date as "during that time," this being the winter of 1403–4. On his death and burial in the Gur-i Amir, see V. V. Bartol'd, "O pogrebenii Timura," *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp. 448–50 (originally published in 1915).

51. For a review of the functions of some more or less contemporary offices with these same titles, see R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 41–44. More recently, Devin Deweese has made a detailed study of the office of naqib and its military-religious functions in Central Asia for this time period. (See Devin Deweese, "The Descendants of Sayyid Ata and the Rank of *Naqib* in Central Asia," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 115, no. 4, New York: American Oriental Society, 1996, pp. 612–34.)

52. I am grateful to Prof. Maria Subtelny for drawing my attention to these appointments and providing me with copies of the two sources cited in the next two notes.

53. Abu al-Qasim Shihab al-Din Ahmad Khwafi Munshi, *Mansha' al-insha' athar-i qalam-i Nizam al-Din 'Abd al-Wasi' Nizami*, ed. Rukn al-Din Humayunfarrukh (Tehran: Danishgah-i Milli Iran, 1357/1978), pp. 278–79.

54. Recueil des documents diplomatiques, des lettres et des précis littéraires (Paris: Bibliotheque Nationale), MS 2336 (= Suppl. Persan 1815), fols. 96b–97a.

55. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar* (London: I.O.L.), fol. 304b.

56. Sultan Mawdud-i Chishti (d. 1133) was the fourth leader of the eponymous Sufi order that was centered at Chisht about 160 kilometers east of Herat, until moving to India in the early 1200s. (See Lawrence Potter, *The Kart Dynasty*, pp. 91–96.)

57. For the full text, see R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, p. 141.

58. From an administrative standpoint, the endowment included not only properties donated as waqf but any valuables and real estate given as a gift or purchased by the shrine administration from its income. When the Tsarist government classified waqf endowments in Tashkent in the 1880s, it recognized four categories of property transfer as comprising legitimate

waqf endowment: (1) gifts of property by the khans, (2) gifts to mosques of land, (3) donations by private individuals during his or her lifetime (here we have what is usually considered a proper waqf endowment), and (4) property purchased by the the administrations of the endowed schools or mosques. "Vakufy v Turkestane," *Turkestanskie Vedomosti*, vol. 10, no. 32, Tashkent, 1884.

59. Jonathan Lee has written a detailed history of the region during this period, *The (Ancient Supremacy): Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh—1731–1901* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996).

60. On the gradual militarization and politicization of the shrine, see R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 241–45.

61. Ibid., pp. 307–13.

62. I received this information in an oral communication from Dr. Rawan Farhadi, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations. In the spring of 1993, at a time when he was still in exile in Peshawar, the head of the family traveled to Mazar-i Sharif at Nawruz in order to bless the crowds of pilgrims and then returned to Peshawar.

63. See, for example, the recent publication by B. Kazakov (comp.), *Khodja Baha ud-Din Nakshband* (Bukhara: Bukhoro Ilmii Markazi, 1993), in celebration of the 675th anniversary of Baha' al-Din Naqshband's birth.

64. G. A. Pugachenkova, *Sredniaia Aziia*, pp. 367–68.

65. Khwajah Baha' al-Din Hasan Nithari Bukhari, *Mudhakkir al-ahbab*, ed. (with critical notes and introduction) Syed Muhammad Fazlullah (New Delhi: 1969), p. 79; Mir Muhammad Sharif Raqim, *Tarikh-i Raqimi* (London: Royal Asiatic Society), MS 163, fols. 131b–132a.

66. See Lisa Golombek, *The Timurid Shrine*, pp. 110–12. On the architecture of the hazirah, see also Elizaveta Gavrilovna Nekrasova, *Pozdnesrednevekovye memorial'no-kul'tovye kompleksy Bukhary i Bukharskoi oblasti po arkheologicheskim dannym* (Tashkent: Institut Istorii, Kandidatskaia dissertatsiia, 1994), who offers a typology of hazirahs in the Bukharan region. I have only had access to the twenty-six page summary (*avtoreferat*) of this dissertation.

67. Nekrasova's full dissertation should clarify this. On p. 14 of the summary she mentions the hazirah of Baha' al-Din and to its west the Shibanid and Tuqay-Timurid (Ashtarkhanid) sepulchers (*dakhmah* or *suffah*).

68. Mirza Bahadur Khwajah b. Husayn Khwajah Pir Masti, *Munsha'at-i Mirza Bahadur Khwajah* (Tashkent: IVAN Uzbekistan), MS T2667, fols. 19a–b.

69. Nekrasova's avtoreferat does not refer to the takht in the summary, but it may be in the dissertation.

70. Henry Lansdell, *Through Central Asia*, p. 389.

71. For a study of this necropolis in detail, see Roya Marefat, *Beyond the Architecture of Death: The Shrine of the Shah-i Zindah in Samarkand* (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991).

72. For Baha'al-Din Naqshband's tomb see Hafiz-i Tanish, *Sharaf-namah*, fols. 235a and 239a. For other shrines at Balkh, Tashkent, and Karminah, see fols. 198b, 257b, 258a, 269b. During the winter of 1579–80, the khan paid a rather unusual number of visits (*ziyarat*) to shrines where he circumambulated (*tawaf*) the tombs and distributed money and gifts to the residents. Between the beginning of December and the middle of February, he paid his respects in Bukhara at the shrine of Baha' al-Din (fols. 270a–b) at Qasr-i 'Arifan and Imam Abu Bakr Sa'd at Char Bakr (fols. 272b); he then made a second visit to Baha' al-Din's tomb (ibid.), a visit to the shrine of Sayyid Amir Kulal at Khwajah Wargir (identical with today's Khwajah Mubarak?) between Bukhara and Nasaf (Qarshi) (ibid.); then one to the shrine of Khwajah 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar just south of Samarqand (fols. 275a), a visit to the shrine of Qutham b. 'Abbas (Shah-i Zindah) in Samarqand itself (fols. 276a), one to the shrine of the Makhdum-i A'zam, Khwajagi Ahmad Kasani, at Dahpid north of Samarqand (fols. 280a), and the tomb of Hazrat-i 'Azizan Mulla Khudaydad (ibid.) at "Ghudayrah." (I am uncertain about the location of this last shrine, but it was within three days ride of Dahpid.)

73. Khunji, *Mihman-namah*, pp. 43–54.

74. Hafiz-i Tanish, *Sharaf-namah* (London: I. O. L.), ff. 387b–391a for a description of the funeral and other related ceremonies.

75. Devin Deweese, "The Eclipse of the Kubraviyah," pp. 45–83, has shown that, until the sixteenth century, the Kubrawiyyah were the dominant Sufi affiliation in Bukhara. In part because of Shibanid patronage, the devotees of the Naqshbandi tradition gradually displaced them.

76. See Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar* (London), fols. 72a (for Jani Muhammad), 76a (for Baqi Muhammad), and 99b (for Wali Muhammad.) Both Jani Muhammad and Baqi Muhammad died at Samarqand, but their bodies were returned to Bukhara for burial at the Naqshbandi shrine.

77. The endowment deed has been published with a Russian translation by O. D. Chekhovich and A. B. Vil'danova,"Vakf Subkhan-kulikhana."

78. According to a work written in 1722, two more khans, Subhan Quli (d. 1702) and his son, 'Ubayd Allah, were buried at the shrine. (*Tarikh-i Shibani Khan wa mu'amalat ba awlad-i Amir Timur* [Tashkent: IVAN], MS 4468/II, fols. 119a, 120a.) Around 1718, Abu al-Fayz Khan, successor to 'Ubayd Allah, retreated to the shrine for a month or so while his amirid supporters tried to cope with an invasion of Qipchaq nomads who were camping in large numbers near Bukhara in search of pasturage (fol. 122b). About one hundred years later, Hafiz Muhammad Fadil (Fazil) Khan, a

Pushtun member of an East India Company reconnaissance group sent to Bukhara in 1808, wrote a lengthy report of the mission in which he noted that it was the practice of the amir of Bukhara, Amir Haydar (r. 1801–26), to walk to the Naqshbandi shrine on Wednesday mornings, pray there, and then return to the city on horseback. Muhammad Fadil Khan, *Tarikh-i manazil-i Bukhara*, ed. Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui (Srinagar: Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir, 1981), p. 38.

79. Dr. Robert O. Freedman, "Notes on Islam in Uzbekistan," p. 1.

80. I am grateful to Jo-Ann Gross for the information about Abdullaev's appointment.

81. These were the Juybari shaykh, Khwajah Sa'd (a.k.a. Khwajah Kalan), a member of the family responsible for the Char Bakr shrine, and Khwajah Khurd-i 'Azizan, affiliated with the shrine of Qasim-i 'Azizan at Karminah Hafiz-i Tanish, *Sharaf-namah* (London, I. O. L.), fol. 387b.

82. Arminius Vámbéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, p. 233.

83. U. S. Army Map Service, Corps of Engineers, Series 1301, Sheet NJ 42 ("Stalinabad"), Edition 4-AMS. (Scale 1:1,000,000.)

84. See J. M. Rogers, "Ahrar," *Encyclopaedia Iranica,* vol. 1, pp. 667–70, for a recent summary of the sources available on Ahrar and a discussion of the problems of interpretation. O. D. Chekhovich published a series of eighteen documents pertaining to Ahrar's property and its disposition after his death, in *Samarkandskie dokumenty XV–XVI vv. (o vladeniiakh Khodzhi Akhrara v Srednei Azii i Afganistana* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974). Jo-Ann Gross, *Khoja Ahrar: A Study of the Perceptions of Religious Power and Prestige in the Late Timurid Period* (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1982), has done a detailed study of the socio-political importance of Ahrar.

85. Babur, *The Babur-nama in English*, p. 132.

86. Ibid., p. 621.

87. Ibid., pp. 652–53.

88. According to the survey of all endowments in Turkistan undertaken by the Tsarist government in 1886, the endowment for the Nadr *diwan begi* Arlat madrasah alone amounted to 1,500 *tanab*s of land (about 750 acres), which produced an annual income of 5,000 Khokand tangahs. I am grateful to Aman Musaevich Tashmukhammedov for giving me this information, which was based on his own research in the Uzbek State Archives.

89. Muhammad Badi' Samarqandi, *Muzakkir al-ashab* (Tashkent: IVAN) MS 4270, fols. 288b–291a. Although writing late in the seventeenth century, the author was a native of Samarqand and a keen observer of the city. He provides information for earlier periods unavailable elsewhere.

90. I visited the shrine in 1977 and found it considerably different from Muhammad Badi''s description. His account appears to place the tomb of Ahrar under a dome. I was told that the grave of Ahrar was on a large open

takht (pl. 19). None of the buildings depicted as being in place along the avenue leading out to the shrine—Baqi Muhammad's festival mosque, the mosque built by Muhammad Yusuf, and the *rastbazar* —could be identified. But the enduring appeal of the shrine as a burial place was evident. One of the first tombs I noticed was that of the late nineteenth-century governor of Afghan Turkistan, Sardar Muhammad Ishaq Khan. Between 1888–89, he led an unsuccessful attempt to separate Afghan Turkistan from the control of the amir at Kabul, fled into exile in Russian Turkistan, died in Samarqand, and was buried at the shrine. In the mid-1980s, the public television program "Frontline" produced a series on various individuals in Soviet society called "Comrades." One of the programs was entitled "Master of Samarkand" and profiled an artisan who was restoring the madrasah at the shrine. The script never identifies the restoration project that the artisan was working on in the film, but at one point a banner in Russian and Uzbek with the words "Madrasah of Nadr Divan Begi" can be seen briefly in the background. Throughout, the narrator refers to the building as a mosque, and no mention is made either of Khwajah Ahrar or Nadr Bi *diwanbegi* Arlat. The fact that local party authorities had chosen this particular site for restoration is evidence of the continuing hold that the site has on the religious sentiments of the people of Samarqand.

91. O. D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty*, documents nos. 5, 10–12.

92. Babur, *The Babur-nama in English*, p. 128.

93. O. D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty*, document no. 13. Babur, too, provides information about Ahrari family members to show their continuing importance in Samarqand. His text has been read differently by Khankhanan, the early Persian translator of the original Chaghatay text, by Annette Beveridge, and, most recently, by Wheeler Thackston. I am following Khankhanan's Persian translation as published by Thackston (Babur, *Baburnama*, Turkish text trans. Abdul Rahim, Turkish Transcription; Persian ed. and English trans. W. M. Thackston, vol. 3 [Cambridge, Mass.: Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University, 1994], p. 746). On 18 or 19 December 1528, Babur presided at a banquet in Agra attended by Iranian and Central Asian envoys and a number of other worthies. The guests included: "the offspring of [Khwajah Ahrar]- Khwajah 'Abd al-Shahid, the son of 'Abd Allah [Khwajagan Khwajah, Khwajah Ahrar's fifth son]; Khwajah Kalan [a son of the slain Muhammad Yahya]; Khwajah Husayni and another *khalifah*." A phrase follows, which Beveridge reads in the original Chaghatay text as "together with the *hafizes* and mullas dependent on the Khwajas who had come from Samarqand" (p. 631). Khankhanan's Persian translation of this passage is not entirely clear to me, and I am not sure that Khankhanan read

the Chaghatay available to him in the same way as Beveridge. It is clear from the Beveridge translation, generally followed here by Thackston, that, despite any reported hostility of Shibani Khan (who had died 18 years earlier) to the Ahrari family, it had by now fully recovered and was thriving in Samarqand.

94. O. D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty*, document no. 16.

95. Ibid., document no. 17. In her introduction (p. 46), Chekhovich suggests that this document, like the earlier waqf-deeds of Khwajah Ahrar, was more in the nature of a summary list of all the properties from other sales and waqf documents and not a true deed of endowment, only one of which (from 1470) is known to have survived. Her argument that these other documents are summaries rather than original endowment deeds is based on the fact that the lone original *waqfiyyah* (document no. 5) names two villages that are listed again in the much longer property list contained in document no. 10. Chekhovich concludes that document no. 10 is a compilation and includes no. 5. From other examples—e.g., copies for field agents, copies to take to a royal court, or simply the need to preserve deteriorating documents—we know that periodically the trustees of endowments compiled a summary of the individual trusts under their control in one document. For other examples, see the 1668 *manshur*, a khanly confirmation of endowment rights based on what must have been such a summary provided by the then chief trustee of the 'Alid shrine at Balkh (in R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, pp. 119–97). See also the *runawisht* (summary) of the Safavid Shah 'Abbas's Isfahan waqfs compiled by Shaykh Baha' al-Din al-'Amili in 1614 (idem, "Waqf and Public Policy: The Waqfs of Shah 'Abbas, 1011–1023/1602–1614," *Asian and African Studies*, vol. 15, no. 2 [Haifa: The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Haifa, July 1981], pp. 178ff.).

96. Hafiz-i Tanish , *Sharaf-namah* (London: I. O. L.), fol. 275b.

97. O. D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty*, p. 46.

98. There are problems that cannot be resolved here regarding the order of succession and who actually succeeded to the chief trusteeship of the endowment. It is possible, though unlikely, that Muhammad Hashim (a. k. a. Khwajah Hashimi) was the immediate successor to Muhammad Yahya. There also may have been two or more men with the same name in later generations. One of the Hashims, perhaps the one whose seal appears here and who is frequently mentioned in the events of the turn of the seventeenth century, died in 1606. (A contract in which his daughter, Ay Begum, sold off some of his estate, has been preserved. See O. D. Chekhovich, *Dokumenty k istorii agrarnykh otnoshenii*, pp. 3–5.) A second Muhammad Hashim is mentioned in conjunction with Nadr *diwanbegi* Arlat's building projects at the shrine in the 1620s. If Muhammad Yahya did pass from the

scene by 1546 (after at least thirty years in the post) and Muhammad Hashim had taken his place, he would have probably been well advanced in years if he indeed died in 1606. Perhaps it is more reasonable to date the beginning of his tenure as trustee more contemporary with his appointment as shaykh al-islam in 1580.

99. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-Asrar* (London: I. O. L.), fol. 73b.

100. The name does not necessarily link the man to the Ahrari tradition for it only means "the khwajah from Amkanah." But his descendants are specifically described as Ahraris.

101. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar* (London: I. O. L.), fol. 146b.

102. Ibid. Mahmud b. Amir Wali's own view of this line of the family is hard to decode. Of Abu al-Qasim, he writes, "he paraded in the garb of a possessor of great wealth, which was a means of veiling the face of the secrets." If we take this at its face value, Mahmud b. Amir Wali is telling us that Abu al-Qasim was not himself by nature or inclination a person of ostentation but that he lived ostentatiously better to hide his true nature. Now one would like, in the late twentieth century, to read this as irony. Mahmud b. Amir Wali had impeccable credentials as an ascetic himself, having spent many years traveling from shaykh to shaykh in India and living the life of a qalandar dervish before returning to take up a scribal post at Balkh. Is he rejecting as hypocritical the sumptuous lifestyle of individuals who passed themselves off as embodiments of a long spiritual tradition that outwardly, at least, rejected worldly materialism? Or did he really see their outward displays as ways of protecting their inner reality? Or is it all simply a literary affectation? The fact that he is publicizing that which he depicts as secret tends to suggest their behavior, if its intent is as he says, is not very effective and leads one to see this as a critique of the way in which people like the Ahraris actually lived. We see the theme repeated in other contexts where Mahmud b. Amir Wali has individuals known for their asceticism repeatedly challenging wealthy holy men to justify themselves. But we do not know the whole cultural context, and the language is certainly ambiguous.

103. Ibid., fol. 88b.

104. Muhammad Badi' Samarqandi, *Muzakkir al-ashab*, fol. 290a. I have not been able to find a reference to Muhammad Ya'qub's father and therefore am unable to locate Muhammad Yusuf's line within the Ahrari family.

105. Muhammad Yusuf was famous for holding a special literary salon on New Year's Day (Nawruz) with the largest prizes of any patron in Samarqand. (See R. D. McChesney, "The Anthology of Poets *Muzakkir al-ashab* as a Source for the History of Seventeenth-Century Central Asia," in *Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays Written in Honor of Martin B. Dickson,*

Professor of Persian Studies, Princeton University, ed. Michel M. Mazzaoui and Vera B. Moreen, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990, p. 76.)

106. Muhammad Badi', *Muzakkir al-ashab*, fols. 288b–289a.

107. Muhammad Badi' gives no chronology for the story. Subhan Quli was khan in Bukhara from 1681–1702. Muhammad Badi' himself was writing this part of his book in 1100/1688–89. This would seem to put the events of the story in the middle to late 1680s. However, there are one or two problems typical of the kind of issues raised by unpublished materials, such as Muhammad Badi''s. For instance, the section on the shrine and the dispute over its management appears in the appendices (*mulhaqat*) to the book. To my knowledge, the appendices are only found in the Tashkent IVAN MS 4270. At least one source believes this manuscript to be the author's autograph. (B. A. Akhmedov, *Istoriko-geograficheskaia literatura Srednei Azii XVI—XVIII vv.: Pis'mennye pamiatniki*, Tashkent: Fan, p. 174, note 58.) It is curious that these appendices appear in no other copies if MS 4270 is indeed the autograph. In all probability Muhammad Badi' was the author of the mulhaqat. The style and his reference in the appendices to his home, which was in the neighborhood of the Gur-i Amir in Samarqand, point to this. But there is a problem regarding the Ahrari personalities named in the story. Elsewhere in his work, Muhammad Badi' tells us of Muhammad Yusuf's literary salons and gives no indication that he is deceased. Yet the story seems to suggest that both he and his son, Khwajah Mahmud, had passed from the scene (perhaps in the interval between the composition of the main text of *Muzakkir* in 1689 and the latest dated entry in the mulhaqat in 1693), creating the circumstances in which Baha' al-Din 'Umar could step forward and claim the shrine administration from Khwajah Khudawand who, I presume, was Khwajah Mahmud's son. This episode requires further investigation.

108. There is a considerable amount of material from the Tsarist period that needs to be researched, which should throw more light on the Ahraris in later periods.

109. O. D. Chekhovich, *Samarkandskie dokumenty*, document no. 18.

110. "Vakufy v Turkestane." The place in which this article appears, *Turkestanskie Vedomosti*, is an important source of information generally on Islamic endowments under the government of Russian Turkestan.

111. O. A. Sukhareva, "Potomki Khodzha Akhrara," in *Dukhovenstvo i politicheskaia zhizn na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke v period feodalizma (Bartol'dskoe chtenie, 1982)*, ed. G. F. Kim, G. F. Girs, and E. A. Davidovich (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), p. 161. According to her informants, there were more than 440 descendants of Khwajah Ahrar of both genders and all ages in the 1930s.

112. [F. B. Rostopchin], *Iz arkhiva*, document no. 101.

113. According to the mid-fifteenth century Ahmad b. Mahmud "Mu'in al-Fuqara," *Kitab-i Mullazadah dar Dhikr-i Mazarat-i Bukhara*, edited by Ahmad Gulchin-i Ma'ani (Tehran: Kitabkhanah-i Ibn-i Sina, 1339/1960), p. 28, the tomb of Abu Bakr Ahmad was only one of many tombs on the southwest (qiblah) side of Bukhara that he considered worth mentioning in his list of Bukharan tombs. He says nothing about caretakers, but then he says nothing about caretaker families at any of the tombs.

114. Wa'iz-i Kashifi's *Rashahat -i 'ayn al-hayat* (see C. A. Storey, *Persian Literature*, vol. 1, part 2, pp. 962–66), written a decade after Ahrar's death is a biography of 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar alone and not an attempt to validate a dynastic lineage as is, for example, Muhammad Talib b. Khwajah Taj al-Din Juybari, *Matlab al-talibin* (Tashkent: IVAN), MS 3757.

115. These documents are reproduced in [F. B. Rostopchin] *Iz arkhiva*.

116. To date two trust deeds, one issued by a third-generation member of the family and one by his nephew, have been described and their contents used as part of a larger study on Bukhara undertaken by G. A. Dzhuraeva in her dissertation. At this time, I have access only to the lengthy abstract (*avtoreferat*) published simultaneously with the dissertation. (Galiba Abdulkarimovna Dzhuraeva, *Vafnye gramoty kak istochnik po sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi istorii Bukhary v XVI-XVII vv.*, Tashkent, Kandidatskaia dissertatsia, 1985.) I am grateful to the author and Dr. Jo-Ann Gross for providing me with the abstract.

117. Hafiz-i Tanish, *Sharaf-namah* (London: I. O. L.), fols. 96a–98a (corresponding to ibid.), (Moscow: Nauka), vol. 1, pp. 213–17. On fol. 96a (p. 213), the "grace" (*barakat*) of Khwajah Islam is credited with the Jani-Begid victory at Bukhara. Badr al-Din Kashmiri (*Rawzat al-rizwan* [Tashkent: IVAN], MS 2094, fol. 97b) and Muhammad Talib (*Matlab al-talibin*, fol. 55a) both reproduce a letter sent by the Jani-Begid conqueror of Bukhara, 'Abd Allah b. Iskandar, to Khwajah Islam on the occasion of the victory.

118. According to the available documents, the number and value of real estate transactions rises significantly after 1557. However, we do not know today whether the documents published in 1938 are a representative sample of the full range of Juybari dealings or whether they were compiled into the manuscript for reasons similar to the compilations of waqf documents mentioned earlier, that is, to serve some immediate but now obscure purpose.

119. On the Jani-Begid building at Char Bakr, see R. D. McChesney, "Economic and Social Aspects," pp. 218–21.

120. O. A. Sukhareva, *Bukhara XIX–nachalo XX v.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), p. 291.

121. For a translation of the letter, see R. D. McChesney, "Economic and Social Aspects," p. 231.

122. Kashmiri culled the family archives for examples of correspondence that confirmed their considerable influence in the political sphere, and he included many examples in the *Rawzat al-rizwan*, e.g., fols. 92a–128a and 307b–368a.

123. See, for example, Mahmud b. Amir Wali (*Bahr al-asrar*, fol. 304a) and Muhammad Talib (*Matlab al-talibin*, fol. 152b).

124. See Muhammad Talib, *Matlab al-talibin*, fols. 153a–159b, for an account of the khans who reportedly deferred to Taj al-Din. Whatever the truth of the matter, a good deal of political savvy must have been needed to develop fruitful relations with (in Taj al-Din's case) eight successive reigning khans (from 'Abd Allah in 1589 to 'Abd al-'Aziz in 1645).

125. Muhammad Talib, *Matlab al-talibin*, fols. 279a–b.

126. I am grateful to Aman M. Tashmukammedov for this information.

127. James B. Fraser, *Narrative of a Journey into Khorasan in the Years 1821 and 1822* (London, 1825; reprint, Delhi, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), Appendix B, p. 83.

128. 'Abdi Khwajah gets a brief mention in Abu al-Fazl al-'Allami, *The Akbar Nama of Abu-l-Fazl*, translated from the Persian by H. Beveridge (New Delhi: Ess Ess Publications, Fourth Indian Reprint, 1987), vol. 3, pp. 1246–47. 'Abd al-Rahim was reportedly a favorite of Jahangir and resided at his court until the latter's death in 1627. (Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar* [London: I. O. L.], fol. 144a.)

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid. Qazi Mirza Beg is known to us as the builder of a mosque in Bukhara as well as the donor of a waqf endowment for it. (See O. D. Chekhovich, "Bukharskie pozemel'nye akty," p. 227.)

Chapter Four. Law, Leadership, and Legitimacy

1. Cited in Rob Hager, "State, Tribe and Empire: Afghan Inter-Polity Relations" in *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, ed. Richard Tapper (London and Canberra: Croom Helm and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 86.

2. O. D. Chekhovich, "Cherty ekonomicheskoi zhizny Maverranakhra v sochineniiakh po 'fikhu' i 'shurutu'," *in Blizhny i Srednyi Vostok: Tovarno-denezhnye otnosheniia pri feodalizme*, ed. G. F. Girs and E. A. Davidovich (Bartol'dskie chteniia 1978) (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), pp. 221–23 gives examples of such phrasing in twelfth-century works of jurisprudence that reveal contemporary changes in legal practice. Babur, *The Babur-nama in English*, pp. 298–99, indicates, by implication, how the Chingizid code (*turah*) was undergoing change. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar*, fols. 210a–211a, discourses on law and its evolution in a way that echoes Babur.

3. Egypt during the Mamluk period (thirteenth to fifteenth centuries) is one exception. There the normative influence of Chingizid law is evident in indigenous narrative sources. (See David Ayalon's masterful treatment, "The Great Yasa of Chingiz Khan: a re-examination," *Studia Islamica*, vols. 33 [pp. 97–140], 34 [pp. 151–80], 36 [pp. 113–58], 38 [pp. 107–56]. Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve-Larose, 1971–1973.)

4. The Dari-Persian-Tajik phrase *bi-yasa rasanidan/rasidan* ("to deal with someone, or to be dealt with, according to the yasa") was a euphemism for capital punishment and was a stock political phrase of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Afghanistan. (See especially Fayz Muhammad Katib, *Siraj al-tawarikh*, passim.)

5. V. V. Barthold, "Mongolskoe zavoevanie i ego vliyanie na persidskuyu kul'turu," chapter five of *Kul'tura Musul'manstva*, reprinted in *Sochineniia*, vol. 6, pp. 189–98.

6. Bernard Lewis, "The Mongols, the Turks and the Muslim Polity" in *Islam in History: ideas, men and events in the Middle East* (London: Alcove Press, 1973), pp. 179–98.

7. George Vernadsky, vol. 3, *A History of Russia, The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), pp. 99–110.

8. Yuri Bregel, *The Role of Central Asia in the History of the Muslim East*, Occasional Paper no. 20 (New York: Afghanistan Council of the Asia Society, 1980).

9. D. O. Morgan, "The 'Great Yasa' of Chingiz Khan and Mongol law in the Ilkhanate," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 49 (London: Luzac and Company Ltd., 1986), pp. 163–76. And see most recently Igor de Rachewiltz's response, "Some Reflections on Çinggis Qan's *Jasaγ*," *East Asian History*, no. 6 (Canberra: The Australian National University, December 1993), pp. 91–104.

10. Yuri Bregel, *The Role of Central Asia*, p. 8.

11. For example, as late as the reign of Ulugh Beg (d. 1449), royal decrees (yarlighs) were still being issued in the name of the nominal sovereign, the Chingizid, Satuq Khan, although the coinage bore the Timurid sovereign's name. (See V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies*, vol. 2, p. 85.)

12. Eventually, they re-established their political fortunes in Northern India under the leadership of Zahir al-Din Babur, the son of 'Umar Shaykh, inflicting on the ruling group there what had been inflicted on them in Central Asia. In India, these descendants of Tamerlane came to be known as the "Mongols" (*Mughal* or *Moghul*) or in agnatic terminology as the "Gurganis." (*Goregan* meant son-in-law and referred to Timur's affiliation, by virtue of his marriage to a Chingizid princess, with the line of Chingiz Khan.) The Timurids of India were also known by another Chingizid name, "Chaghatayid," the Chingiz lineage into which Timur had married.

All these names evoke a Chingizid heritage in one way or another. Though successful in maintaining their authority in India the Timurid/Moghuls remained psychologically attached to Central Asia. In particular, the dynasty remained committed to regaining its ancestral lands—the site of the tombs of its ancestors and the source of its political legitimacy—and made it a central if ultimately futile focus of its foreign policy.

13. Traditionally there were either 32 or 92 such tribes. Generically they were described by a number of different terms—*ta'ifah, ayl, batn, ulus, uymaq,* etc. T. I. Sultanov has published and correlated the surviving tribal lists in *Kochevye plemena Priaral'ia v XV–XVII vv. (Voprosy etnicheskoi i sotsial'noi istorii)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), pp. 40–44.

14. Richard Tapper, ed.,"Introduction" to *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, provides a thorough and highly useful review of the concepts of "tribe" and "tribalism" as developed in recent scholarship. I use the term "tribe" here despite the difficulty of finding any information about the actual structure and patterns of succession within these nominally distinctive Uzbek groups.

15. Babur,*The Babur-nama in English*, p. 155.

16. See R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, p. 163, note 41.

17. On mid-seventeenth century court protocol, see V. V. Barthold, "Tserimonial pri dvore uzbetskikh khanov v xvii veke," *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, pt. 2, Moscow: Nauka, 1964, pp. 388–99 and R. D. McChesney, "The Amirs of Muslim Central Asia in the XVIIth Century," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* vol. 26 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), pp. 39–41.

18. On the qumiss (*qumiz*) ceremony, see Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar*, fol. 388b; on wearing the quiver as a sign of repentance before the khan, see Muhammad Amin b. Muhammad Zaman, *Muhit al-tawarikh* (Paris: Bibliotheque Nationale), MS 472, fol. 148a. All these ceremonies have analogues in the *Secret History of the Mongols.*

19. Maria Subtelny, "The Cult of 'Abdallah Ansari under the Timurids," p. 380.

20. Mirza Muhammad Haydar Dughlat, *A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia being the Tarikh-i-Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat*, ed. N. Elias and trans. E. Denison Ross (1895; reprint, London: Curzon Press and New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972), pp. 69–70.

21. Mahmud b. Amir Wali, *Bahr al-asrar* (London: I. O. L.), fols. 210a–211a.

22. Issues such as seniority within the clan, the office of heir-apparent, the use of felt carpets for ceremonial purposes and for the khan's enthronement, the use of qumiss, and the significance of quivers and how they are worn at court are a few of the things ascribed to "Chingizid yasa" by such

sources as Khunji (early sixteenth century), Dughlat (mid-sixteenth century), Hafiz-i Tanish (late sixteenth century), Mahmud b. Amir Wali (mid-seventeenth century), Muhammad Amin Bukhari (late seventeenth century), and Muhammad Yusuf Munshi (early eighteenth century), among others.

23. Babur, *The Babur-nama in English*, pp. 298–99.

24. Ibid., pp. 154–55.

25. Hafiz-i Tanish, *Sharaf-namah* (London: I. O. L.), fol. 371a.

26. 'Ala al-Din 'Ata-malik Juvaini, *The History of the World Conqueror*, trans. from the text of Mirza Muhammad Qazvini by John Andrew Boyle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 104.

27. Of twelve sixteenth-century Abu'l-Khayrid/Shibanid khans, three died violent deaths, of whom one (Muhammad Shibani) was killed in battle with the Safavids. The other two died at the very end of the century when a major contest to determine the royal clan was waged. They were the Jani-Begids: Abd al-Mu'min, the son of 'Abd Allah; and Pir Muhammad, the son of Sulayman. Of seven seventeenth-century khans, three—Imam Quli, Nazr Muhammad, and 'Abd al-'Aziz—abdicated voluntarily (although there was much opposition to Nazr Muhammad by the time of his abdication) to make the hajj-pilgrimage; three died natural deaths in office; and one was killed in battle (Wali Muhammad), again in the course of a major struggle over which clan should emerge as the royal clan.

28. Khunji, cited by R. D. McChesney, *Waqf in Central Asia*, p. 54.

29. Nur Muhammad Nuri, *Gulshan al-imarah* (Kabul: Anjuman-i Tarikhi Afghanistan, 1335/1956), pp. 46–47.

30. Robert L. Canfield, "Islamic Coalitions in Bamyan," p. 223.

31. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the Tuqay-Timurid khans, while still observing many of the Chingizid rituals, emphasized their affiliation with, and loyalty to, Islam and the Shari'a, especially through the prominent display of their status as sayyids, i.e., descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. They had acquired this status through marriage to a woman from a family of shrine guardians at Mashhad. Their own documents and narratives stress the Islamic affiliation over the Chingizid, although the titulature of "khan" and "bahadur khan" (hero khan) is never altered. There are also some signs that Subhan Quli Khan (r. 1681–1702) may have tried to revise his genealogy by tracing it back to Shiban (son of Jochi) rather than Tuqay-Timur. See the preamble to the *manshur* he issued concerning the endowments of the 'Alid shrine at Balkh (in Hafiz Nur Muhammad, *Tarikh-i Mazar-i Sharif*, p. 63) where he identifies himself as Subhan Quli Khan "son of Nadr (i.e., Nazr) Muhammad Khan, son of Din Muhammad Khan, son of Jani Muhammad Khan, son of Yar Muhammad Khan, son of Baghishla [Mangqishlaq] Muhammad Khan, son of Iskandar Khan, son of

'Ubayd Allah Khan, son of Shibani Muhammad Khan." Up to Mangqishlaq, the genealogy can be independently verified, but from that point on it throws together a group of sixteenth-century Shibanids (Iskandar, son of Jani Beg; 'Ubayd Allah, son of Mahmud and nephew of Shibani) in a haphazard and careless way. It is not at all clear why the khan would have allowed such a genealogical potpourri to be inscribed in such a permanent record.

32. Fayz Muhammad, *Siraj al-tawarikh*, p. 127. The biographer of Dust Muhammad tells approximately the same story, though his has a slightly different cast. See Mohan Lal, *Life of the Amir Dost Muhammad Khan of Kabul with his Political Proceedings Towards the English, Russian and Persian Governments, including the Victory and Disasters of the British Army in Afghanistan* (1846; reprint with a new introduction by Nancy Hatch Dupree, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 168–70.

33. Hasan Kawun Kakar, *Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1979), pp. 176–78.

34. On his reign and reforms, see especially Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King Amanullah's Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).

35. Fayz Muhammad, the author of *Siraj al-tawarikh*, also compiled a narrative of the period leading up to and immediately following Aman Allah Khan's fall. The work, *Kitab-i tazakkur-i inqilab*, is known only in Russian translation (*Kniga upominaniya myatezha*, ed. G. F. Girs, Moscow: Nauka, 1988.)

36. The Tajik bandit, Habib Allah, who held Kabul from mid-January to October 1929, also took the title amir.

GLOSSARY

Abū'l-Khayrid/Shībānids: The group of neo-Chingizid clans that conquered Central Asia at the beginning of the sixteenth century.

Aga Khan: Head (Imām) of the Ismā'īlī branch of Shī'ī Islam.

'ālim (pl. 'ulamā'): A scholar in Qur'ānic disciplines: e.g., theology, law (fiqh) ḥadīth, Arabic grammar.

amānat: A system of investment similar to a sleeping partnership.

amīr: A member of a Uzbek tribe, usually connoting a military leader; in an Afghan context, the sovereign, implying leader of the Muslim community.

Amīr al-Mu'minīn: Commander of the Faithful.

astānah: Shrine, threshold.

atābeg: A court/military title, often for the guardian of a prince.

b.: Abbr. for "ibn," meaning "son of."

bāgh: Garden.

bālā jandah: flag raising.

bt.: Abbr. for "bint," meaning "daughter of."

chahār bāgh: A Persian garden, based on a plan of four equal sections.

dār al-bazm: "House of feasts," opium den.

dār al-qażā: A Muslim court of law. Same as maḥkamah.

dargāh: doorway or threshold; metaphor for royal court or shrine.

dīwānbegī: A military and royal court official.

farmān: Royal decree.

farsakh (farsang): A unit of distance varying from about six to ten kilometers.

farż 'ayn: Religious obligation of every believer.

farż kifāyah: Religious obligation of the community as a whole.

ghazal: A poetic form; a short poem.

ghāzī: A warrior, especially the leader of a struggle against those threatening the faith.

göregān: son-in-law, referring to the Timurid affiliation to the line of Chingiz Khan.

guberniia: Province.

gūshah gīrān: "Corner-holders," i.e., someone with a stipendiary position at a shrine.

ḥadīth: A saying of, or story about, the Prophet Muḥammad. One of the principal components of the Sharī'a.

ḥāfiẓ: A person who has memorized the Qur'ān and recites it on both public and private occasions—for funerals, holidays, or other ritual celebrations.

ḥawīlī (ḥawālī): Haveli; residential compound.

ḥaẓīrah: An unroofed tomb enclosure for individual or group burials.

'īdgāh: A large walled area with a miḥrāb for holiday worship; a holiday mosque.

iqrār: Legal acknowledgment or certification of a transaction.

īshīk-aqā-bāshī: The commander of the īshīk-aqās, usually the khan's bodyguard or personal corps.

Ismā'īlī: An adherent of a branch of Shī'ī Islam and follower of the Aga Khan.

īwān: A recessed arched entryway or niche; vaulted hall.

Jānī-Begids: The Shibanid clan that governed Balkh, Karminah, and Miyankal and later Bukhara, Samarqand, and Tashkent as well.

jarīb: Unit of surface measurement equivalent to approximately one-half acre.

jihād: An exertion or struggle. The "greater" jihad is the struggle for moral perfection. The "lesser" jihad is the struggle against attacks on the faith, sometimes translated as "holy war."

khalīfah: Successor; second-in-command; caliph.

khān: Supreme ruler.

khānaqāh: Hostel or hospice.

kharāj: The name of a tax on property.

khwājah: A title common among adherents of the Naqshbandī brotherhood of ṣūfīs.

Kūchkunjids: The Abū al-Khayrid/Shībānid clan, which governed Samarqand during the first half of the fifteenth century.

kūknārkhānah: Opium den.

lājawardī: Azure.

lalmī, lalmīyah: Unirrigated farmland.

langar: Shrine; tomb, sometimes equivalent to khānaqāh.

ma'bad: Place of worship, mosque.

madrasah: College, seminary.

madrasah-i humāyūn: Royal College.

maḥkamah: A Muslim court of law. Same as dār al-qaẓā.

majlis: Gathering, session.

māl: Moveable wealth.

mamlakah: Kingdom, state.

manshūr: Royal decree.

marqad: Resting place, shrine.

mashhad: Shrine.

mawāt: "Dead land." Unowned fallow land.

mazār: Shrine.

maẓja': Bed, shrine.

miḥrāb: The niche or other indicator in a building or elsewhere that orients the worshipper towards Mecca.

milk: Private property; private ownership, immoveable property.

milkīyat: Private ownership.

mi'mār: Municipal engineer, architect.

mudarris: Professor at a madrasah.

mujāhid (pl. **mujāhadin**): One who conducts jihād.

mustaṣnayāt: Exceptions. Kinds of properties that cannot be owned; e.g., rights of way, areas around water sources, mosques, cemeteries.

mutawallī: Chief trustee of an endowment.

namāz-i janāzah: Funeral service.

namāzgāh: A large open area with miḥrāb for holiday prayers.

naqīb: An officer of a shrine.

nāshpatī: A kind of pear.

naẓargāh: A place of witness, shrine.

nāẓir: Shrine endowment officer.

nuẓūrāt: Votive offerings.

pādshāh: King.

pīr: Spiritual leader.

qabālah (qawālah-nāmah): Deed of sale.

qabr: Tomb, shrine.

qadamgāh: Shrine.

qāżī: Muslim judge.

qiblah: Direction of Mecca (for prayer).

qumiss (qumīz): Fermented mare's milk.

raqam: Decree.

rāstbāzār: Street of shops.

sayyid: A lineal descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad.

Shāh-i mardān: Lord of men.

Shāh Budāqid: The Abū'l-Khayrid/Shībānid clan to which Shībānī Khan belonged and which held Bukhara for much of the first half of the sixteenth century.

shar'ī: Legal; in accord with the Sharī'a.

Sharī'a: Islamic law; literally, "the way."

shaykh: A ṣūfī leader; also a shrine officer.

shaykh al-islām: A high religious official.

Shībānids: See Abū al-Khayrid/Shībānids.

soviet: Local ruling council (Soviet period).

ṣūfī: A member of an Islamic mystical brotherhood (ṭarīqah).

ṣuffah: A platform or bench; also a term sometimes used instead of īwān.

sulṭān: General meaning of king, ruler. In the neo-Chingizid context, it meant a member of the royal clan eligible to become khān.

ṭāq: Entry, arch.

takht: Throne; funerary platform.

ṭanāb: Unit of surface area; approximately one-half acre; equivalent to jarīb.

ṭanābānah: A tax based on land area.

ṭarīqah: A ṣūfī brotherhood. Some common ṭarīqahs were: Naqshbandī, Kubrawī, Atā'ī, and Yasawī.

tawliyat: Trusteeship of a shrine or endowment.

Thawr (Sawr): The zodiacal month (Taurus) in which the 1978 Communist overthrow of the Afghan Republic occurred.

Tīmūrids: The descendants of Tīmūr b. Taraghāy who ruled Central Asia during the fifteenth century.

Tuqāy-Tīmūrids: The neo-Chingizid family (descended from Jochī b. Chingiz Khan) that ruled Bukhara and Balkh in the seventeenth century.

tūrah: Another word for Yāsā.

'ulamā': See 'ālim.

Uzbek: A member of one of the tribes affiliated with Shībanī Khān. In modern times, a citizen of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, now the independent republic of Uzbekistan.

waqf: Charitable endowment or trust.

waqfiyya: An endowment charter.

yarlīgh: Royal decree.

Yāsā: The legal code attributed to Chingiz Khan; sometimes referred to as "yāsā and yūsūn."

ziyāratgāh: Shrine.

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N.B.: These abbreviations are not alphabetized; b. = ibn ("son of"); bt. = bint ("daughter of"); Kh. = Khwājah.

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